FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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APRIL 1937

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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A REQUISITE FOR THE SUCCESS OF POPULAR DIPLOMACY

By Elihu Root

Mr. Root died February 7, 1937. To mark his long service to FOREIGN AFFAIRS, *the Editors find it suitable to reprint here the article which he wrote for the first issue in September 1922.*

THE control of foreign relations by modern democracies creates a new and pressing demand for popular education in international affairs. When the difficult art of regulating the conduct of nations toward each other, in such a way as to preserve rights and avoid offense and promote peaceful intercourse, was left to the foreign offices of the world the public in each country could judge policies by results, and, in the various ways by which public opinion expresses itself, could reward or punish the success or failure of government. To perform that particular function it was not very important that the public should be familiar with the affairs out of which success or failure came. That condition, however, is passing away. In the democratic countries generally, the great body of citizens are refusing to wait until negotiations are over or policies are acted upon or even determined. They demand to know what is going on and to have an opportunity to express their opinions at all stages of diplomatic proceedings. This tendency is due partly to a desire to escape from certain well recognized evils in diplomacy as it has been practised. It is due in part doubtless to the natural disposition of democracies to revert to the conditions which existed before the invention of representative government and thus to avoid the temporary inequalities involved in delegations of power to official representatives however selected.

The new condition has undoubtedly been accelerated by the great war and its lessons. We have learned that war is essentially a popular business. All the people in the countries concerned are enlisted in carrying it on. It cannot be carried on without their

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general participation. And whoever wins the war all the people of all the countries involved suffer grievous consequences. There is a general conviction that there has been something wrong about the conduct of diplomacy under which peoples have so often found themselves embarked in war without intending it and without wishing for it and there is a strong desire to stop that sort of thing. Democracies determined to control their own destinies object to being led, without their knowledge, into situations where they have no choice.

The demand for open diplomacy and contemporaneous public information, although in its application there is frequently an element of mere curiosity or news-gathering business, nevertheless rests upon the substantial basis of democratic instinct for unhampered self-government. It is incident to the awakening sense of opportunity which, among the unskilled majority, has followed the exercise of universal suffrage, the spread of elementary education, and the revelation of the power of organization. The change is therefore not to be considered as temporary but as a step in the direct line of development of democratic government, which, according to the nature of democracies, will not be retraced. The new conditions, and such developments as may grow from them, are the conditions under which diplomacy will be carried on hereafter. Of course, as in all practical human affairs, limitations and safeguards will be found necessary, but the substance will continue, and public opinion will be increasingly not merely the ultimate judge but an immediate and active force in negotiation.

The usefulness of this new departure is subject to one inevitable condition. That is, that the democracy which is undertaking to direct the business of diplomacy shall learn the business. The controlling democracy must acquire a knowledge of the fundamental and essential facts and principles upon which the relations of nations depend. Without such a knowledge there can be no intelligent discussion and consideration of foreign policy and diplomatic conduct. Misrepresentation will have a clear field and ignorance and error will make wild work with foreign relations. This is a point to which the sincere people who are holding meetings and issuing publications in opposition to war in general may well direct their attention if they wish to treat the cause of disease rather than the effects. Given the nature of man, war results from the spiritual condition that follows real or fancied

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injury or insult. It is a familiar observation that in most wars each side believes itself to be right and both pray with equal sincerity for the blessing of heaven upon their arms. Back of this there must lie a mistake. However much ambition, trade competition, or sinister personal motives of whatever kind, may have led towards the warlike situation, two great bodies of human beings, without whose consent war cannot be carried on, can never have come to two diametrically opposed genuine beliefs as to the justice of the quarrel without one side or the other, and probably both, being mistaken about their country's rights and their country's duties. Here is the real advantage of the change from the old diplomacy to the new. Irresponsible governments may fight without being in the least degree mistaken about their rights and duties. They may be quite willing to make cannon fodder of their own people in order to get more territory or more power; but two democracies will not fight unless they believe themselves to be right. They may have been brought to their belief by misrepresentation as to facts, by a misunderstanding of rules of right conduct, or through having the blank of ignorance filled by racial or national prejudice and passion to the exclusion of inquiry and thought; but they will fight not because they mean to do wrong but because they think they are doing right. When foreign affairs were ruled by autocracies or oligarchies the danger of war was in sinister purpose. When foreign affairs are ruled by democracies the danger of war will be in mistaken beliefs. The world will be the gainer by the change, for, while there is no human way to prevent a king from having a bad heart, there is a human way to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion. That way is to furnish the whole people, as a part of their ordinary education, with correct information about their relations to other peoples, about the limitations upon their own rights, about their duties to respect the rights of others, about what has happened and is happening in international affairs, and about the effects upon national life of the things that are done or refused as between nations; so that the people themselves will have the means to test misinformation and appeals to prejudice and passion based upon error.

This is a laborious and difficult undertaking. It must be begun early and continued long, with patience and persistence, but it is the very same process as that by which all the people of the great democracies have learned within their own countries to respect

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law and to follow wise and salutary customs in their communities, and to consider the rights of others while they assert their own rights, and to maintain orderly self-government.

It so happens that our own people in the United States have been peculiarly without that kind of education in foreign affairs. Not only have we been very busy over the development of our own country and our own institutions, but our comparatively isolated position has prevented the foreign relations of the old world from becoming matters of immediate vital interest to the American people, and they have not been interested in the subject. Naturally enough a great part of our public men have neglected to study the subject. The great body of Americans in office would study questions of transportation and tariff and internal improvements and currency because their constituents were interested in these subjects; but there was no incentive for them to study foreign affairs because their constituents were indifferent to them. The conditions are now widely different. Our people have been taught by events to realize that with the increased intercommunication and interdependence of civilized states all our production is a part of the world's production, and all our trade is a part of the world's trade, and a large part of the influences which make for prosperity or disaster within our own country consist of forces and movements which may arise anywhere in the world beyond our direct and immediate control. I suppose that the people of the United States have learned more about international relations within the past eight years than they had learned in the preceding eighty years. They are, however, only at the beginning of the task.

The subject is extensive and difficult and a fair working knowledge of it, even of the most general kind, requires long and attentive study. Underlying it are the great difference in the modes of thought and feeling of different races of men. Thousands of years of differing usages under different conditions forming different customs and special traditions have given to each separate race its own body of preconceived ideas, its own ways of looking at life and human conduct, its own views of what is natural and proper and desirable. These prepossessions play the chief part in determining thought and action in life. Given two groups of men, each having a different inheritance of custom and tradition, and each will have a different understanding of written and spoken words, of the reasons for conduct and the meaning of

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conduct, and each will to a very considerable degree fail to understand the other. Neither can judge the other by itself. If the instinctive occidental reformer and the instinctive oriental fatalist are to work together they must make biological studies of each other. Add to these differences the selfish passions which have not yet been bred out of mankind and there inevitably follow in the contacts of international intercourse a multitude of situations which cannot be solved by the men of any one nation assuming that the rest of the world is going to think and feel as they themselves do and to act accordingly.

The organization of independent nations which has followed the disappearance of the Holy Roman Empire is in the main the outgrowth of that progress in civilization which leads people to seek the liberty of local self-government according to their own ideas. Whatever may be the form of local governments there can be no tyranny so galling as the intimate control of the local affairs of life by foreign rulers who are entirely indifferent to the local conceptions of how life ought to be conducted. National independence is an organized defense against that kind of tyranny. Probably the organization of nations is but a stage of development but it is the nearest that mankind has yet come towards securing for itself a reasonable degree of liberty with a reasonable degree of order.

It is manifest that the differences of thought and feeling and selfish desire which separate nations in general have to be dealt with in particular in the multitude of controversies which are sure to arise between them and between their respective citizens in a world of universal trade and travel and inter-communication. The process of such adjustment without war is the proper subject of diplomacy. During some centuries of that process many usages have grown up which have been found necessary or convenient for carrying on friendly intercourse, and many of these have hardened into generally accepted customs in manners or in morals which no longer require to be discussed but which every nation has a right to assume that other nations will observe. Many rules of right conduct have been accepted and universally agreed upon as law to govern the conduct of nations. In England and America these rules of international law are authoritatively declared to be a part of the municipal law of the country enforceable by the courts. In this way the nations founded upon differences have been gradually rescuing from the field of differ-

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ence and controversy, and transferring to the field of common understanding and agreement, one subject after another of practical importance in the affairs of the world. The process is in the direction of that unity of thought and feeling, the absence of which hitherto has caused the failure of all schemes and efforts for the unity of mankind. The study of international relations means not only study of some particular controversy but study of this long history of the process of adjustment between differing ideas and of the prejudices and passions and hitherto irreconcilable differences which have baffled adjustment and which affect the relations and probable conduct of the nations concerned. All these are in the background of every international question and are often of vital importance to its right understanding.

The process I have described has created a community of nations. That community has grown just as communities of natural persons grow. Men cannot live in neighborhood with each other without having reciprocal rights and obligations towards each other arising from their being neighbors. The practical recognition of these rights and obligations creates the community. It is not a matter of contract. It is a matter of usage arising from the necessities of self-protection. It is not a voluntary matter. It is compelled by the situation. The neighbors generally must govern their conduct by the accepted standards or the community will break up. It is the same with nations. No nation whose citizens trade and travel — that is to say, no nation which lives in neighborhood with other nations — need consider whether or not it will be a member of the community of nations. It cannot help itself. It may be a good member or a bad member, but it is a member by reason of the simple fact of neighborhood life and intercourse. The Bolshevik rulers of Russia are illustrating this. They have been trying to repudiate all the obligations resulting from their country's membership in the community of nations, and one result is that intercourse is impossible.

This great fact of the community of nations is not involved at all in any question about the "League of Nations" or any other association of nations founded upon contract. The "League of Nations" is merely a contract between the signers of the instrument by which they agree to super-add to the existing usages, customs, laws, rights, and obligations of the existing community of nations, certain other rights and obligations of the existing

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community of nations, certain other rights and obligations which shall bind the signers as matter of contract. Whether a country enters into that contract or not, its membership of the community of nations continues with all the rights and obligations incident to that membership.

A self-respecting democracy which undertakes to control the action of its government as a member of this community of nations, and wishes to respond fairly and fully, not only to the demands of its own interests, but to the moral obligations of a member of the community, is bound to try to understand this great and complicated subject so that it may act not upon prejudice and error but upon knowledge and understanding.

There is one specially important result which should follow from such a popular understanding of foreign affairs. That is, a sense of public responsibility in speech and writing, or perhaps it would be better stated as a public sense of private responsibility for words used in discussing international affairs. More fights between natural persons come from insult than from injury. Under our common law, libel was treated as a crime, not because of the injury which it did to the person libeled, but because it tended to provoke a breach of the peace. Nations are even more sensitive to insult than individuals. One of the most useful and imperative lessons learned by all civilized governments in the practice of international intercourse has been the necessity of politeness and restraint in expression. Without these, the peaceful settlement of controversy is impossible. This lesson should be learned by every free democracy which seeks to control foreign relations.

It cannot, however, be expected that every individual in a great democracy will naturally practise restraint. Political demagogues will seek popularity by public speeches full of insult to foreign countries, and yellow journals will seek to increase their circulation by appeals to prejudice against foreigners. Hitherto these have been passed over because the speakers and writers were regarded as irresponsible, but if the democracy of which the speakers and publishers are a part is to control international intercourse that irresponsibility ends, and it is the business of the democracy to see to it that practices by its members which lead directly towards war are discouraged and condemned. Offenses of this character are frequently committed in this country by political speakers and sensational newspapers and because we are

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a great nation the expressions used become known in the other countries concerned and cause resentment and bitter feeling. What especially concerns us is that these are very injurious offenses against our own country. Such public expressions by our own citizens bring discredit upon our country and injure its business and imperil its peace. They answer to the description of crime in the old indictments as an act "against the peace and dignity" of the State. They will practically cease whenever the American public really condemns and resents them so that neither public office nor newspaper advertising or circulation can be obtained by them. That will come when the American public more fully understands the business of international intercourse and feels a sense of the obligations which it incurs by asserting the right to control the conduct of foreign relations.

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ON THE EVE OF THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE

By L. S. Amery

THE world is confronted today with one of the most widespread and formidable revolutions in history. It is, in essence, the same revolution everywhere, even if it manifests itself in fiercely contending forms. Bolshevism, on the one hand, and Fascism or Nazism, on the other, may differ profoundly in certain respects, and are relentlessly at issue with each other along the whole line from Lisbon to Vladivostok. For all that, they are one in their essential features. Both are based on the repudiation of nineteenth century liberal individualism and on the unlimited exaltation of the state as against the citizen. They not only in fact suppress, but on principle deny, all that we in England and America mean by liberty. "To claim to reconcile the State and liberty is nonsense," said Lenin: and there are plenty of parallel passages that could be quoted from Mussolini and Hitler. Freedom of political organization, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, are ruthlessly stamped out in the interests of national unity and of the dominant political creed. The courts of law exist to enforce the political views of the governing party; the notion that they can or should be independent is regarded as an absurdity. Nor can we dismiss this revolution as a purely local phenomenon confined to the countries immediately affected by it. In both of its main manifestations it is unscrupulously aggressive, determined at all costs to spread its doctrines and aggrandize its power, whether as against its rival form or against the outside world. What is more, in both of its manifestations it enjoys the advantage of a degree of all-round organization for war such as the world has not known hitherto, and of a fanaticism only equalled by that of France in the Revolution or of Islam in its first career of conquest.

These developments menace the peace and freedom, not only of Europe, but of the whole world. Even the United States cannot afford to ignore them. Neither the Atlantic nor the Monroe Doctrine can be relied on as effective barriers against propaganda; and there is much in the social conditions as well as in the temperament of Latin America that might in certain circumstances reproduce, on a larger scale, the present situation in Spain. At

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the same time the first impact of the forces generated by the European Revolution will not be upon the United States, but upon that other kindred system of ordered freedom which is known as the British Empire or (in respect of the national relation of its self-governing elements) as the British Commonwealth of Nations. How we of that Commonwealth are facing, or are likely to face, our problems, both internal and external, should consequently be of greater interest to Americans today than at any previous time since Monroe and Canning combined to frustrate the far-reaching designs of the Holy Alliance more than a century ago.

But first of all it may be as well that I should remind my American readers of what the present structure of the British Commonwealth is, how it has developed, and in what respects the course of that development has differentiated it from the constitutional structure with which they are most familiar. Both systems are based on the same fundamental principles, evolved in the course of some seven centuries of a common history. The first of those principles, and an essential prerequisite of all true freedom, is the power of the executive to maintain order and enforce the law. That was secured for us by those remarkable organizers, William the Conqueror and his successors, thanks to whom England enjoyed order and unity under a strong and efficient government centuries before the rest of Europe. The second and even more important of those principles — the one first asserted in Magna Carta — is the "Reign of Law," the principle that the executive, however powerful, must act within the law; that the law is not a mere emanation of the will of the government, but something preëxisting and supreme, the all-enveloping medium within which, and subject to which, monarchs and governments, as well as ordinary citizens, live and move and have their being. The third principle, a natural corollary from the second, is that the law can be modified only by something approaching general consent. That requisite of consent for changing the law — including in that term the King's right to levy taxation — is the root from which sprang our Parliamentary system, with its representation of the various elements and interests in the national life and with its elaborate provisions for full discussion.

The system thus built up contained one grave inherent weakness: the separation of executive responsibility from legislative

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power and financial control, and the absence of any provision for settling the issue between the executive and the legislative power when the two were at variance. Over that issue we fought one civil war in the seventeenth century, only to learn that a parliament, as such, is incapable of governing, and that a chastened monarchy was preferable to a dictatorship. We fought a second civil war more than a century later over what was in essence the same issue — the civil war that ended in the independence of the American Colonies. Left to themselves, the Fathers of the American Constitution found a simple device for preventing a permanent deadlock between executive and legislature in the periodical election of the Supreme Executive by the people itself. At the same time they solved the problem of coöperation between thirteen liberated and now equal sovereign states by vesting certain aspects of their sovereignty in a common federal system.

Meanwhile we in the Old Country were already groping our way towards a different solution of the same problem. The essence of that solution lay in identifying the executive government with a stable majority in the legislature by establishing the convention that the King should choose as his ministers only members of the legislature who between them can secure the support of such a majority, and by gradually vesting in those ministers all responsibility for the actual conduct of the government. That solution not only met our own needs at home, but when, seventy years after the American Revolution, a similar situation confronted us in Canada, it enabled the genius of Lord Durham to ensure the peaceful development of a second British Empire on the foundations of responsible self-government. That second Empire was quasi-federal, in so far as the sphere of colonial self-government was confined to local affairs, and a measure of general control over foreign policy and defense was exercised by the "Imperial" Government. But there was no demarcation of powers, nor did the idea of creating a true federation ever appeal either to Britain or to the colonies. Instead, by an inevitable process, the colonies gradually extended their powers, until, as Dominions, they enjoyed *de facto*, and finally claimed *de jure*, all the powers and privileges of equal sovereign nationhood with the Mother Country.

Today the British Commonwealth consists, to quote the famous definition of the Imperial Conference of 1926, of a group of "autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in

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status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations."

The Crown, in fact, remains the only constitutional link binding these nations together. A slender link, it may seem, and yet it stands, actually and symbolically, for so much. For one thing, it embodies the common citizenship of the Empire. In virtue of it the Empire, while in one aspect comprising a number of completely independent governments, is yet, in another aspect, one single body of British subjects owing a common allegiance and loyalty to the same Crown and consequently also to each other. This obligation of mutual loyalty and coöperation constitutes, so to speak, the common law of the Empire — a common law enforced, not by any central authority, but by the free action of all its governments and peoples.

Behind that common law stands the whole complex of common interests in trade and defense, of common political ideals, of common traditions and memories, which is the real binding force that holds the British Empire together; a force no less real, even if it has no legal or constitutional expression; a force whose ultimate sanction lies in the instinctive emotions and actions of all our peoples. Moreover, the part which the Crown has played in the evolution of our constitutional system at home, the peculiar character which it gives to the working of that system in practice, and the unique position to which our Monarchy has attained, all have their corresponding influence upon the constitutional tradition and outlook of the Empire as a whole.

The same process of differentiation which, in the United Kingdom, has enabled the Monarch to embody the unity and continuity of the national life, and to become the focus of all those loyalties which transcend the conflicts of the hour, has equally made it natural that he should, for the whole Empire, become the embodiment of the wider patriotism, the object of a loyalty transcending more immediate loyalties. For in each case it has enabled that higher, spiritual function of the Crown to be developed without prejudice to the fullest freedom in the conduct of governments, whether pursuing separate party policies within a nation, or separate national policies within the Empire. To that unique function no small contribution has been made by the personal character of successive sovereigns. Queen Victoria, in the

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course of her long reign, became not only the visible embodiment of the continuity of the Imperial system, but the loving mother of all her peoples. King Edward VII by his democratic tastes and unaffected geniality increased the popularity of the throne. King George V and his Queen, through anxious and critical years, set a standard of devotion to duty and unwearied interest in public affairs, as well as of a happy and irreproachable family life, which won for them a steadily increasing admiration and affection.

All these aspects of the British Monarchy must be kept in view in order to understand the nature of the recent crisis. The whole British Commonwealth was stirred to its very foundation, not because King Edward VIII thought of marrying a commoner, or an American citizen. That, in other circumstances, might have been a cause of general satisfaction. It was because the particular marriage contemplated seemed an impairment of the ideal of monarchy which the British peoples had set up for themselves, that they saw in it a blow both to the whole structure of their ordered freedom and to the unity of the Empire. It was a crisis of the first magnitude in Imperial relations, for, in accordance with the Statute of Westminster, a change in the succession could only be made with the unanimous agreement of all the Dominions. That the crisis was surmounted so swiftly and so easily was because it emerged that all the nations of the Empire shared the same conception of the Monarchy, and were unanimous in regarding the common Crown as of infinitely greater importance than the personality, however attractive, of its individual wearer. What was, above all, significant about the crisis was that it brought home to every Government of the Commonwealth, not only its equal status with the Mother Country, but its equal responsibility for the maintenance of the whole Imperial heritage.

The representatives of the component parts of the British Commonwealth are to meet in London in May for the Coronation of King George VI. They will meet to take part in a religious ceremony symbolical of all that the Commonwealth stands for. But they will also meet to discuss together the practical problems which confront the Commonwealth today in production and trade, in foreign policy and defense, facing the economic and political revolution in the world outside.

The most immediate and urgent of those problems concern foreign policy and defense. They are problems which in the post-

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war period have been allowed to fall into the background, for a variety of reasons. For one thing there was no immediate danger. The military predominance of France and her allies secured the peace of Europe. The Washington Treaties provided relative stability in the Far East. Again, the British Government, and the other Commonwealth Governments following its lead, were wedded to the illusion that the League of Nations could provide effective machinery for preventing war and settling international differences, and that, consequently, there was no need for any positive British foreign policy apart from support of Geneva. The last few years have in this respect witnessed a disillusionment no less complete because it is, even now, not fully avowed. The collapse of the Disarmament Conference and the ever-increasing armaments of Europe; the Manchurian, Abyssinian and Rhineland episodes; the fact that three of the world's greatest military Powers, Germany, Italy and Japan, frankly reject the whole conception of League authority — all these things have led to one irresistible conclusion.

The League of Nations may yet do work of the highest international value as a permanent conference of the nations, as a standing machinery for conciliation, as the center and focus of many beneficent international activities. But as an effective instrument for the maintenance of universal peace, whether by economic or military coercion, it is finally out of the picture. It therefore can no longer dominate or even influence, in any direct sense, the foreign or defense policies of the nations. These will be governed, in the future as in the past, by the interaction of the basic facts of geography and economics with the interests and ambitions of individual states, affected, in turn, by the political doctrines of which those states may be the protagonists. It is from this point of view, stripped of all the illusion and make-believe of recent years, that the British Imperial Conference will have to examine the difficult problem of the Commonwealth's continued existence in a world where increasingly formidable and aggressive forces are at play.

For us of the British Empire, the starting point and foundation alike of defense and of foreign policy must always be the maintenance of our sea power. The British Empire is the creature of sea power and sea traffic. Every portion of it, beginning with the British Isles themselves, was settled or conquered from the coast inwards. To quote Rudyard Kipling:

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It was the sea that, from our beginnings, directed our imaginings. It was the sea that waited on us the world over, till our imaginings became realities — till our mud-creeks at home grew to be world-commanding ports, and our remotest landing-places the threshold of nations.

The whole economic life, not only of the United Kingdom, but of every Dominion, of India and of the British Colonies, is dependent upon oversea trade to an extent which it is difficult for Americans, with their substantially self-contained continental economic system, to realize. The closing of the sea routes would mean ruin to every part of the Empire — except, possibly Canada, which might, at the cost of much difficulty and disorganization, find an alternative outlet for her surplus production in the United States. More serious still, while the command of the sea affords in itself complete security to many parts of the Empire, the loss of that command would preclude all military support from the rest to any one part that was directly threatened by land or air. Maintenance of sea power is, therefore, the only condition upon which the various parts of the Empire can continue to organize their national life upon its present basis of freedom and non-militarism. To maintain it is thus the first task of our defense policy, just as the chief preoccupation of our foreign policy must be to prevent any naval coalition against ourselves which would make that task impossible.

The task has become infinitely more difficult since the Great War. Formerly we had to deal with only one formidable opponent at sea, and, in effect, with only one small area of naval action. All that has been changed by the emergence of new naval power in many quarters of the world. When I refer to the growth of American naval power I need only say that it affects neither our defense nor our foreign policy. We do not contemplate the United States as possible opponents, and we see no menace to ourselves in the growth of the American Navy. The principle of numerical parity, through which we endeavored to give expression to that point of view, has broken down through circumstances outside the control of both of us, but its essential spirit remains. Each of us can henceforward build our own navy to meet our specific needs, without the necessity of bringing the other into the picture. As for our political relations, neither the American nation, with its traditional dislike of external commitments, nor a Commonwealth whose members are not prepared to enter into formal commitments even with each other, will want to base them upon

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any other footing than that of an increasingly better mutual understanding.

The most formidable potential naval menace to the British Empire is obviously that implied in the development of the Japanese Navy. At present that Navy is not only assured of supremacy in its own home waters (with which no one wants to interfere), but could paralyze the whole of our shipping in the Pacific and even in the Indian Ocean. Only when the Singapore Base is completed, and then only so long as our main battlefleet is free to move rapidly to Singapore from the Mediterranean, will there be real security for that major half of the British Empire which, from South Africa through India and Malaya to Australia and New Zealand, lies in a vast semicircle round the Indian Ocean, or for the vital traffic which crosses that ocean.

But the second of these conditions depends, in its turn, upon our relations to the European naval Powers. There is first of all Italy, possessed not only of a powerful navy, but of a geographical position astride the waist of the Mediterranean which would enable her splendid air force to participate actively in any naval war. There is secondly France, capable of balancing Italy or at any rate of holding the Western Mediterranean. There is lastly Germany. Even if the German Navy is kept down to the 35 per-cent figure of the recent agreement, that figure, in the event of a conflict, would require the attention of at least half the British Navy, in view both of Germany's strength in the air and of our own greater vulnerability.

Next to the naval problem, and closely linked with it, is the problem of our air defense. That affects, in the first instance, the United Kingdom. The British Navy alone, while it may prevent actual invasion, cannot today prevent a superior enemy air force from paralyzing our efforts by the destruction of our naval dock-yards, our aërodromes, our arsenals and munition factories, or from starving us by the bombing of our ports and railway junctions. A home air force equal to any continental air force within striking distance, and an adequate scheme of local anti-aircraft defense for the United Kingdom, is therefore an immediate necessity. But over and above that, Imperial defense will require effective air support to the navy in the Mediterranean and a main overseas air force for the defense and control of the Middle East from Palestine to India and to Singapore.

When it comes to land forces, we must inevitably maintain our

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standing regular field forces and garrisons in India, Egypt and at our chief naval bases. We need, but have not at present got, an organization which would enable us to reinforce these rapidly, without a general mobilization, in a minor crisis, as well as provide a substantially larger force for serious trouble in the Middle East or in the event of a Russian menace to India. Whether, over and above that, we should attempt to make provision, as in the Great War, for the possible dispatch of an expeditionary force to the Continent and for its subsequent expansion, is a more doubtful proposition. There is much to be said for the view that, without conscription, we could not provide a force that could exercise any decisive influence at the outset, that a future war would certainly never give us the time to repeat the improvisation of the Great War, and that the best help we could give would be through the immediate intervention of our air force. We are in any case compelled to maintain that force on an equality with our strongest neighbor.

Obviously the problem of the defense of the Commonwealth is not easy, especially as the main burden must for many years to come fall upon the United Kingdom. That our people in the old country now understand the gravity of the situation, and are prepared to make whatever sacrifices are necessary to fill the existing gaps in our system of defense, may be taken for granted. Nor can there be much doubt that, as the outcome of the frank discussions which will be held during the Imperial Conference, the other partners in the Commonwealth will begin to take the defense problem more seriously. This does not mean that there is the least likelihood of anything in the nature of a cut-and-dried scheme of common defense emerging from the Conference. All are likely to do more than they have done; but those most directly menaced will naturally do most. Australia, for instance, which is spending over £8,000,000 a year on its defense, and is already an appreciable factor in the naval situation, will no doubt still further develop its naval effort, while at the same time making a start at creating an aircraft industry to render its air force independent in time of war. South Africa is mainly concentrating on the air side of its defense, leaving the naval aspect to the British Navy. All the Dominions, indeed, in view of the natural opportunities which they afford for the development of civil aviation, are likely in the future to contribute more proportionately to the air strength of the Empire than to either its naval or military equipment.

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In such a situation foreign policy assumes an anxious importance for the whole Commonwealth. Our cards are not strong enough to enable us to play any but a cautious game. We are too near the centers of disturbance to be able simply to ignore European developments. On the other hand, there would be no sympathy or support from the rest of the Commonwealth if we in Britain pursued a policy which automatically involved us in either the nationalist or the ideological conflicts of Europe. If we are to undertake any commitments, they must be strictly limited to objects which bear directly upon our own security. Of these there is only one that involves a commitment — namely, the defense of Belgium and France against a direct and unprovoked act of aggression by Germany. To that we are pledged, not only by our treaty obligations, but also by our own immediate defensive interest. This obligation in its turn secures for us, as M. Delbos has recently declared, the immediate and wholehearted support of France if such an unprovoked attack were directed against ourselves, and insures, at the least, the friendly neutrality of France in other contingencies.

On the other hand, the last thing we can afford to do is to drift, either on the plea of trying to resuscitate the League of Nations as an effective instrument for enforcing peace, or on the ground of our "democratic" sympathies, into the position of being committed to a Franco-Russian Alliance. For that would inevitably lead to the consolidation of a corresponding German-Italian-Japanese counter-alliance. After what I have already said about our naval problem it will be clear that a conflict with such a coalition would involve an impossible strain upon our naval resources and expose the whole future of the Commonwealth to disaster. To restore good relations between Italy and ourselves and, consequently, between Italy and France, should therefore be a primary object of Empire policy; and there can be little doubt that the Imperial Conference will heartily endorse the steps recently taken in that direction. Ideologies apart, there is no substantial conflict of interests between Italy and France, still less between Italy and ourselves, and Italy has more to gain from the friendship of the other two great Mediterranean Powers than from being tied to the chariot wheel of German ambitions.

With Germany, too, we have no necessary quarrel. We cannot consent to her overwhelming Belgium or France. Nor can we — on strategical grounds if on no other — give way to her clamor

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for the restoration of her former colonies, founded as it is, in fact, upon a mere desire for prestige and not upon any real economic necessity. On that issue the Dominions more immediately concerned have already given unmistakable expression of their views. Nothing, indeed, could shake the unity of the Empire more seriously than if Britain either proposed the surrender of a Dominion Mandate or herself surrendered Tanganyika, so largely conquered by South African troops and so closely affecting South Africa's security. Students of American colonial history may find a parallel in the effect upon American opinion of our retrocession of Louisburg to the French after its capture by the New Englanders in 1745. On the other hand, there is no reason why we should interfere, on one side or the other, in a quarrel between Germany and Russia. And the same applies to any quarrel that may arise over Northern China or Mongolia between Japan and Russia. If Providence has placed three of the world's most restless and potentially aggressive Powers in juxtaposition, why should the rest of us wish to divert their attention from each other?

To sum up. The foreign policy towards which the British Commonwealth will naturally gravitate is one which while aiming at friendship with all nations will tend to make a particular point of French friendship for the defense of the United Kingdom and its outwork, the Low Countries, and of Italian friendship in the Mediterranean. Such a policy will refuse to be drawn into either camp in any general struggle between "Reds" and "Whites" in Europe, but will, on the contrary, coöperate in every effort that will mitigate European animosities and help to bring about the creation of a self-balanced, peaceful and relatively disarmed European system.

There is much to be said for the view that the only final solution of the European problem is the creation, among the nations west of Russia, of some permanent association or commonwealth. Such a commonwealth would be based on the recognition of the common history, culture and outlook of the nations which were once part of Western Christendom or of the Holy Roman Empire; on the acceptance of existing frontiers; on the toleration of minorities; and on a system of mutual economic preference, including in its scope the colonial possessions of each. Such a solution seems far off today. But the selfsame revolution which is threatening Europe with renewed conflict may well, when its fires have subsided, bring that consummation nearer than now

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seems possible. If so, then we of the British Commonwealth can well afford to give to such a movement our good will and support, in the belief that an essentially peaceful and self-regarding European Union, occupied with the economic development of its own territories, continental and colonial, need no more be a menace to Britain than the American Union is a menace to Canada.

Let me now return from these speculations to the immediate problems confronting our British Commonwealth. Behind the immediate problems of defense and foreign policy lies the even more fundamental problem of the resources in manpower and economic power upon which they are based. In the long run, the task of defending a world-wide Empire by sea, in the air and on land, against the organized power that may be brought against it from more than one possible quarter, cannot be sustained by some forty million people in a small island anchored off the northwest coast of Europe. It can only be sustained by the developed resources in men, materials and money of all the vast territories whose security and unity are at stake. The question of Imperial economic coöperation is, therefore, an integral part of any consideration of our external problems. But it is more than that. The British Commonwealth is not merely an association for mutual defense. It is above all, as Sir J. Harrington called it in his "Oceana" three centuries ago, "a Commonwealth for increase," an association for promoting the common welfare and prosperity of all its members in times of peace. Such a coöperation, moreover, whether its immediate object be security or wealth, in either case creates the occasions of mutual contact and understanding and the sense of a common interest which are essential if the unity of the Commonwealth is to endure.

In any case, what I have described above as a policy desirable on broader grounds is to a large extent being imposed upon us by the necessities of the world economic situation. One of the natural and probably permanent results of the present world revolution is the immense strengthening of the idea of national economic self-sufficiency or "autarchy." The trend in that direction is profound, created not merely by the desire for military self-sufficiency, but also by the whole conception of the planned and regulated state, responsible for the employment and standard of living of its workers; and it is well-nigh universal. The old promiscuous free trade on which England flourished and under which her

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colonies grew in the last century, has ceased to be possible. The world's doors are no longer open. For countries so one-sidedly developed, by nature and by the history of their growth, as are the countries of the British Empire, a policy of rigid autarchy would be disastrous. The natural solution for them is the sort of reasonable compromise, as between a large group of essentially complementary countries, which was embodied in the agreements for mutual preference inaugurated by the Ottawa Conference of 1932.

That the Ottawa policy has been a success can hardly be disputed. At a time of exceptional economic depression the enjoyment of sheltered and favored markets in the Empire has been of immense advantage to every one of its members. The percentage of the United Kingdom's imports from Empire countries has gone up from under 29 percent in 1931 to over 40 percent, while the percentage of its exports to Empire countries has gone up from under 44 percent to not quite 49 percent (over 50 percent in manufactured exports). Taking the Ottawa agreement countries alone — *i.e.* Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Southern Rhodesia and Newfoundland — imports into the United Kingdom for the first three quarters of 1932 stood at £129,590,000, and for the corresponding nine months of 1936 at £178,657,000, an increase of over £49,000,000, or 38 percent. United Kingdom exports to these countries went up, over the same periods, from £73,851,000 to £107,806,000, an increase of £34,000,000, or nearly 48 percent. That the various treaties will mostly be renewed, and on the whole strengthened, can hardly be doubted.

There are, of course, many difficulties to be adjusted. The industrialist in the Dominions and India naturally demands some measure of protection against British as well as against foreign manufactures. The British farmer cannot face unlimited competition from fellow farmers in the Dominions. There are export markets outside the Empire which are important to one or other of its members. Canada has to consider her market in the United States; Australia her market for wool in Japan and in Germany; Britain her markets in South America and Scandinavia. None of these difficulties are insuperable, or need impose a serious obstacle to the progressive development of the policy of mutual economic coöperation within the Commonwealth.

Nor is that policy likely to be confined to tariffs. When inter-

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national lending begins to revive, it will be seen, I think, that British finance will give very definite preference to lending for Empire development as against lending for purely financial reasons outside. The question of British shipping, too, is certain to engage increasingly the attention of the governments of the Commonwealth. We may not, at present, go beyond specific limited measures for assistance to tramp shipping, or the building of the giant Cunarders, or such subsidy as may keep the Canadian-Australian service in existence against the competition of the Matson Line. But sooner or later the shipping policy of other nations is likely to force us to some scheme of preferential tariff encouragement of British shipping, or even to go as far as America has done, and make all inter-Empire traffic coastwise traffic and confine it to Empire ships.

Above all, as soon as the present depression and its economic and psychological consequences have worn off, we shall have to begin to face the question of a more rational and effective distribution of the white population of the Commonwealth. The problem of population underlies all other problems affecting the Dominions and their inter-Imperial relations. The British Commonwealth is the product of migration and settlement, and it is only by more migration and closer settlement that it can fulfil its destiny or maintain its existence. The British Dominions today are the most thinly peopled and consequently underdeveloped regions of the world's surface. Canada, with an area of 3,600,000 square miles, has only some 10,000,000 people. The United States next door, with possibly twice the area susceptible of effective economic development, has over 120,000,000. Australia, on 3,000,000 square miles, has less than 7,000,000 people confronting the 70,000,000 of Japan and the 400,000,000 of China. Such a situation cannot make for security. Nor does the present enormous disparity between the population and resources of the United Kingdom and those of the several Dominions make it easier to work a system of coöperation based on equality of status. Coöperation on a footing of equality will be much easier when there is something nearer equality in the contribution which each partner can make, whether in the grant of access to its markets or in the building up of its defensive services. The forthcoming Conference is not likely to see more than the most tentative discussions of the possibility of reviving the flow of migration within the Commonwealth. But in the course of the next few

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years that question, and the question of the coöperative measures which must be taken to encourage it, may well become a major issue of inter-Imperial policy.

I have said enough to give at any rate an indication of the magnitude of the problems confronting the young British Commonwealth, and of the difficulty and complexity of the tasks which it must accomplish if it is to survive. Those tasks have to be carried out, not under a single direction, but by the free coöperation of entirely independent governments, each of them subject in the last resort only to its own electorate. What machinery is there available to make that coöperation effective? Here we are confronted with one of the greatest weaknesses of the Commonwealth as it exists today. It has discarded the centralized administrative machinery of the old Colonial Office days, and it has not yet created anything adequate to take its place. Its leading statesmen meet in Imperial Conference at irregular intervals, and in between keep more or less in touch by dispatch, telegram or telephone. The representatives of the Commonwealth at Geneva consult among themselves before taking up their attitudes in public. British High Commissioners in the Dominions and Dominion High Commissioners in London exercise the functions of inter-Imperial diplomacy. There are certain inter-Imperial committees, of a purely advisory character, dealing with shipping and marketing, and a valuable inter-Imperial executive organization on a small scale which deals with various scientific aspects of agriculture. But there is no standing machinery of inter-Imperial coöperation, no common clearing house even or secretariat for inter-Imperial correspondence and information.

How is it that the Governments of the British Commonwealth, all of which regularly send their representatives to the frequent fixed sessions of the League of Nations, and contribute large sums to the elaborate secretariat of that institution, without seeing in such action any impairment of their independence, have never yet been prepared to create any comparable organization for the more intimate society of nations which means so much more to them? The answer lies largely in the fact that membership in the Geneva League, while appealing irresistibly to the peace sentiment of the nations of the Commonwealth, has never been regarded as involving any real commitments. On the other hand, an improvement in the machinery of coöperation between the Governments of the Commonwealth might well give a definite

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direction to that organism's whole constitutional evolution. The matter therefore has naturally been approached with some circumspection, above all during a period when constitutional thought in the Dominions has been concentrated upon emphasizing equality by getting rid of the last vestiges of centralized control. It is only as the last traces of the old anti-Downing Street complex disappear, as the new equality becomes self-evident, that practical necessities will compel the recognition of the need for adequate machinery of Imperial coöperation.

In this and many other respects the members of the British Commonwealth stand today where the American States stood after 1783. They have attained their freedom. They have no intention of separating. They mean to work together. They have not yet made up their minds exactly how to do it. But sooner or later they will discover the appropriate method. If they fail, the Commonwealth will assuredly not long survive the grave perils that threaten it from without or the disintegrating influences which will develop within. But the very magnitude of the danger, and the increasing consciousness, in face of the menace to freedom outside, of the preciousness of their common heritage, will, I believe, teach them how to solve this problem with the rest. They must find their own solution. But their effort is one which, I suggest, deserves the sympathetic understanding of the American public.

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CANADA'S FUTURE IN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

By F. R. Scott

PREPARATIONS are under way for another meeting of the Imperial Conference, to take place in London while representatives from the Dominions are gathered for the coronation of George VI. This will be the first full and official meeting of the Conference since 1930 [1] and the thirteenth since the original Colonial Conference was summoned to London in 1887. In view of the disturbed condition of the world and the breakdown of the League, questions of foreign policy and defense are certain to have first place on the agenda. Amid the enthusiasm stimulated by the Coronation, and faced with the threat of war, the older school of imperialists, well represented in the British Government, are likely to bring strong pressure to persuade the Dominions to tie their foreign policy more closely to that of Great Britain and to share in schemes for imperial defense. How will the Canadian delegates respond to these suggestions? What attitude will they adopt toward the various other topics that will come up for discussion? These questions are giving rise to much speculation in Canada, and in certain quarters at least to no little apprehension. For Canadians at present have very strong and very divided opinions on the subject of Canada's obligations toward the Commonwealth, and there is great uncertainty regarding the stand which the Dominion Government proposes to take.

The coming Imperial Conference will differ from all its predecessors in that for the first time the Dominions will meet on terms of legal equality with Great Britain. The last two meetings of the Conference, held in 1926 and 1930, were primarily concerned with evolving a new political theory for the Commonwealth, and in bringing the law of the constitution into harmony with that theory. These aims have now been accomplished. The principle of equality of status and complete autonomy for the component parts of the Commonwealth in every aspect of their domestic and external affairs was enunciated in the Balfour Declaration of 1926. It became legally a fact, in so far as legislative capacity is concerned, through the adoption of the Statute of Westminster in

[1] The Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa in 1932 discussed commercial matters only; the British Commonwealth Relations Conference at Toronto in 1933 was entirely unofficial.

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1931. Certain developments since then have rounded out the work of the last Conferences and clarified the meaning of the formal texts. The Union of South Africa, by legislation adopted in 1934,[2] established full internal control not only over its own constitution but also over the methods by which the royal assent may be given to statutes and other documents, thus rendering possible independent action by the Union probably even on matters of peace and war. The Irish Free State successfully contended before the Privy Council its right to disregard the restrictions imposed in the Treaty of 1922,[3] and it also has virtually full internal control over the exercise of the royal prerogative in foreign affairs. Canada's power to prevent appeals from its courts to the Privy Council by purely Canadian legislation has been upheld,[4] and though her capacity to give legislative effect to treaties has been grievously weakened by the recent decision of the Privy Council with regard to Mr. Bennett's "new deal" legislation, the power to negotiate all treaties short of those relating to separate peace and war remains somewhere in the Dominion.

The events surrounding the abdication of Edward VIII, while in one sense indicating the unity of the Commonwealth, also demonstrated the equality of status enjoyed by the Dominions, since their consent had to be obtained before the Abdication Act could be passed by the British Parliament; and they have since adopted their own Abdication Acts into the bargain. Those portions of the constitutional unity of the former British Empire which remain — and they are not inconsiderable — rest clearly on the voluntary agreement of the Dominions to retain them rather than on the absence of Dominion capacity to dispose of them. This is true even of Canada's present inability to make her own declarations of war and peace. She has not yet acquired a separate right to control these vital matters, and so in this respect is far from equality with Great Britain; yet it would appear that she could at any time follow the example of South Africa and obtain the power by making the necessary constitutional changes. In any case, the right of every Dominion to decide how far it will participate in a British war has been fully recognized by previous Conferences. The coming Imperial Conference, then, which ought

[2] Status of Union Act, and Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act.
[3] *Moore v. Attorney-General for the Irish Free State*, 1935 Appeal Cases, 484.
[4] *British Coal Corporation v. The King*, 1935 Appeal Cases, 500.

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now to be renamed the "Commonwealth Conference"[5], will represent nations more legally independent of one another, more free to adopt separate courses of action, than at any time in their history.

These considerations alone would suffice to give the approaching meeting a special significance. It will disclose to what extent the new freedom of the Dominions will be exercised. But there is another factor which will make the Conference of particular importance, not only to the members of the Commonwealth but also to the world at large. The modern idea of the Commonwealth was evolved along with the new concepts of international behavior which found embodiment in the League of Nations. The separate Dominion membership in the League heralded the constitutional changes in the Empire. Dominion autonomy came to maturity under the ægis of Geneva, and the loosening of the legal bonds with Great Britain was peacefully arranged in a world that subscribed to the idea of collective security. If it had not been possible for the Dominions to look to the alternative protection of the League in place of the weakening Imperial guarantees, their constitutional evolution might have been very different. Today the League is powerless. Collective security can scarcely be termed even a remote ideal.

How will this change affect the policies of the Dominions? Will it drive them to seek an old security by strengthening the defenses of the Empire, thus creating a military unity to replace the constitutional autonomy? Or will they keep clear of the political implications of such a policy and look to new regional groupings dictated more by geography than sentiment? And what possibility is there of the Commonwealth nations coming forward as champions of a revivified League? These are the basic questions of the forthcoming Conference. Other matters of lesser importance, such as trade agreements, immigration, communications and shipping, will doubtless receive their share of attention. But it is the decisions on the larger political issues, whether these decisions be express or tacit, which will be of prime importance in shaping the Commonwealth's future development.

To show how completely the outlook has changed even since the informal British Commonwealth Relations Conference met in

[5] The "Colonial" Conference became the "Imperial" Conference in 1907; since the Statute of Westminster, the Imperial Conference would more properly be called the "Commonwealth" Conference.

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1933, we may cite a portion of the report of the special subcommittee appointed by that Conference to go into the question of a Dominion's right to neutrality in the event of a war involving Great Britain. The all-important question was disposed of in the following manner:

> It seems to us academic and unprofitable to consider legal constitutional difficulties which might arise if there were no Covenant and no Kellogg Pact. The principles of freedom and coöperation and "agreed anomalies" on which the Commonwealth is based, may create difficulties in many fields and we feel, therefore, that it would serve no useful purpose to try and foresee problems in one field, that of war, which we are entitled to hope are never likely to arise, and to seek to apply to them legal conceptions as to war and neutrality appropriate to the pre-League world.

Today the "academic" question of neutrality is uppermost in the minds of Canadians, and the "legal conceptions as to war and neutrality appropriate to the pre-League world" are precisely the ones in the light of which the obligations of the members of the Commonwealth must now be decided.

Thus the Canadian delegates to London, like those from the other Dominions, will be faced with decisions of the greatest moment. But unlike some of their colleagues, the Canadians will labor under the added difficulty of having to represent an extremely divided public opinion at home. In view of the racial and religious composition of the Canadian population, and the conflicting economic interests of different sections of the country, this division is scarcely surprising. No mistake is more common, even among Canadians, than to talk about "Canada" as though the term represented a single people with well-defined political allegiances. Because Canadians have a white skin and a parliamentary system of government they are assumed to be a "British" people with a natural tendency to take a British view of world affairs. An examination of the facts will give a different impression. Some 30 percent of the people are French-Canadian, and fully another 20 percent have non-British origins. At the 1931 census the Canadians of British descent amounted to only 51.8 percent of the population, and the non-British, whose natural increase is greater, are almost certainly in the majority today. In other words, Canada has ceased already to be racially British. Further, no less than 41 percent of the people in Canada are Roman Catholic (as against 6 percent in Great Britain). The fact has an increasing political significance in a world where inter-

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national conflicts are taking on more and more the aspects of wars of religion. And while some "assimilation" (which to the British-Canadian means "anglicization") of the foreigners has taken place, while they may speak English, or a variant of it, and are accustomed to a holiday on Empire Day and the King's birthday, these factors are more than offset by the growing North American character of the political thinking of the Dominion, especially in those areas far removed from contact with any country save the United States. These racial and religious diversities are additional to the economic and geographic factors which have always divided Canada into sections, setting the industrial East against the agricultural West, and cutting off the St. Lawrence Valley from the Prairies and separating the Pacific seaboard from both.[6]

The inescapable social facts here briefly indicated produce conflicting attitudes within Canada. And it is her internal conflicts, not any nastiness of temperament in the Canadians, which chiefly explains why the Dominion has always been so lukewarm toward proposals for closer Imperial coöperation. Canada's real difficulty is not how to coöperate with other members of the Commonwealth, but how to secure coöperation within herself. The constitutional evolution within the Dominion during the past forty years has accentuated the internal divisions. The Privy Council, through its interpretations of the British North America Act, has steadily whittled away the authority of the federal parliament, and exaggerated, against all reason, that of the provincial legislatures; the recent decisions on Mr. Bennett's legislation are the most destructive of all, virtually undoing all the work of nation-building that has gone on since the World War. The consequence is that national unity is still further delayed and both Commonwealth and international coöperation are rendered more difficult. The Privy Council has been an important factor in weakening the Imperial sentiment in Canada.

Today there are at least four important groups of Canadian opinion on foreign policy. There are, first, the pure nationalists or isolationists, who argue that as Canada has no enemies and is under no conceivable threat of invasion she should keep clear of all entanglements in the Empire, the League, or elsewhere, and devote herself to the solution of her own internal problems. The

[6] See further on this point, "The Social and Economic Bases of Canadian Foreign Policy," by Professor A. R. M. Lower, in "Canada, The Empire and the League," Nelson, 1936, p. 100.

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second group, closely allied in sentiment, would welcome isolation from European commitments, but would willingly see Canada join the Pan American Union in an attempt to create a regional system of security in the Americas. It is safe to say that all French-Canadians belong to one or other of these two groups of thought, as well as a great preponderance of the 20 percent of the population who are neither of French nor British origin, and a fair proportion — greatly increased in the past two years — of the Canadians of British descent. Thus a substantial majority of Canadian citizens would almost certainly be "North American" in the prevailing temper of the country, and though they have no desire to see the British connection broken, some cause or ideal greater than mere Commonwealth solidarity would be needed to make them support the idea of active participation in European affairs. Such a cause was felt to exist in the Italo-Abyssinian affair, and the prompt application of sanctions by Mr. King undoubtedly met with general approval in Canada outside Quebec; but even then the isolationist sentiment reappeared suddenly with the Government's repudiation of Dr. Riddell's suggestion of the oil sanction. In the absence of a strong League and collective international action, there probably is no cause for which a preponderant number of Canadians would be willing to go to war in Europe. Certainly another appeal to save democracy would be a doubtful rallying cry.

The other two schools of opinion are still influential in Canada though their numbers are declining. One consists of the "imperialists," the other of League of Nations supporters. The imperialists are still heard to say that the British Empire is the strongest bulwark of world peace, and that Canada should stand ready to answer the call of the motherland in every emergency. They want closer ties with Great Britain generally, larger expenditures on Canadian defense, and more British immigrants. Mr. J. W. Dafoe has recently said that this old type of imperialism "has almost completely vanished from the minds of the people of Canada" in the years since the World War.[7] This is probably an over-statement, though it is true that the process is going steadily on. The imperialists usually occupy the more dignified positions in church and state and thus sound more numerous than they actually are. No one would deny the reality of the pro-British sentiment in Canada; but it is more and more becoming a

[7] FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1936, p. 298.

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respect for certain ideals, institutions and forms of government, and it is ceasing to include either a blind faith in the continual rightness of England's foreign policy or a tacit assumption that the Commonwealth constitutes an offensive-defensive alliance. The Englishman may see that his frontier is on the Rhine; the Canadian finds it a little difficult to believe that his is also. From this position it is only a step to the demand for the right to neutrality. Similarly, the fourth block of opinion in Canada, composed of those who believe in collective security, is important because it has representation in responsible quarters. The members of this group hope against hope that some turn of affairs may restore the prestige of the League and make possible a revival of the collective system, to which they would want to see Canada give full support. Should such a revival occur, public sympathy for the League would revive with it; but at the moment there are no signs of either event.

These groups of opinion are not always mutually exclusive, and their relative strengths vary with changes in the international situation. Only present tendencies can be analyzed; future alignments cannot be forecast too precisely. This much seems clear, however. French-Canadian opinion is steadily nationalist; most of the other Canadian opinion appears to fluctuate between support of the collective system and some form of isolationist policy. The true imperialist fares badly. Recent political changes, both in the international and in the domestic sphere, have tended to move public opinion rapidly toward isolation. The principal factor, influencing especially the English-Canadians, has been the foreign policy followed by the National Government in Great Britain since 1931. Whether the Canadian interpretation of that policy be correct need not be argued; in these matters it is not the truth of the opinion, but its acceptance, which counts. Briefly, many Canadians feel that the National Government betrayed the principles of the League over Manchuria, throwing away the chance of coöperation with the United States;[8] that its sudden use of the League in the Abyssinian incident was mere support of the traditional imperialist policy of protecting the sea route to the East, and not at all a defense of the Covenant, of international law or of weaker member states — the Hoare-Laval treaty being an unexpectedly abrupt dropping of the disguise; that the subse-

[8] The Canadian delegate at Geneva supported the British *laissez-faire* policy at the time, but his action was severely criticized on his return to Canada.

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quent day-by-day conduct of British foreign relations, almost without regard to Geneva, shows an absence of vision and leadership and a frank preference for office politics of the old type; and that a government like that now in office in London will simply try to use the Commonwealth as a supplier of men and munitions for the inevitable and futile war that its policy will produce. This belief has driven many former imperialists, and many more of the League supporters, into the isolationist camp.

Other events, different in kind, have had similar consequences. The successful working of the new Reciprocity Treaty with the United States, the reëlection of President Roosevelt on a progressive program, the recent and widely publicized Pan American meeting at Buenos Aires, have convinced many Canadians that their natural and proper affiliations lie more in the Americas than in Europe. The old fear of absorption by the United States seems completely to have disappeared from the Canadian mind, due partly, no doubt, to the stronger national consciousness found in Canada today as a result of the ending of the colonial status, and partly to a greater belief in the absence of any desire for expansion in the minds of people in the United States. Canada is ceasing to feel herself a sort of semi-European visitor in the North American household. Even some of the French-Canadian newspapers have recently supported Dominion membership in the Pan American Union, and though the full implications of the idea have not yet been appreciated the idea is undoubtedly finding much favor. A North American system of security would furnish a common meeting ground for the extreme isolationist and the disappointed League supporter, each of whom finds it preferable to participation in the European armament race toward war. Those who have once tasted the larger loyalty to the League will not now, in their disillusion, revert to a narrow imperialism, whatever the guise in which it may appear — not even though it be described, in the truly ingenious phrase of an English Member of Parliament, as "collective security within the Empire."

Amongst the French-Canadians the most important development has been the revival of nationalism in the Province of Quebec. Never before has this movement been so vocal or so aggressive.[9] Its extreme wing is openly secessionist, aiming to create an independent French-Canadian republic on the banks of the St. Lawrence. The resurgence of nationalism was the principal

[9] See "Nationalism in French Canada," THE ROUND TABLE, December 1936.

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reason for the overthrow of Mr. Taschereau and the provincial Liberal Party in August 1936, and the coming to power of Mr. Duplessis at the head of a new party, the *Union Nationale*. The instinctive isolationist attitude of the French-Canadian is fortified by the movement, and every suggestion of closer ties with the Commonwealth is now being met with vigorous opposition. The pressure of this nationalist influence upon the 59 French-Canadian members of Mr. King's Liberal Party will tend to make the Canadian Government's policy more cautious toward proposals for coöperation in imperial defense, assistance to immigration, and kindred matters. It would be utterly impossible, in Quebec's present temper, to induce any French-Canadians to take part in another European war simply because Great Britain was engaged in it; and any attempt by the Dominion to enforce conscription for this purpose would create civil disturbance on a large scale. The knowledge of this fact has a sobering influence on the impulsive loyalties of certain imperialists in Canada.[10]

Such, in broad perspective, are the movements of Canadian opinion which Mr. Mackenzie King will have to bear in mind when he sits with his colleagues around the conference table in London. The net result will be discouraging for those who expect Canada to assume further responsibilities toward the Commonwealth. Mr. King himself has stated that "Canada's first duty to the League and to the British Empire, with respect to the great issues that come up, is, if possible, to keep this country united."[11] The impossibility of maintaining Canadian unity on a policy of rigid Commonwealth commitments should be clear to the reader. If attempts are to be made to bring the Commonwealth closer together in a political and military sense because of the League's breakdown, Canada will be inclined to draw farther away. A united move by the Commonwealth nations to restore the League would undoubtedly command wide sympathy in Canada, and would have the effect of strengthening the Imperial connection, for then the one loyalty would incorporate and give new purpose

[10] At the same time it must be remembered that the French-Canadian is first of all a Catholic, and will always support a Vatican foreign policy. He is more under the influence of Rome than the English-Canadian is of London. The French-Canadians, despite their isolationism, sent a contingent of volunteers to Rome to fight for the Pope in 1870, and might be expected to lend assistance to Great Britain if she should join the Fascist powers in an attack on the Soviet Union. The sympathy of the Quebec nationalists, which was pro-Boer in the South African War because of a fellow feeling for the small nation fighting imperialism, was completely pro-Italian in the Abyssinian war and is now strongly pro-rebel in Spain.

[11] Canadian House of Commons Debates, March 23, 1936, p. 1441.

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to the other. It is difficult, however, to see the initiative for such a policy coming from Mr. King. He has indicated on more than one occasion that Canada must take a back seat at Geneva.[12]

The policy of promoting Canadian unity, however, will necessitate some degree of Commonwealth coöperation on the part of Mr. King in order to satisfy the imperialist sentiment. In so far as defense is concerned, the recent large increases in the Canadian defense estimates, which were explained as being required solely for Canadian purposes, are clearly intended to ease the pressure for greater military preparedness without unduly exciting the isolationists. There is not likely to be further concession to the proposals that Canada should share in the cost of British rearmament. Some English imperialists would do well to remember that any attempt to impose additional taxation on Canada for defense purposes, by veiled implications that Canadians are enjoying the privileges without the responsibilities of membership in the Commonwealth, are simply going to force Canada to consider the question whether those privileges cannot be too dearly bought. The membership dues paid by Canada between 1914–1918 amounted to some 60,000 dead and a legacy of internal debt of over four billion dollars. Moreover, it is difficult for Canadians to believe that the existence of Canada today has added one farthing to the amount which the British Government was determined to spend on rearmament in any event. England cannot solve her military problems by invoking the military aid of the Dominions to help her dominate the Continent or isolate herself from it, and in so far as the Dominions foster that illusion they are doing a disservice to the true interests of the British peoples and to Europe also.

More important even than defense is the vexed question of neutrality. This delicate issue has so far been successfully evaded by the Dominion Government, and the uncertainty continues as to what Canada's position would or could be in the event Great Britain were involved in a war. In the debate on January 25, 1936, on Mr. J. S. Woodsworth's resolution supporting a policy of neutrality, Mr. King and Mr. Lapointe talked at length on the subject, and only added to the confusion. "So far as participation in war is concerned," Mr. King said, "It will be for the Parlia-

[12] On this and other aspects of Mr. King's foreign policy, see articles by Escott Reid in *University of Toronto Quarterly*, January 1937, and in *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, February 1937.

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ment of Canada to decide . . . It will be for this Parliament to say in a given situation whether or not we shall remain neutral." This sounds as though Canada were free to do as she pleased, and doubtless was intended to convey such an impression. Yet the fact is that under the existing Canadian constitution a declaration of war by the Crown in Great Britain would automatically avail to make Canada at war. The royal prerogative in foreign affairs has not been fully delegated to the Dominion Governor-General. Therefore Mr. King's decision in the event of such a declaration could only be a decision as to how far Canada would supply troops and materials; it could not be a decision to "remain" neutral, since war would have begun in Canada. In his remarks in the House he has confused the right to neutrality with the right to "passive belligerency," and his word "participation" is ambiguous. Such language is the language of political dodgery rather than of fact; it can only be intended to stave off an open fight on the issue, so that Mr. King can carry on his government while avoiding a revelation of the wide differences of opinion which exist within his own party.

Public opinion in Canada will not long be satisfied with evasion, and already is moving to demand that the situation be clarified whether or not the coming Conference intends to deal with it frankly. The consequences of independent action in time of war are difficult to weigh.[13] But the right to neutrality will have to be granted sooner or later, and the theory of a permanent personal union under a divisible Crown expanded to meet it. Canada can never be held permanently in the Commonwealth if a mere majority party controlling the House of Commons in London is to be able at any time to involve Canadians in war. The lack of racial unity in the country, if not plain self-respect, would make the British connection impossible on those terms. The full implications of the Balfour declaration of 1926, that the Dominions are to be autonomous in *every aspect of their domestic and external affairs*, will have to be accepted very shortly, and the decision as to whether Canada will lend aid to Great Britain must be made independently by Ottawa on each occasion as it arises, free from the technical condition of belligerency which the present position automatically involves. It should be the task of this coming Conference to provide in advance a method for possible Dominion

[13] See P. E. Corbett, "Isolation for Canada," in *University of Toronto Quarterly*, October 1936, and Escott Reid, "Can Canada Remain Neutral?," *Dalhousie Review*, July 1935.

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neutrality; only so can the Commonwealth avoid the confusions and recriminations that independent and unprepared action by a Dominion will inevitably entail. The right to non-participation has already been conceded; the right to neutrality is the next step.

Turning from defense and neutrality to the less fundamental issues, we find it easier to guess at the probable attitude of the Canadian delegates. As regards the Ottawa trade agreements of 1932, it has already been announced that a revision has been arranged. The details are not yet public, but it is clear that the scheme will not be completely abandoned. In essence the agreements were simply an extension of the principle of Imperial Preference, to which Mr. King and the Liberal Party have long been committed. But whereas the "preference" under Mr. Bennett's administration was increased by the process of raising still further the tariff against non-Empire countries, under Mr. King it is likely to be increased rather by a process of reduction in specific articles, principally textiles. The Canadian Liberal Party believes in free trade, which means that it will always try to put the tariff back to the point where it stood before it was last raised.

Since the Ottawa agreements went into effect in 1932, Canada's trade with the Empire has not remarkably increased. Exports to the Empire rose from 42.1 percent of the total exports in 1932–33 to 47 percent in 1935–36; imports rose from 29.6 percent to 31.6 percent. Part of this increase was due to the increased American tariff of 1930, and part of the increase in British imports was due to the inevitable consequences of economic depression — for in a depression, trade in capital goods and manufacturer's raw materials decreases more than trade in other commodities. Canada buys more of the former from the United States and more of the latter from Great Britain. Already the non-Empire countries have begun to regain some of their share of Canadian trade, and as the present treaties with the United States, Germany, Japan and France continue to take effect and new treaties are negotiated this recovery will become more apparent. It is not likely that Mr. King's government will risk these new benefits in pursuit of "a vague and somewhat mystical imperial commercial policy."[14] Dr. Buell's fear that "the conclusion of the Ottawa agreements

[14] See on this Professor K. W. Taylor, "The Effect of the Ottawa Agreements on Canadian Trade," in the Canadian Papers for the Yosemite Conference, 1936.

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marked the final abandonment of the principle of the Open Door" in the British Empire would appear to be unfounded, and Canada may well serve the cause of Anglo-American friendship once more by the influence she is likely to bring to the Imperial Conference against the doctrines of economic imperialism.

In so far as immigration is concerned, Mr. King may be expected also to pursue a cautious policy. There has been some detailed statistical investigation undertaken lately into the results of Canada's past immigration schemes, and the results are not encouraging.[15] In the first place, Canada is not a country of "great open spaces" — at least, not habitable spaces. Only 16.25 percent of her land area is "potential agricultural land," and much of this is uncleared and marginal land. In the second place, it is doubtful whether Canada's rural population can be expanded much further within the next decade. In the years 1921–31 the net immigration of foreign-born to rural Canada was 142,000; the net exodus of native-born to the cities and other countries was about 550,000, or 71.2 percent of the estimated natural increase in rural population. In that decade, therefore, more than 400,000 people left the rural districts. Immigrants, many from Central Europe, drove out Canadians. The 1936 census in the Prairie Provinces showed that between 100,000 and 150,000 people had left since 1931. Professor Hurd has calculated that "if agriculture merely holds its own and other rural employment is not forthcoming, a rural surplus of 800,000 is quite within the realm of expectation during the next decade." [16] Add to this the fact that nearly a million Canadians were on relief in January 1937 (a larger number than in January 1936) and the logical reasons for new immigration cease to exist. The reference in the proceedings of the 1926 Imperial Conference to the "conspicuous success" of the scheme to place 3,000 families on the land in Canada, should be read along with a press dispatch from Ottawa, dated January 12, 1937, stating that only 45 percent of those same families were still on the land. The rest had drifted to the cities or had been voluntarily deported back to England. The sickness in the Canadian economy is not due to lack of population. Yet immigration propaganda is being spread within the Dominion, sponsored by the imperialist group and certain commercial interests which hope to gain by the influx of new British settlers. In view of the opposition of the

[15] They are summarized by Professor Forsey in *The Canadian Forum*, February 1937.
[16] See *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, May 1935, p. 222 ff.

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French-Canadians, however, and in face of the tale told by population and relief statistics, it is unlikely that any new plan for fostering immigration will come out of the Conference in so far as Canada is concerned.

If this analysis of Canadian sentiment is broadly correct, the coming Imperial Conference will not see the Canadian delegates posing as the champions of any particular Commonwealth policy. Their attitude, however, is likely to carry the implication that the principle of complete autonomy for the Dominions must not now be abandoned. If they do only this, they will have made a real contribution. The way of armaments, of military alliances, of exaggerated kingship and imperial pageantry will lead to no solutions. What men seek today in every country under the sun is the chance to live in freedom and to develop their native powers in security and peace. It is only in so far as the Commonwealth serves these ends that it has a present validity and can hope to command a heartfelt allegiance amongst its myriad peoples. And since it is an artificial and widely separated grouping of nations, it can never hope to supply from within itself the security which can come from a world society alone. In a multitude of matters coöperation between the parts of the Commonwealth is potentially of great value. Markets can be opened, resources developed, research institutes coördinated. Experiments in economic planning may be promoted, and the results of social security schemes exchanged. There are vast populations of native peoples to be educated, and there are obligations to be fulfilled towards less fortunate nations which lack essential raw materials. Little enough has been said of these things in previous Imperial Conferences, and little enough can be hoped for without great social and economic change within the Commonwealth itself. Yet it is along such lines alone that growth and permanence lie. The old concept of unity based on race and a common history must be replaced by positive aims and practical objectives which will be found not to distinguish the Commonwealth from, but to unite it with, other progressive peoples. Empire must cease to exist if Commonwealth is to survive; and Commonwealth itself will fail unless it coordinates its activities with those of a world community. Realistic thinking about Commonwealth problems leads to the necessity of ceasing to think about them in terms of the Commonwealth alone.

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THE NEW ERA IN PAN AMERICAN RELATIONS

By Sumner Welles

I

DURING the brief period that has elapsed since President Roosevelt assumed office on March 4, 1933, the relations between the United States and the other American republics have undergone a transformation for the better which has seemed nothing short of miraculous to those familiar with inter-American affairs. That relations between the United States and the other nations of this Hemisphere had been increasingly unsatisfactory over a period of many decades was generally recognized by public opinion in the United States. Occasionally attempts had been made to remedy conditions, but these efforts were partial and tentative in character and it was clear that no real improvement could become possible until the whole continental policy of the United States, both political and economic, had experienced a radical change, and until it was based upon new foundations of justice and of reason.

On the political side, the peoples of the twenty Latin American republics had uppermost in their minds the numerous interventions by the United States in the smaller republics of the Caribbean in disregard of the inherent sovereignty and independent rights of those nations. By no means less rankling was the attitude of patronizing and domineering superiority which had crystallized in these acts of physical interference. On the commercial side, the economic policy which had culminated in the Smoot-Hawley tariff had dealt a staggering blow to the vital interests of many of the Latin American republics and, as an immediate consequence, had gravely prejudiced the export trade of the United States.

In 1933 suspicion of the real motives of the United States was rife throughout the Latin American world. Antagonism and hostility were openly and even officially voiced, as at the Inter-American Conferences of 1923 and of 1928. Propaganda against the United States found a fertile field. The slogan, "Buy only from those who buy from us," directed against exports from the United States, was published far and wide.

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In his first inaugural address, President Roosevelt announced that his Administration would maintain the policy of the "good neighbor;" and he immediately thereafter undertook to carry this policy to practical accomplishment. During the past four years, the policy of the "good neighbor" has been signalized by the following developments — all of them facilitating the growth of the era of good feeling which today prevails:

President Roosevelt made it clear by official pronouncement at the outset of his Administration that this Government opposed the policy of intervention in other American republics, and this declaration was formally subscribed to by the United States Delegation at the Inter-American Conference of 1933. The Government of the United States withdrew its armed forces of occupation from the Republic of Haiti and (on the expiration of the Treaty of 1915 between the two countries) likewise withdrew from every other form of interference in Haitian affairs. The Government of the United States, at a moment of grave crisis in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, made it clear to the world that its relations with that Republic were identical with those which it maintained with every other sovereign nation, and consequently could permit of no interference by the United States, direct or indirect, in domestic Nicaraguan concerns. At a time when the Cuban people were experiencing the most tragic epoch of their history since they achieved their independence, this Government, through a practical policy of economic cooperation, equally beneficial to the trade interests of both countries, rescued Cuba from commercial and financial ruin, and from actual starvation; it also, at the same time, renounced through a new treaty the contractual right of intervention in Cuba which it had formerly possessed. The United States Government negotiated a new treaty with the Republic of Panama, which, while fully safeguarding our complete control over the Canal, yet provided for a more fair and equitable treatment for the commercial interests of the Panamanian people than had previously existed, and abolished that right of intervention in Panama which the United States had previously possessed. Finally, the United States, through its liberal trade policy during these past few years, and through the trade agreements negotiated with many of the American republics, had materially assisted these latter to increase both their exports to and their imports from the United States. So long as the belief had persisted on the part of the other American republics that

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the United States would continue to pursue the policy of "might makes right," and that while the United States would exert itself to sell more of its own exports to them it was not interested in developing mutually profitable trade, there could never exist that feeling of confidence and frankness and of sincere friendship for the United States which now obtains.

In this manner were laid the foundations for a continental relationship which otherwise would have been impossible. But while the way had been cleared, there still remained reasons for serious disquiet for lovers of peace throughout the Americas. The long-smouldering controversy between Bolivia and Paraguay, which flamed eventually into a protracted and devastating war, brought sharply home to every American statesman that the existing peace machinery of the Continent must be regarded as far from effective. Had it not been unable to prevent the Chaco tragedy? Moreover, other controversies of potential gravity between American nations still remained unsolved.

Simultaneously the world horizon was darkening. Clouds of new hatreds and new fanaticisms were fast arising overseas. Many nations seemed bent on policies of rearmament, economic nationalism, and militaristic expansion which menaced the whole structure of world peace. Confidence was everywhere undermined.

President Roosevelt consequently determined upon taking the initiative in suggesting the holding of an Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace upon the American Continent, and on January 30, 1936, he addressed a personal letter to the Presidents of the other American republics. Referring to the successful negotiation by the Governments of Bolivia and Paraguay of protocols providing for the peaceful solution of the controversy which had arisen between them, President Roosevelt in these communications to the other American Presidents wrote:

> I cherish the sincere conviction that the moment has now arrived when the American Republics, through their designated representatives seated at a common council table, should seize this altogether favorable opportunity to consider their joint responsibility and their common need of rendering less likely in the future the outbreak or the continuation of hostilities between them, and by so doing, serve in an eminently practical manner the cause of permanent peace on this Western Continent. If the tragedy of the Chaco can be considered as having served any useful end, I believe such end will lie in our joint willingness to profit from the experience learned and to exert our common endeavors in guarding against the repetition of such American disasters.

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It has seemed to me that the American Government might for these reasons view favorably the suggestion that an extraordinary inter-American conference be summoned to assemble at an early date, at Buenos Aires, should the Government of the Argentine Republic so desire, or, if not, at some other capital of this Continent, to determine how the maintenance of peace among the American Republics may best be safeguarded — whether, perhaps, through the prompt ratification of all of the inter-American peace instruments already negotiated; whether through the amendment of existing peace instruments in such manner as experience has demonstrated to be most necessary; or perhaps through the creation by common accord of new instruments of peace additional to those already formulated.

These steps, furthermore, would advance the cause of world peace, inasmuch as the agreements which might be reached would supplement and reinforce the efforts of the League of Nations and of all other existing or future peace agencies in seeking to prevent war.

The President did not envisage a plan to align the American nations against the remainder of mankind. His purposes embodied no doctrine of narrow isolation. He did suggest friendly and practical coöperation between the American nations to make their own Hemisphere safe for peace, and by so doing to advance the cause of peace throughout the world. The initiative taken by President Roosevelt received the immediate and unanimous support of all of the other Presidents of the two Americas. By common agreement, the great capital of the Argentine Republic was selected as a meeting place for the Conference, and the invitations were extended by the President of Argentina.

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace held at Buenos Aires obviously did not assemble without extended preparatory work. There was a thorough unanimity of opinion on the part of the twenty-one participating Governments as to the objectives to be attained, as well as a very clear understanding on their part as to the methods through which attainment must be sought.

The agenda for the Conference was prepared in a spirit of complete democracy. A special committee was created composed of representatives of all of the American republics. To that committee each Government indicated the topic or topics which it wished to see included in the agenda. This program, based upon the principle of unanimity, in accordance with prior precedents for inter-American conferences, was then submitted to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union and was given formal approval by all of the Governments concerned. The date for the opening session was fixed for December 1, 1936.

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During the intervening months, the majority of the American Governments undertook informally to consult the other participating governments as to certain specific projects for conventions or resolutions, based upon the subjects included in the agenda, which they desired to submit for the approval of the Conference. These discussions were invaluable in ascertaining the views and reactions of the respective governments, and assisted materially in preparing the way for expeditious, constructive and conciliatory debates when the Conference actually assembled.

II

Among the most significant achievements of the Conference should be listed the "Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Coöperation" adopted by the Conference upon the initiative of the five republics of Central America. The text of this Declaration is as follows:

The Governments of the American Republics, having considered:

That they have a common likeness in their democratic form of government, and their common ideals of peace and justice, manifested in the several Treaties and Conventions which they have signed for the purpose of constituting a purely American system tending towards the preservation of peace, the proscription of war, the harmonious development of their commerce and of their cultural aspirations demonstrated in all of their political, economic, social, scientific and artistic activities;

That the existence of continental interests obliges them to maintain solidarity of principles as the basis of the life of the relations of each to every other American nation;

That Pan Americanism, as a principle of American International Law, by which is understood a moral union of all of the American Republics in defense of their common interests based upon the most perfect equality and reciprocal respect for their rights of autonomy, independence and free development, requires the proclamation of principles of American International Law; and

That it is necessary to consecrate the principle of American solidarity in all non-continental conflicts, especially since those limited to the American Continent should find a peaceful solution by the means established by the Treaties and Conventions now in force or in the instruments hereafter to be executed.

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace

Declares:

1. That the American Nations, true to their republican institutions, proclaim their absolute juridical liberty, their unrestricted respect for their several sovereignty and the existence of a common democracy throughout America;

2. That every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one of them, and justifies the initiation of the procedure of consulta-

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tion provided for in the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace, executed at this Conference; and

3. That the following principles are accepted by the international American community:

(a) Proscription of territorial conquest and that, in consequence, no acquisition made through violence shall be recognized;

(b) Intervention by one State in the internal or external affairs of another State is condemned;

(c) Forcible collection of pecuniary debts is illegal; and

(d) Any difference or dispute between the American nations, whatever its nature or origin, shall be settled by the methods of conciliation, or full arbitration, or through operation of international justice.

The principles embodied in this document mark not only a new day in inter-American relations, but perhaps a brighter day as well in the history of the world. When the twenty-one nations of the New World proclaim "the existence of a common democracy throughout America;" state "that every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects the peace of each and every one of them" and justifies consultation between them; and (in the third article) proclaim their faith in the most enlightened practice possible in the dealings of one state with another — that declaration of policy not only gives assurance that we of this Hemisphere can maintain peace among ourselves, but also holds out hope to war-weary peoples in other parts of the world that right and justice and fair dealing and liberty still exist and have not yet vanished.

In the same spirit the Conference adopted the "Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Reestablishment of Peace." This Convention is very brief but it marks a great step forward in inter-American relationships. It establishes in contractual form the obligation on the part of the American republics to consult together for the purpose of finding and adopting methods of peaceful coöperation in certain contingencies. This consultation shall take place whenever the peace of the American republics is menaced, whether that menace arises through the threat of war between American states, or whether it be of any other nature whatsoever; and, secondly, "in the event of an international war outside America which might menace the peace of the American Republics," in order to "determine the proper time and manner in which the signatory states, if they so desire, may eventually coöperate in some pacific action tending to preserve the peace of the Continent."

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In the Convention under reference, the mechanism for consultation would be the respective foreign offices, since these are the natural and normal agencies for consultation between governments. The world has learned by experience during these past twenty years that there is nothing more difficult than to secure practical results from negotiations between nations in a time of grave crisis or of threatened conflict, unless the mechanism for and the scope of such consultation have been previously determined. Nor is it a simple matter for a party to a dispute to accept the good offices of other nations, unless this has been provided for in advance, because of the fact that public opinion at home has become aroused as a result of the controversy, and too often considers that the mere tender of friendly offices by nations not involved demonstrates partiality for the other party to the dispute. If experience has taught us anything, it is that the way to avert war is not to wait until the storm is breaking, but to seek the pacific solution when the cloud of controversy no bigger than the palm of a man's hand first appears on the horizon.

The world has also learned that the staunchest safeguard against war today possessed by mankind is the force of public opinion freely expressed. What this Convention provides is something new on this Hemisphere. It provides that whenever there is any threat to the maintenance of peace in the Americas, however remote that threat may be, any American state shall possess the right to bring about consultation between all of the American Governments in order to avert the danger. And it is equally clear that whenever such consultation is requested and is undertaken, the force of public opinion of our respective democracies will rally strongly in support of a peaceful solution. If this convention had been operative in the earlier stages of the Chaco dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, if the good offices of all the American Governments not parties to the controversy had been brought into play, and if the peoples and the press of the American republics had insisted that a solution could and must be obtained without war, the two Governments directly involved would certainly have been greatly assisted in their endeavor to find an equitable and satisfactory solution. It is well known that the Chaco War continued until the mediatory efforts of a group of American republics comprising Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay and the United States assisted the two antagonists in finding a method of restoring peaceful conditions. Endeavors

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were made by many of the American republics throughout the period of the controversy to lend their good offices; but there was no continental understanding of the purposes of consultation, there was no rallying of the forces of continental public opinion, and there was no agreement such as we now possess for obligatory consultation between all whenever peace is jeopardized.

In complete harmony with the Convention just referred to is the "Convention to Coördinate, Extend, and Assure the Fulfillment of the Existing Treaties between the American States." This second Convention adopted at Buenos Aires refers specifically to the five peace instruments to which the American republics in overwhelming majority are already parties — the Gondra Treaty to Avoid and Prevent Conflicts, of 1923; the Pact of Paris, known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, of 1928; the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, of 1929; the General Treaty of American Arbitration, also of 1929; and the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, known as the Anti-War Pact, signed in 1933. It reaffirms the obligations contracted in those earlier treaties by the American nations, to settle by pacific means controversies that may arise between them.

Each party to this new Convention likewise agrees that when an emergency arises affecting the common interest in the maintenance of peace it will, through consultation and coöperation, assist the other American republics in fulfilling existing obligations for pacific settlement, recognizing at the same time the general right of each to individual liberty of action. It is further stipulated that should a controversy arise between two or more of the parties, and should consultation on the part of all of the American republics take place, the parties in dispute shall have no recourse to hostilities nor take any military action whatever during a period of six months. Furthermore, American states which may be involved in some controversy and which are unable to settle the dispute by diplomatic negotiation, agree not only to have recourse to the peace instruments above cited, but also to report the method for pacific settlement which they adopt, and the progress made thereby in the adjustment of their dispute, to the other signatory states. In the event that any American republics should fail to carry out their obligation to settle solely by pacific means the controversies which may arise between them, the signatories agree to "adopt in their character as neutrals a common and solidary attitude;" to consult immediately with

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one another and to "consider the imposition of prohibitions or restrictions on the sale or shipment of arms, munitions and implements of war, loans or other financial help, to the states in conflict, in accordance with their municipal legislation, and without detriment to their obligations derived from other treaties," in order to discourage or prevent the spread or prolongation of hostilities.

But the Conference likewise specifically reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention in the internal or external affairs of other states. Through an admirable treaty on the prevention of controversies suggested by the Government of Chile, it provided for the establishment of permanent bilateral mixed commissions between each American republic and each of the other American republics, these commissions to be composed of representatives of the two Governments in question, for the purpose of studying and eliminating the causes of possible future difficulties. Through an equally effective treaty proposed by the Government of Brazil, recourse may be had to the good offices or mediation of an eminent citizen of any American republic, to be chosen from a permanent list, in the event of a controversy arising which might require such friendly service. Through a convention on the Pan American Highway, sponsored by the Government of Mexico, practical steps are proposed to expedite and facilitate the construction of that artery of communication between the American republics.

The Conference likewise unanimously adopted two resolutions pledging the support of the American republics to the principles of a liberal trade policy. They recommended the suppression of all discriminatory practices in their commercial policy, including those arising in connection with import license systems, exchange control, and bilateral clearing and compensation agreements, and urged the other countries of the world to join with them in removing those artificial barriers to trade which today exist and which have done and are doing so much to threaten the maintenance of peace. They likewise recommended that a policy of reducing excessive or unreasonable prohibitions and restrictions upon international commerce be immediately undertaken and carried forward through the conclusion or revision of bilateral economic or commercial agreements and treaties.

Finally, through a convention for the promotion of inter-American cultural relations, proposed by the Delegation of the

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United States, each of the American Governments will award fellowships in some one of their universities or colleges to two graduate students or teachers from each other American country, and will receive an exchange professor from each of the other republics to lecture and to teach in appropriate institutions of learning. Such cultural interchange will contribute enormously to a better appreciation abroad of the methods of government and of the habits of thought and modes of life in each of the respective countries, and will assist greatly in preventing the misconceptions and needless misunderstandings which unfortunately have so often prejudiced inter-American relations in the past.

Such were the chief tangible achievements of the Conference. But it would be impossible to ignore an equally important aspect of its work. The Conference opened in harmony and adjourned in harmony. Friction, recrimination, and suspicion on the part of certain delegations regarding ulterior motives and objectives of others were completely lacking. Each delegation possessed outstanding statesmen from the republic which it represented, and each delegation contributed its full share to the final accomplishment. There has been no previous inter-American conference where a spirit of such complete democracy prevailed or where the agreements concluded were arrived at more openly.

III

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace constitutes only one milestone on the long road to be traveled before the American republics achieve that "solidarity" which they proclaimed at Buenos Aires as being in their common interest. Many steps remain to be taken. The chief immediate requisites may be summarized as follows:

At the council table of the Americas there exists today real equality as between the participating governments. So long as this condition, so recently achieved, prevails and is consecrated, there will be no danger of the creation of blocs or special alignments which would gravely impair the growth of a living Pan American spirit or the maintenance of peace itself on this Hemisphere. The insistence of any one government that because of its physical or economic resources it should possess any form of hegemony over some other American republic would constitute a threat to the security of all.

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The improvement of communications between the American republics is an imperative need. The great advance made in airplane connections during recent years have been in the highest degree beneficial to the political and commercial relationships of the American peoples. Communication by high road is in many cases nonexistent. The construction of the proposed Inter-American Highway would be a great step forward. When the average citizen of the United States can travel by automobile to Argentina through Mexico, the Republics of Central America, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile, and when the citizens of those nations can travel north by the same route, there will be established a most useful current of constant intercommunication. Similarly, high road communication must be developed between the republics of the Atlantic coast of South America.

There is likewise urgent need for the improvement of shipping facilities between many parts of the Hemisphere, and, in particular, between the republics of the eastern coast of South America and the United States. Maritime communications from Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil to Europe are far more extensive, rapid and commodious, than those which exist between those three great nations and the United States. It is futile to speak of any great improvement in inter-American trade relations until this situation is corrected.

While at Buenos Aires the several governments declared their intention of adopting a non-discriminatory and liberal trade policy as between themselves, there still remain artificial barriers and impediments to the flow of commerce between them which must be leveled before inter-American commerce can flow along normal channels. And although the United States has taken the lead in the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements, based upon the unconditional most-favored-nation principle, only a beginning has been made. No greater advance towards inter-American interdependence can be made than in the rapid prosecution of this program.

Mankind's need for a practical demonstration of the value of reason, coöperation, and conciliation in the relations between governments was never greater than today. The Conference of Buenos Aires responded to this need. The nations of the Western World there demonstrated their capacity to devise a sane balance between nationalism and international coöperation. As peoples in whom there has ever been instinct faith in the representative form

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of government, the American democracies have in fact — as President Roosevelt phrased it in his address at the opening session of the Conference — "offered hope to our brethren overseas." The example offered should encourage other nations elsewhere — even though their problems may be more ancient, more difficult of solution — to join with the American republics in renouncing aims that can only be achieved by war, in fashioning methods whereby all may have equitable means of access to the world's natural resources, and in composing by peaceful arrangements the injustices which may exist between them and which, if not rectified, may endanger the peace of the world.

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WHY CZECHOSLOVAKIA?

By Stefan Osusky

CZECHOSLOVAKIA is often represented as an artificial state, one that owes its existence to the caprice of an individual and the chances of circumstance. Strangely enough, we Czechoslovaks have unwittingly done as much to spread this erroneous idea as have our political adversaries. Such was our joy at the restoration of our independence and political liberty, and such the zeal with which we expressed our affection, gratitude, admiration, and filial devotion to our venerated leader, Thomas G. Masaryk, that even sincere people have accepted the thesis that Czechoslovakia's resurrection was a miracle, comparable to that which occurred when Prometheus caused the goddess Pallas Athene to spring from the head of Jupiter. Let us consider the reality.

If the fable of Czechoslovakia's artificial birth were not a fable, if it were true, that truth would be fatal for Czechoslovakia and — what is more important — tragic for Europe. A Czechoslovakia arbitrarily and miraculously created could not endure. Nor could the European order of which it is an integral part. Fortunately for both Czechoslovakia and Europe, the way in which our state was created in 1918 had nothing to do with caprice and chance. It had very different origins from the eternally virgin Pallas Athene. And its existence is justified by realities — living realities which are an integral part of European history and the European tragedy.

Czechoslovakia is a country whose existence and character must be quite incomprehensible to anyone who is ignorant of her antecedents and her geographical situation. As the "Great Moravian Empire," she existed as a separate entity as early as the ninth century. Under Svatopluk (870–894) she lived through her first great tragedy, produced largely by her geographical situation. The Christian faith was spreading at the time, and Svatopluk's Empire was torn between the Western and Eastern Churches. He was incapable of making his choice in time, and his realm dissolved. What remained of it — Bohemia — was then faced with a choice between Western and Eastern civilization. The political consequences of such a serious choice would have been quite different if it had been made by the Great Moravian

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Empire and not by little Bohemia. The Empire would have been in a position to defend itself much more efficiently than could the smaller state. When Bohemia chose the West, she was forced, due to her geographical situation, to accept the Western civilization and the Western church represented by Germany, her neighbor to the west. This meant that she was obliged to submit to German ecclesiastical domination, and in turn to German political supremacy. Her priests and monks came from Germany. The Christian Jehovah became the God of the Germans and their protector against the foreigner.

By strength of character the Czech people resisted this necessity to a certain extent. The Kings of Bohemia became Prince Electors of Germany, that is to say, they acquired the right to elect and to be elected Emperors of Germany — with the result that in the fourteenth century they were, in fact, so elected. Under Charles the Fourth, King of Bohemia and Emperor of Germany (1346–1378), it came about that by reason of the ascendancy of the Church a large portion of the soil of Bohemia was in the hands of a clergy and of ecclesiastical organizations which were almost entirely German. Naturally, these took advantage of the situation to entrench themselves in every domain of public life. The Czechs had to embark on a fierce struggle against this economic, social and political domination, alike clerical and German. This was the origin of the historic duel between Czechs and Germans. In their defense against German infiltration and domination, the Czechs had recourse to every sort of moral and spiritual and religious method. The culminating period of this struggle, which built up and moulded the Czech national soul, was marked by the movement of Jan Hus and by the Hussite Wars of 1400–1471. Those events were the reaction of the Czech people against German domination over their territory and life — a result, in turn, of their earlier choice of Western civilization and of the Western church.

At the height of this struggle, the Turks invaded the Valley of the Danube and on August 29, 1526, at Mohacs, conquered Hungary. Threatened in her turn by the Turks, and with the idea of strengthening herself to deal with them, Bohemia freely elected the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, of the House of Hapsburg, as King. Hungary followed suit. In this personal union between Austria, Hungary and Bohemia, it was the latter which played the leading rôle. The reasons for this were several. In the

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first place, Bohemia alone (apart from her possessions) contributed as much to the common defense against the Turks as did the three Austrias together. I say "the three Austrias," because, after the death in 1564 of Ferdinand the First of Hapsburg, Austria was divided into three parts. The Archduke of Hapsburg, who was at the same time King of Bohemia and Hungary, reigned only over Lower Austria, which was but a third of Greater Austria. If to Bohemia's own efforts we add the contributions made by her possessions, we see that the Crown of Bohemia contributed twice as much to the common struggle against the Turks as did the three Austrias together, and seven times as much as Hungary alone. To this must be added a second fact: The King of Bohemia was a Prince Elector of Germany, and it is chiefly because he was King of Bohemia that the Hapsburgs succeeded in acquiring and preserving the Imperial Crown of Germany. In consequence, during the reign of Emperor Rudolf the Second of Hapsburg (1583–1682), the seat of the Emperor of Germany, who was then a Hapsburg, was Prague.

Unfortunately, by reason of the fact that the Hapsburg who was King of Bohemia had, as Emperor of Germany, his seat in Prague, there naturally occurred a great influx of Germans into Bohemia. During the period of the Reformation these Germans accepted the teachings of Luther and thus were drawn close to the majority of the Czech people, who were Hussite. But the Hapsburg dynasty was and remained Catholic. As such, it saw its dynastic and political position threatened by the religious alliance of the Germans from Germany with the Hussite Czechs. In order to defend the dynasty and its imperial prerogatives, the Hapsburgs, flying the flag of Catholicism, entered into a struggle with the states of Bohemia. The result was the defeat of the Czechs in the battle of the White Mountain in 1620. Thereafter, Bohemia was wiped off the political map of Europe. Three-quarters of her lands were confiscated by the Hapsburgs and distributed amongst their followers from abroad. The Hapsburgs inaugurated a period of Germanization, not only of Bohemia, but of Hungary as well.

II

Fate so willed it that the defeat of Bohemia in 1620 coincided with the birth of modern nationalism in Europe. Everyone knows that Cardinal Richelieu, between 1624 and 1642, with the assistance of the German and Swedish Protestant princes, unified,

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created and organized a French state on a national and not a religious basis. Following the French example, England proceeded to forge her national unity. The effect of these two examples of unification on the whole of Europe was enormous. Inspired by them, Peter the Great undertook the organization of modern Russia. Italian and German nationalism still slept during most of the eighteenth century. But in the end the French Revolution came and lighted their torches too, with the result that the nineteenth century witnessed the creation of modern Italy and Germany's great effort to achieve unity. The decisive moment in the political evolution of Europe was approaching.

The Czech nation considers its original election of the Hapsburg dynasty in 1526 as the most injurious act in its history. However, it was not that which most concerned Europe. For Europe as a whole, the crucial question was whether the Hapsburgs were going to aspire to leadership amongst the German princes in the family of German states, or whether they would remember the European mission conferred upon them by the personal union of Austria, Bohemia and Hungary, and would protect those countries against the foreigner. The union had been created in 1526 for the common defense of all three against the Turks. In the nineteenth century it was a question of defending the Valley of the Danube, not only against the Turks, but against the new Russia and the Germany then in process of being born.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the German Reich of today was merely a mosaic of little states, a handful of free cities and ecclesiastical territories. The effort at unification into a modern national state was accompanied by ferocious struggles between the individual German states and their dynasties, each one ambitious to have the leadership over the others. This struggle crystallized in the rivalry between the Hapsburg and Hohenzollern dynasties.

In 1815, a Germanic Confederation was constituted, at least in theory, with the Hapsburgs at its head. If that position was simply decorative and moral, it nevertheless constituted the first victory of the Hapsburgs over the Hohenzollerns in the struggle for leadership amongst the German states. Nevertheless, the idea of German unity was making progress. In 1848, under the powerful impetus of the French Revolution, the Germans conceived the idea of creating a genuine German federal state, that is to say, "Greater Germany." A Diet was convened at Frankfurt for the

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purpose. The Hapsburg dynasty, having achieved the presidency of the Germanic Confederation, sought to change this honorary position into a practical one, and hence agreed to meet at Frankfurt to carry the project further. The Austrian parliament also agreed to be represented.

Bohemia, forming part of the personal union with Austria, was also invited. On April 11, 1848, Palacký, the Czech political leader, declined this invitation because, as he said in his reply, "it would mean the end of Austria, Bohemia and Hungary." He further added: "The maintenance of Austria (Austria, Bohemia and Hungary), its integrity, and its consolidation are of the utmost importance, not only for my own people, but for the whole of Europe, for humanity and civilization. A formidable empire is arising in the east of Europe; it is almost invincible, and an irresistible instinct drives it towards the West and South. Further successes for this empire would lead to the establishment of a universal monarchy. I am not hostile to Russia, any more than I am hostile to Germany. But I am hostile to a universal domination which I consider fatal to the general welfare and progress. In southeastern Europe, along the frontiers of Russia, history has grouped peoples that differ in language, customs and history: Slavs, Rumanians, Magyars, not to mention Greeks, Turks and Albanians. These nationalities are brought together by their weaknesses, since none of them is sufficiently strong to resist its formidable neighbor. They are linked together by the Danube, and Austria, which holds them together, cannot abandon them without risk. The Austrian state is indispensable to the security of Europe and of humanity. If there were no Austria, it would have to be invented."

In order to justify their willingness to go to the Diet of Frankfurt for the purpose of constituting Greater Germany, the Austrians said: "Austria will be German or nothing." Through the mouth of Palacký, Bohemia replied: "If Austria did not exist, it would have to be invented." Palacký spoke of Austria because, as it included Bohemia and Hungary in addition to its own territory, Austria at that time represented Central Europe. When he said: "If Austria did not exist, it would have to be invented," his meaning was: "If a free and independent Central Europe did not exist, it would have to be invented."

The historic decision was in the hands of the Hapsburg dynasty. It had to choose between a national German mission and

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a European mission, between presiding over the destinies of Greater Germany or over those of the peoples of Central Europe. In 1848, it was the Czechs, not the Austrians nor the Hapsburgs, who were defending Austria. It was Bohemia which refused to sacrifice Austria, Bohemia and Hungary to Greater Germany.

Did the Hapsburgs realize their great European mission? Alas, the answer is in the negative. Instead of choosing to preside over the destinies of the peoples of Central Europe they decided to embark upon the Germanization of Bohemia and Hungary. To what purpose? For the mere satisfaction of Germanizing? Most certainly not! When the Hapsburgs undertook to Germanize Bohemia and Hungary it was in order to be able to present them, at least in appearance, as German states to the other states of the German community, so as to be able to boast that they had added not only Austria, but Bohemia and Hungary as well, to Greater Germany, and thus create an argument in favor of their claim to German leadership and the right to wear the Imperial Crown.

In Germany, there was a statesman who understood the truths of history; his name was Bismarck. He knew that Austria, Bohemia and Hungary could not be incorporated into Greater Germany without danger to Europe. Since the Hapsburgs would not renounce the Imperial Crown of Greater Germany, he decided to declare war. This was in the year 1866. Bismarck conquered the Hapsburgs at Sadowa. King William of Prussia demanded as the price of victory the annexation of Austria; but this Bismarck resolutely opposed. The Hapsburgs and Austria were eliminated from Greater Germany.

Amongst other reasons, Bismarck must certainly have argued that Austria was Catholic and that he did not want a reinforcement of the Catholic element which might interfere with the welding together of the elements which were to constitute Greater Germany. But Bismarck's mind was possessed by another idea, which extended far beyond the limits of German nationalism. That idea was of vital interest to the future of Europe itself. It was something which, to Bismarck's mind, was an insurmountable obstacle to the annexation of Austria. What was this obstacle? Palacký, the Czech political leader, had pointed it out when, refusing the invitation to be present at the Diet of Frankfurt, he declared that if Austria did not exist it would have to be invented. Agreeing with him, Bismarck defined the obstacle in

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these terms: "Bohemia in the hands of Russia would mean the enslavement of Germany. Bohemia in the hands of Germany would mean war to the knife with the Russian Empire."

So Bismarck spoke and reasoned. He knew that Europe could never allow Central Europe to be in the hands of either Germany or Russia. Now that they had been conquered by Bismarck, would the Hapsburgs learn their lesson? Would they finally accept the evidence that their great historical mission was to preside over the lives and happiness of the nations of Central Europe? This was their last opportunity to submit to the realities of history. To their own undoing and the misfortune of Europe, they persisted in their determination to remain German princes in order to preserve their chance of one day wearing the Imperial Crown of Greater Germany. After the defeat of 1866, the Hapsburgs, so far from organizing Austria as a federation of Central European nations — as the Czechoslovaks wished and hoped, not for themselves only, but for Central Europe and Europe as a whole — made the decision to divide the Empire in two, handing over Hungary to the Magyars exclusively, reserving Austria for the Germans exclusively.

Such is the significance of the famous Compromise concluded in 1867 by the Hapsburg dynasty with the Magyars, who had revolted in 1848 under the leadership of Louis Kossuth. But the Austrian Germans were a very considerable minority in Austria itself and the Magyars formed a purely artificial majority in Hungary. In the circumstances, the Germans and the Magyars, in order to retain their political advantage in each of the two halves of the Dual Empire, were obliged to rely more and more on Germany.

From the moment the Austro-Hungarian Empire fell under German domination, realization of the double prophecy of Palacký and Bismarck became inevitable. It came with the catastrophe of 1914. The result of the World War was the fall and dissolution of the Austria-Hungary which had come into being in 1526, when Ferdinand the First of Hapsburg was freely chosen King of Bohemia and King of Hungary.

Palacký refused in 1848 to sacrifice Austria to Greater Germany. In 1867, when the Hapsburgs reached the Compromise with the Magyars and definitely forfeited their historical mission in Central Europe, this same Palacký wrote: "Bohemia existed before Austria; it will still exist when Austria is no more." The

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prophecy was realized in 1918 when, even before the Armistice, Bohemia, taking the name "Czechoslovakia," resumed the place in Europe which she had occupied as early as the ninth century. It was on October 28, 1918 — and so prior to the Armistice accorded by the Allies to Austria-Hungary on November 3 — that Czechoslovakia declared its independence and constituted itself a Republic.

Those who persist in believing that Czechoslovakia is an artificial and arbitrarily created state, without historical antecedents and without social and ethnological foundations, are advised to read a study which the learned Magyar, Oscar Jászi, published in FOREIGN AFFAIRS in October 1933 under the title "Kossuth and the Treaty of Trianon." There will be found the correspondence which passed between the great leader and idol of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, Louis Kossuth, and Count Ladislas Teleki, his diplomatic emissary in Paris. In order to enlist Western sympathies, Teleki proposed to Kossuth to establish the provincial autonomy of the Serbs and Rumanians inside Hungary. Louis Kossuth rejected this suggestion for the reason that everything that Hungary granted to the Serbians and the Rumanians she would also have to grant to the Slovaks, the Ruthenians and the Germans. As he pointed out, the plan "would mean the dismemberment of Hungary into six parts," and "the Serb, Rumanian, Slovak, Ruthenian and German provinces would inevitably yield sooner or later to the force of attraction exercised by the neighboring nations." And what would be the end? Not federation but secession: "Secession of the Vojvodina to Serbia; of the Rumanian province of Transylvania, of the Bánát, and of the counties Arad, Bihar, Szathmár, Mármaros, K. Szolnok, Zaránd-Kraszna-Kövár to Wallachia; of the Slovak territory (a colossal province) to the Czechs; of the Ruthenians, with the Galicians, to Russia; of the Germans (Vas, Sopron, Moson) to Austria. And the Magyars to whom? To death."

One has merely to look at a map of Central Europe in order to see that the geographical delimitation indicated by Louis Kossuth makes a series of frontiers which strangely resemble those determined by the Treaty of Trianon seventy years later.

III

The outstanding triumph of the World War was that the nations achieved the right of self-determination. Liberation of the

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oppressed nationalities was an indispensable condition to any fruitful international collaboration in Europe in general and in Central Europe in particular. More, this preliminary condition, once realized, might in itself become a means, an instrument, of fruitful coöperation. Here a very grave danger threatened. If the builders of the new Europe were not careful, the right of national self-determination might become an end in itself, instead of being used as the means of collaboration. Thus a new disrupting element might be brought into Europe instead of an element of unification.

Fortunately, above the material, social, moral, human and political ruins strewn everywhere by the World War, a new principle arose and only waited to be put into practice. I refer to the principle of *solidarity*. Men saw that the war had been won solely because of a mighty effort at organization, coöperation and solidarity. After that experience, why did they not see that, in order to overcome hatred and the destructive forces of exaggerated competition in every day life, even more coöperation and solidarity were necessary than had been needed during the war, particularly as the war had on the one hand destroyed sources of wealth and on the other had accelerated communications and reduced distances?

A political solution of the problem of Central Europe was within reach. The component national units, now free and independent, could at last organize a new Central Europe in which no one nationality would be exploited by another. Whether the World War was to be a triumph for good or for evil depended on man. If the first, action was necessary; but to let things drift would be to allow evil to triumph automatically.

Now science was given to man for his liberation, but often it ends by enslaving him. Science frees only those who know how to use it to control life. Those who do not know how to use it for that purpose are themselves enslaved. Let me explain myself. Because modern science has transformed the material side of human life, people have been quick to conclude that all that is necessary is to surrender body and soul to science and one will become prosperous, free and happy. Such people use the formulæ of leadership. But they have interpreted them in such a way that, instead of becoming the masters of material things, they have become the slaves of material things. In the intoxication of material success they thought of everything except the principal thing, which was

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man himself, who lives not through material forces alone but by his strength of will and by virtue of his ideas.

The Allied and Associated Powers had won the World War by virtue of their ideas as well as by means of cannon, machine guns and airplanes. Now in a Europe still filled with the repugnant fumes and odors of the war, would they preserve the ideas which had enabled them to triumph, not merely as precious memories, but as their chosen companions in their march along the road leading to a New Europe? Or would these ideas become poor relations, handicaps of which they were ashamed and which they would like to forget?

It is constantly asserted that the Paris Peace Conference dissolved the Austro-Hungarian Empire. One fact only need be cited among many to prove this statement incorrect. Czechoslovakia had effectively proclaimed herself a free and independent Republic as early as October 28, 1918, whereas the Austro-Hungarian Empire did not sign the Armistice until November 3, and then only because it was in a state of complete dissolution.

In the process of organizing themselves for an independent existence the Czechoslovaks did not forget the lessons of history. Accordingly the first Czechoslovak Minister of Finance, Aloîs Rašin, requested the Peace Conference to take steps to avoid monetary collapse in Central Europe. M. Beneš and I left no stone unturned, going from one delegation to the other, in order to explain that if the Peace Conference would act in concert it could bring the Central European nations to collaborate in warding off a monetary catastrophe. Our entreaties fell on deaf ears; they came to nothing.

The peace treaties nevertheless had to deal with the economic and commercial problems of Central Europe. Under Article 217 of the Treaty of St. Germain, Austria undertook not to discriminate against the commerce of the Allied and Associated Powers; but these latter, remembering the bonds which existed between Bohemia, Austria and Hungary, agreed (Article 222) not to enforce their rights in a manner that would nullify whatever special arrangements the Austrian Government might make with the Governments of Hungary or Czechoslovakia with a view to establishing a special customs régime. The same article stipulated that the duration of this arrangement should not exceed five years. The Treaty of Trianon, in Article 205, embodied the same terms for Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

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Unfortunately these arrangements were never put into force. Why? I will not pretend that just at the end of the war the Czechoslovak people displayed much enthusiasm for plunging into a close collaboration with Austria and Hungary. They had just freed themselves from the political servitude imposed upon them for centuries by Vienna and Budapest. Their feelings towards their ancient oppressors could hardly be ones of great tenderness. I think it is to the honor of the Czechoslovak people that they nevertheless realized quickly that the nations of Central Europe had not become free and independent in order to exploit and fight each other, but that they would have to collaborate on an equal footing for their joint prosperity and happiness. Such collaboration had been impossible so long as some of them were free and the others slave. Liberty made it possible by placing all on a footing of equality. Lord Balfour, British delegate to the League of Nations, once reproached me severely. He accused Czechoslovakia of never having really wanted to apply the Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon. Quite rightly he said that if their provisions had been executed, certain of the old economic bonds between Czechoslovakia, Austria and Hungary would have been maintained and that various economic and financial catastrophies would thereby have been prevented. I had little difficulty in proving to him that this was not Czechoslovakia's fault and that the secret of the failure was to be found in the Chancelleries of the Great Powers.

However that may be, here is what happened. As the economic and financial difficulties of Austria grew steadily worse, the Great Powers decided in February 1922 to come to its financial assistance. England lent it 2,250,000 pounds sterling; France, 155,000,000 francs; Italy, 70,000,000 lire. To this help for Austria the little state of Czechoslovakia contributed no less than 500,000,000 Czechoslovak crowns! On October 4, 1922, the Protocol for the financial restoration of Austria was signed. The sum of 650,000,000 gold crowns was allotted to Austria, guaranteed as follows: Great Britain and France, 24.5 percent each; Italy, 20.5 percent; Belgium and Sweden, 2 percent each; Holland and Denmark, 1 percent each; and Czechoslovakia, 24.5 percent, that is to say, as much as France and Great Britain and more than Italy, even though her own financial needs were great and she was herself compelled to undertake a thoroughgoing reorganization.

In order for this loan to have produced its full financial and

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economic effect it should have been followed by another. Why was this second loan delayed until 1933? Because it could not be made without authorization of the Reparations Commission. The answer to the mystery reposes in the archives of the Commission. I do not wish to speak evil of anyone. But I must say that I represented Czechoslovakia on the Reparations Commission from the day of its birth to the day of its death, and I feel at least qualified to state that it was not Czechoslovak opposition which postponed the granting of the second Austrian loan until 1933.

So much by way of testimony that the new Czechoslovak state remained faithful to Palacký's idea as expressed in the words I have quoted above: "If a free and independent Central Europe did not exist, it would have to be invented." It was because of that faith that the new Czechoslovakia cared not only about her own fate but also about the fate of her neighbor Austria.

IV

We are sometimes reproached with having created the Little Entente. This political formation is presented to the world as being incompatible with the new European spirit. We are also reproached with the manner in which we treat our linguistic and racial minorities. What do these grievances actually amount to?

Until February 16, 1933, the Little Entente was simply a dike raised against the recrudescence of an evil past which had been definitely condemned by the World War. Its transformation step by step into something more positive and general was due solely to the fact that the League of Nations did not take the position which the New Europe had expected. The League's failure has had more immediate political consequences for Central Europe than for most other parts of Europe. Czechoslovakia, for example, knows as a result of the experience I have already described how painful it is to choose or not to choose between the West and the East. For her the League of Nations offered the ideal solution. By choosing the League, she politically chose the West without thereby — as had been necessary in the tenth century — surrendering to her powerful western neighbor, Germany. On the contrary, she could collaborate with Germany to the full extent that her geography and her economic interests dictated. But since the League has not yet proved itself a decisive force in the affairs of Europe, the Little Entente is trying with all

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its soul to organize joint forces in order that its component states may not become again an instrument of national and imperialist policy in the hands of some Great Power. Due to their geographical position, the Little Entente states simply cannot side with one Great Power without siding against others.

To whatever extent misunderstandings exist between Czechoslovakia and Poland they are due in essence to the fact that the Poles believe that Czechoslovakia, being forced to choose between West and East, has chosen the East. That is how Warsaw interprets the policy of Prague. The Polish Government cannot see, cannot believe, that Czechoslovakia really is exercising every possible effort to avoid making the choice. I know that sometimes appearances seem to contradict the thesis here advanced. That is because the means at Czechoslovakia's disposal for defending herself against having to make a choice are very rudimentary. If the League of Nations had asserted itself firmly and definitely in the politics of Europe, Czechoslovakia would not today be in a position which lays her open to the suspicion of having chosen the East.

A few words, now, about the treatment of minorities. If Czechoslovakia had not done her full duty in this respect, as prescribed by the Minorities Treaty, would not Germany between 1919 and October 1933 have officially drawn the attention of the Council of the League of Nations to her derelictions? Would not Poland and Hungary have done so too, in order that the Prague government should be officially and publicly blamed? Why would so much propaganda through the press and on the radio have been wasted on the attempt to create an unfavorable impression of Czechoslovakia if the sounding-board of the League of Nations could have been utilized to prove to all the world that Czechoslovakia was mistreating her linguistic and racial minorities?

This simple fact would justify me in merely saying that the whole attack is a fraud, and in abstaining from discussing the question of minorities any further. In recent months, however, a newspaper campaign has been launched against Czechoslovakia in order to try to convince the world that Prague has organized to bring about the economic ruin of the Sudeten Germans. I must reply to this campaign with facts set forth as briefly and clearly as possible.

On the territory which is now Czechoslovakia was concentrated 70 percent of the entire industry of old Austria-Hungary. The products of this industry were available to all the 51,000,000

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inhabitants of the Empire, without customs or other barriers. After the dissolution of the Empire, the number of consumers on Czechoslovak territory was reduced from 51,000,000 to 14,000,000, with the result that the Czechoslovak Government was compelled considerably to limit industrial production. Naturally the most highly industrialized regions suffered the most from this limitation. And the most highly industrialized regions were precisely those in the northern part of Bohemia, inhabited largely by Germans.

On the other hand, during the first years following the foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic, Sudeten German industry did not have much confidence in the currency of the new state and deposited its savings (as did the German merchants in Czechoslovakia) in banks and savings banks in the Reich. When inflation destroyed the German mark they of course lost large sums of money. Then during the subsequent period of prosperity, as they were making money easily, they easily got into debt. They modernized their plants without calculating just what their commercial profits would be in normal times. The crisis of 1929 ensued and the enterprises failed. The banks involved with them abandoned them, considering that they had been badly managed and were poor risks even for the future.

The world commercial crisis struck Czechoslovakia with particular severity because of the importance of her export industries. In 1928 Czechoslovak exports were 21,224,000,000 crowns; in 1933 they had fallen to 5,923,000,000 crowns. Great losses occurred in such export industries as porcelain, glassware and textiles, the great majority of which are situated in regions inhabited by Germans.

These are the simple facts which explain why the Sudeten German population of Czechoslovakia has been so hard hit in recent years.

V

It may be asked why, when it was a question of organizing Central Europe, more was not done and why it was not done more rapidly. There are several reasons. The first is that each of the new states was so absorbed in the work of organizing its administration, its schools, its roads, its railways, all the details of its social and economic life, that it had little leisure to think of other things, particularly of broad European interests. As for the older

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states, Austria and Hungary, they were so weakened and exhausted by defeat and by the disruption of their former structure that they hesitated for a long time before they took courage and determined to build anew.

A touchingly optimistic spirit infected great regions of Central Europe. The Ottoman Empire had been broken up, the Empires of the Tsars and the Hohenzollerns had collapsed. Suddenly these great Powers, whose political aspirations had weighed so heavily on Central Europe and clashed along the Danube, had disappeared from the scene. Now that the Danubian nations no longer felt threatened politically from without, they quickly forgot the deep-rooted and remote cause of their past difficulties and misfortunes. They lived in a state of beatitude, believing that the victory which had crowned their efforts in the World War would suffice for everything, that it had removed forever their political misfortunes — misfortunes due in fact to something quite different, namely their geographical situation. The creation of the League of Nations confirmed this state of mind. They regarded the League both as a product of the New Europe and as something less than a necessity for Central Europe in view of the fact that the World War had settled once and for all the historic conflicts which formerly had troubled them.

In reality, of course, the League was a vital necessity for Central Europe. How could the various nations living there collaborate without leaving each of them open to reproach on the score of having betrayed their separate national interests? The defeated governments found it hard to take a forward step without risk of arousing popular suspicion that they were going to Canossa. The victors were too full of their success to run after old enemies now conquered. The League of Nations was there precisely for the purpose of clearing the atmosphere — morally, and in personal and political terms. It was neither humiliating nor dishonorable for either side to meet the other on the neutral territory of Geneva. Unfortunately, few statesmen were found at Geneva, just as there had been few at the Peace Conference, who believed that the organization of Central Europe presented a major task and a major opportunity. The accepted idea was that the problem had been settled by the mere fact that the various national states had come into being.

Years have been needed for the world to become conscious of the broad necessities, rooted in geography and history, of the

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Central European situation. Italy, for example, had been concerned until 1918 simply with the problem of how to defend herself against the Austro-Hungarian drive towards the Adriatic. Now that she has become a Great Power she claims a place on the banks of the Danube — a reminder that the affairs of Central Europe are not solely the affairs of the Danubian states. Then there is the return of Russia to Europe. And there is the national resurgence of Germany. These are brutal reminders to the world that, though Central Europe has undergone profound transformations from a national and local point of view, though politically and morally its internal situation is much healthier, the problem of its relationship to the Great Powers is the same as it was in 1815. The only difference is that the Ottoman Empire has disappeared from the ranks of those claiming to have vital political interests in that region.

One last and important observation. The Central European concept of the nation and the state differs from that held in Western Europe and in America. It is not a cultural and spiritual concept so much as a linguistic and material one. It is definitely Germanic, with blood, race and language holding an importance beyond anything known in Western Europe or in the Western Hemisphere. This Central European concept of state and nation influences political ideas so intensely and so profoundly that it becomes confused with patriotism and even with the loyalty of the subject towards the state. Let me cite one example to show what harm so materialistic a concept of nationality has done even in the national domain. My example will indicate, perhaps, that it lies at the very source of those internal difficulties which critics use abroad as grounds for reproaching the Czechoslovak Government. I believe that it is the Germanic concept of the nation which has led the Czechs into error in their manner of treating the Slovaks. If the relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks had not been disturbed — I almost said "corrupted" — by the materialistic and linguistic concept of nationality, I am sure that there never would have been any doubt abroad as to the Republic's stability. The myth of Pallas Athene alone would not have been enough to create this doubt. Further, the problem of the Sudeten Germans would never have become what it is today. Deliberate choice or policy on the part of the Prague Government is not the root of this error. The original fault is the concept held by the peoples of Central Europe as to what constitutes a nation.

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This concept, as I have said, is fundamentally of Germanic origin.

In concluding, let me observe that just as a science without ideas is merely a craft, so is political empiricism without ideas. Those who practise it are like navigators endlessly wandering the seas, without a compass and without a definite objective. In the case of Central Europe there are three sorts of ideas. There are ideas which history has proved a failure. There are others which can be practised only if one is resigned to living dangerously. Finally, as far as we are concerned, there are healthy ideas. The great healthy idea for us Czechoslovaks is that a country like ours should identify its interests with the general interests of Europe. Mr. Baldwin, the British Prime Minister, has stated that the Rhine is the frontier of England — that is to say, that England cannot be defended at all unless she defends herself on the Rhine. History would indicate that as a result of her geographical situation Czechoslovakia runs great risks if she does not choose between the East and the West, and that, whichever she chooses, she must resign herself to living dangerously. But, fortunately, there is an escape from this dilemma, which is simply for Czechoslovakia to take the over-riding choice of identifying her interest with the general European interest. She must cling unshakably to the interests, the ideas, and the general aspirations of Europe. To these ideas, these interests, these aspirations, she must help attract all those who love Europe sufficiently to accept the sacrifices necessary in order that the Continent shall continue to breathe and live.

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CHINA PREPARES TO RESIST

By Lin Yutang

THE summer of 1935 marked the darkest period of China's political history. The three Manchurian provinces had been lost without a struggle. Jehol had then been taken by the Japanese after an eight-day battle lasting just long enough for the opium-king, General Tang Yu-lin, to furnish an example of the world's most demoralized army in a most spectacular retreat. The Tangku Pact had been signed next, after a futile war of resistance had been fought along the Great Wall by local generals, pathetically without leadership from the National Government. As a result of the Tangku Pact, the text of which never was officially published, the Japanese claimed many rights and privileges in the important province of Hopei, containing the great cities of Peiping and Tientsin. The Chinese denied that many of these concessions had ever been granted, such as the Japanese claim that the Chinese Government had agreed not to station more troops in Hopei than necessary for policing purposes. The most clearly defined result of the Pact was the establishment of a demilitarized zone inside the Great Wall, coming within about thirty miles of Peiping. Under this scheme, the bogus "autonomous régime" of East Hopei had been established, with the ill-concealed guidance of Japanese army chiefs. The same bogus régime had been used for daylight robbery of the Chinese national revenues through wholesale smuggling by a fleet of small Japanese steamers. An army of ruffians, chiefly Koreans, under the direct protection of Japanese consular authorities, demanded the disarming of the Chinese Customs officers and negotiated for the release of arrested smugglers, the return of their goods, and damages for any injuries sustained. Meanwhile, under the most rigid press censorship, the Japanese were penetrating into and taking over part of Chahar (lying north of Hopei and outside the Great Wall), without either the Chinese or the Japanese Government saying a word about it. And finally, spurred on by the success of these silent tactics, Japanese army officers had broadly hinted at the necessity of "performing a surgical operation" on China by severing all five of the northern provinces — Chahar, Suiyuan, Hopei, Shansi and Shantung. This darkest period symbolically ended with the attempted assassination by

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Chinese nationalists of Wang Ching-wei, Chinese Foreign Minister, in the fall of 1935.

China then presented a truly pathetic picture — a picture of lack of national leadership in the government, and general chagrin, suppressed indignation and consequent despondency among the people. General Chiang Kai-shek, the head of the Government, had refused to tell the people his policy vis-à-vis the issue which was rending their hearts; at least no sign of any preparation for resistance had been publicly made known. Local generals who were stationed in the northern area and who wished to resist had to make the obvious choice of at once having their own little armies annihilated without central support, or yielding to a policy of compromise and gradual suicide. A rigid censorship was clamped down on the press; no mention of the activities of the "autonomous" régime or of the smuggling was permitted; no editorials dared attack the policies of militarist Japan for fear of being charged with "injuring relationships with a friendly neighbor" (as stated in the Censorship Regulations); anti-Japanese meetings were absolutely forbidden, no demonstrations were permitted, and the Peiping Chinese police fought the student demonstrations, which flared up again and again. The police used fire-hose in icy weather, or knocked the students down with the very knives that they themselves had paid for and contributed to the army of Sung Cheh-yuan when he was fighting the Japanese on the Great Wall. On the demand of the Japanese, the offices of the Kuomintang party, the Government's own party in China, had been closed down in Peiping and the party members sent south.

A government which had acceded to demands of this nature had sunk as low as it was imaginable for any government to sink, in the eyes not only of its people, but even in the eyes of Japan.

II

Clearly such a state of things could not last, and it was the Japanese who, by their further pressure, brought matters to an issue. About the most stupid thing the Japanese Kwantung army ever did — the most stupid, because most tactless — was to challenge Chiang Kai-shek in the same summer of 1935 and demand his downfall. Even a military attaché of the Japanese Embassy at Nanking openly said that Chiang Kai-shek, the head of a friendly Power, ought to be overthrown. That such an impudent

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statement could have been made at all clearly illuminates the picture that I have painted above of the summer of 1935. But the statement had two effects, each electrifying. In the first place, Chiang Kai-shek is a human being, with human emotions common to every mortal; in particular, he is a born last-ditch fighter. Japan's open hostility affected him just as a Persian cat is affected by having its coat stroked backwards. In my belief, he had been following a consistently realistic policy and playing for time. This development must have helped to confirm in him the view that no compromise was possible with the Japanese militarists short of turning China into a vassal state. The foolish statements to that effect made by Japanese army chiefs who liked to see their names in the papers must have been like iron entering into his soul and inevitably stiffened and hastened his spirit of resistance.

The other effect of Japanese denunciation of Chiang Kai-shek resulted in absolving him in the eyes of the Chinese people from all guilt and suspicion of being pro-Japanese. The people began to flock around him as national leader as they never had done before. The Chinese and the Japanese had been working at cross purposes for so long that when the Japanese began to pray for rain, every Chinese felt it his patriotic duty to pray for sunshine. The Chinese nation, by a kind of vague instinct, felt that if the Japanese thought Chiang Kai-shek bad for China, then he certainly must be good for China; since the Japanese disliked him, the Chinese must like him; since the Japanese said he must go, the Chinese decided he must stay. In China the press functions as the agency for publishing official dispatches. Whispers are therefore listened to avidly; and a whispering campaign now started to the effect that Chiang Kai-shek had been preparing for military resistance against Japan and for an eventual matching of force so soon as China was ready.

During the Kuomintang Congress in the fall of 1935, Chiang Kai-shek had armies concentrated in strategic positions in Kiangsu and Chekiang, ostensibly in preparation for conflict. This was the first sign of any kind that Chiang was ready to fight. There was great talk of resistance before and during the Congress, and General Feng Yu-hsiang, who could not have been induced to come to Nanking on any other terms, actually did come and was appointed Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission of the National Government. What the intention of those army movements was no one except Chiang knew, for, as silently as the

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whispers, the armies disappeared again from their positions after the Congress was over.

But Chiang's position vis-à-vis Japan was not yet clarified in the eyes of the people. This was proved in the students' convention which he called at Nanking as a means of turning to his own purposes the growing student unrest which was promising to sweep the entire country. At this convention, as late as the spring of 1936, the student delegates demanded that Chiang clarify his stand with regard to Japan. The unmistakable voice of the people, of all classes and in all provinces, showing itself in a series of catastrophic upheavals, had proved that the public mind was made up about the supreme sacrifice required. Chiang was forced to take a position.

During the Kuomintang Congress in 1935, Wang Ching-wei, standing in front of the camera in the center of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, was shot down by a would-be assassin playing the rôle of a photographer. About a month afterwards, his closest henchman, T'ang Yu-jen, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs under Wang, was shot on his door-step in the French Concession in Shanghai. These acts (and also the assassination of Yang Yung-tai half a year later), were undoubtedly done from political motives and by a political faction. Although Wang survived, his position as head of the Chinese Executive Yuan and of the Foreign Ministry was no longer tenable.

Directly after the Congress of 1935, Chiang took over the helm of state as the formal head of the Executive Yuan and organized a new Cabinet. The Japanese had been demanding that Chiang come out in the open and take personal responsibility for Sino-Japanese negotiations. So Chiang did. Strange to say, although the new Cabinet was composed of a greater number of Japanese-returned students, and though it sought the settlement of outstanding issues by pacific means, an entirely new tone was observable in its diplomatic policy. The willingness and readiness to start negotiations with the diplomatic representatives of Japan indicated, not a continuation of the supine policy of Wang Ching-wei and T'ang Yu-jen, but rather a new note of self-confidence on the part of China, who now treated herself as Japan's equal. China's diplomatic machinery was centralized in Nanking and regional pacts with Japan made by local authorities were declared null and void. Chiang Kai-shek was meeting the Japa-

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nese problem squarely and confidently, with poise and dignity, but also without verbosity and without cheap truculence.

Then in 1936 came a series of rebellions which steadily pressed the issue of immediate war with Japan. The chief of these rebellions were that in Kwangsi in August and the Sian revolt in December. However complicated the motives underlying the revolts, they clearly expressed the voice of the people. One must have been living in China at the time to feel their full portent. Whether the rebelling generals acted from personal or public motives or a mixture of both, and whether immediate war was advisable or not, is irrelevant; the fact remains that the whole nation had come to realize the danger of further compromise. They saw that there was no end to Japan's ambitions, and that to yield another inch of Chinese territory could not be tolerated. The nation had reached the point of determining to resist Japan even at the risk of a major war. War was in the air and Chiang felt it, knew it. The problem of war with Japan, of alliance with Russia, and of stopping internal wars against communists, had became *real* questions. They have not yet been settled.

It was a remarkable testimony to the Chinese Government's popular strength that although it was taking a more moderate and less anti-Japanese position it came out after every rebellion stronger than before. Chiang Kai-shek settled the rebellions with firmness and considerable sagacity. Some of his immature rawness had worn off, and he showed more temperance. In his dealing with the Kwangsi Rebellion he rose to the full stature of a statesman. He faced the opposition and won; but it was a victory far above party or personal lines, for while winning, he accepted the view of his adversaries that it was absolutely necessary to stop further encroachments, to meet force with force. Moreover, he acted on his new conviction; he predicted that the conflict of forces would begin in Suiyuan, and when the conflict actually did begin, Nanking for the first time in history mobilized its forces under open national leadership to meet Japanese or Japanese-inspired aggression. Thus did he fall into perfect alignment with the will of the people. Only by bowing to the will of the people could he command. His reward for the new policy of resistance was the spontaneous tribute of loyalty that came to him from the nation during his Sian captivity.

Thus was a circle completed, beginning with the Japanese denunciation of Chiang in the summer of 1935 and ending with the

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complete alignment of the people behind him as the national leader in December of 1936.

III

Proof as to how much the Chinese attitude had stiffened was shown in the negotiations that took place in Nanking, lasting from the middle of September to the beginning of December 1936, between Chang Ch'un, Nanking Foreign Minister, and Mr. Kawagoe, Ambassador of Japan. China met Japan's demands with counter-demands. Chang Ch'un repeatedly warned the Japanese Government to prevent the outbreak of hostilities in Suiyuan; and when the Japanese Kwantung army went ahead with its own plans of adventure there, the central Chinese Government not only met these Japanese-inspired onslaughts with its own troops but also refused to proceed further with the negotiations. Then on December 3, Japan landed 700 marines in Tsingtao (after a strike in Japanese mills by Chinese workers) and raided the Chinese railway and party offices and arrested Chinese officials. Chang Ch'un at once lodged a violent protest, and abruptly terminated the conferences which had been under way for 83 days. The landing of 4,000 Chinese troops in the suburb of Tsingtao eventually caused the Japanese marines to withdraw.

These events indicated the opening of a new chapter in the history of Sino-Japanese relations. The tables had been turned. Now it was China that was lodging complaints against Japan. China protested against violations of her sovereignty in the northeast, against the illegal smuggling into North China of Japanese goods, the illegal flight of Japanese airplanes over Chinese territory, and the illegal arrests of Chinese officials. Finally, while it was Japan who had protested against the Chinese use of Hopei as a base for subversive activities against "Manchukuo," as a result of which she demanded a demilitarized zone inside the Great Wall, it now was China's turn to protest against Japan's use of "Manchukuo" as the base for hostile activities in the territory of a friendly power. China did not logically proceed to demand the demilitarization of "Manchukuo." It would be quite some time before China was ready for that. But in response to Japan's invitation to coöperate in the fight against communists in Chinese territory, she replied by offering to send Chinese troops to Manchuria to help Japan exterminate them there.

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Even more significant than the above is the fact that Japan was no longer negotiating with the Chinese local authorities in the north, but with the Nanking Government. She no longer claimed that China was "not a nation." Trivial, yet significant, is also the fact that, when Japan sent a departmental chief of her Foreign Ministry to carry on conferences in Nanking, the latter also sent a departmental chief of the Foreign Ministry to negotiate with him. Things had changed, evidently, since the Wang Ching-wei régime, when the late Tang Yu-jen, a Vice-Minister of the Chinese Government, paid dutiful visits to the Japanese Consul-General every time he came to Shanghai, and when Wang Ching-wei issued an order for the Mayor of Nanking to act as a personal guide and entertainer for a minor Japanese officer on a visit to Nanking—as a result of which the Mayor protested and resigned.

The rupture of the negotiations by Chang Ch'un when the Japanese marines landed in Tsingtao occurred only nine days before the kidnapping of General Chiang Kai-shek in Sian. The demands of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang during the time he was holding Chiang in Sian, calling for war with Japan, alliance with Russia and absorption of the Chinese communists into the Chinese army, represent problems that will have to be faced at the next Kuomintang Plenary Session.

IV

A few words should be said about the events of 1936, which culminated in the discussions between Chang Ch'un and Kawagoe. Back in March of that year, General Arita, then Ambassador to Nanking, expressed the desire that China arrive at a fundamental solution of the outstanding issues. Chang Ch'un replied by expressing also the earnest desire of the Chinese Government for a fundamental solution, but added that the "removal of existing obstruction to China's administrative integrity in Hopei, Chahar and Inner Mongolia should be the first, as well as the minimum, condition in the readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations." The somewhat fundamental nature of this suggestion took Mr. Arita unawares, and as Japan evidently was not prepared to discuss the situation of China's northeastern provinces, the conference was dropped.

There followed a series of incidents, beginning with the murder of two Japanese in Chengtu (Szechuan province). Mr. Kawagoe came as a new Japanese Ambassador to Nanking, ostensibly to

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open negotiations regarding these incidents. Instead, he presented somewhat drastic demands as the basis for discussion. These demands concerned: (1) the opening of a commercial air-route between China and Japan; (2) the revision of the Chinese tariff on imports; (3) control of the activities of Korean revolutionists in China; (4) employment of Japanese advisers; and (5), control of anti-Japanese activities. China gave these demands careful attention, but also presented counter-demands, which threw back onto Japan the onus of establishing a new basis of relations between the two countries. Then came two events already mentioned — the Suiyuan conflict, which paralyzed the negotiations for weeks, and the Tsingtao incident, which helped break them off completely. On the evening of December 3, Chang Ch'un had a last interview with Mr. Kawagoe. The latter took out an *aide-memoire* of the previous conversations and asked Mr. Chang to "keep it for reference." Mr. Chang refused to accept it, but Mr. Kawagoe insisted on leaving it. The same night, Mr. Chang sent it back to the Japanese Embassy, on the ground that it was incorrect and could not be used for reference. The next morning, the document was presented once more to the Nanking Foreign Office and once more returned. Mr. Kawagoe left Nanking on December 4.[1]

With regard to the five demands presented, the stand taken by China's diplomatic representatives during the conversations was characteristic. With regard to the establishment of an air route between Fukuoka and Shanghai, the Chinese authorities said, according to the Nanking Central News Agency, that China had been negotiating on this point even before September 18, 1931, on the principle of equality and reciprocity, but that "unfortunately since last winter, Japanese aëroplanes have been flying freely over Northern China without going through the legitimate procedure of obtaining the consent of the Chinese Government. Such illegal flights are a violation of China's sovereignty. The Chinese Government maintains that until a stop is put to these illegal flights it will be extremely difficult to proceed with further discussions to link Shanghai and Fukuoka by a civil air line. The Chinese Government has not modified this attitude."

Regarding the second demand, that for revision of the import tariff, China replied that "revision of China's import tariff is

[1] The text of the statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Office on December 6, 1936, describing China's position in detail, may be found in the *North-China Herald*, Shanghai, December 9, 1936.

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China's domestic affair. The tariff may be readjusted any time, as required by national financial and commercial conditions, but when tariff readjustment is being studied the Chinese Government regards the suppression of smuggling and freedom of the Chinese Customs Preventive Service as questions first to be considered."

China replied in the same spirit to the request that Japanese advisers be employed. This solely depends, she said, "upon the requirements of the Chinese Government and the technical ability of those to be employed" and added that "nationality should not enter into the question," and that "this is not a matter which can be made the subject of a demand by a foreign government." And as regards the control of unlawful activities of Koreans, the Chinese Government, while recognizing its duty to stop unlawful activities of any nationals in its territory, pointed out that "the Japanese Government should also suppress unlawful activities committed under its protection by Koreans, Formosans and other subjects of Japan." Its stand regarding the suppression of anti-Japanese feeling was that this depended on the eradication of the *causes* of misunderstanding and bad feeling.

Each of these Chinese replies was what every western diplomat would recognize as a plain, sensible and entirely normal argument. But coming from the mouth of a Chinese diplomat in reply to a Japanese demand it was unprecedented.

It was not Japan that had changed, but China. Japanese aëroplanes had always been flying freely over Chinese territory; Japanese marines had often before landed in Chinese ports; Japanese soldiers had many times before raided Chinese offices and arrested Chinese officials and citizens; Japanese smugglers had been active for a long period; and, of course, Japanese violation of China's territorial integrity had not begun in 1936. Now China had begun to treat Japan as an equal, and what was still more important, treat herself as an equal. What had happened?

V

In making clear her intention to meet further Japanese aggressions with force, China has perhaps accidentally called Japan's bluff. The factors that have contributed to this change are threefold.

In the first place, Japan's policy has in itself been very influential in solidifying Chinese unity. So long as the military powers

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of the two nations were unequal, and so long as Japan continued to bite off small bits of Chinese territory, there would always be a section of the Chinese people — endowed with the unmatched philosophy of "changing a big thing into a small thing and a small thing into nothing" — who would favor a policy of conciliation with Japan by putting up with various temporary disadvantages in the hope of "getting by." If it had been possible for those Chinese to continue to believe in conciliation they would certainly be doing so even now. Unfortunately, or fortunately, Japan, by her acts and plain intentions, has destroyed every possible argument for coöperation. Put in plainer English, the Chinese people feel that it has become a simple question of "I cut your throat or you cut my throat." The various statements of Japanese soldiers, unversed in the art of diplomatic lying, have made it inordinately plain that nothing short of complete Japanese hegemony in East Asia and the submission of China as a virtual vassal state will satisfy the ambitions of militarist Japan. Consequently, through the instrumentality of Japan, particularly of her militarists, there has been built up a tremendous national force in China in the form of anti-Japanese feeling, or pure hatred of the Japanese. Today I believe it is the greatest single, and the only certain, factor in the entire Far Eastern picture.

In the second place, the new tone of self-confidence is due to the gradual crystallization of a positive policy on the part of Chiang Kai-shek, that inhumanly cool statesman. Like all good chess-players, Chiang never talks; and, like a good chess-player, he plans and calculates his moves. If he must fight Japan, he would like to prepare, ruthlessly, determinedly and systematically. He would like to have three years, he is reported as saying; if not, one year; and if Japan presses too hard, he would fight even now. But if he must fight he would want to fight under the best advantages possible, and if today it comes to a question of giving in a little to gain time, then I believe he still will go some distance to humor Japan. In view of his past record of evasion of the Japanese issue, the only justification for such a policy on his part is whether he is seriously and actively preparing for the eventual matching of forces. And I am led to believe that he is preparing very fast, but also very systematically. He envisages war as a practical military matter — including the provision of military equipment, the training of mechanized armies, the building of an

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air force, provision for the wounded, conscription of reserves, the elaboration of tactics and the creation of a stable base of defense, necessitating the sacrifice of certain territories, the adoption of financial measures and the building of arteries of communication. He has built a modern mechanized army (still inadequate for matching Japan's); he has bought aëroplanes and trained an air force; he has envisaged the blockade of the China coast (the reason for hastening the completion of the Canton-Hankow railway by night and day); he has put into practise the military training of Chinese college students; he has even organized nurses' corps of peasant women in the neighborhood of Nanking. He has also adopted and put through the necessary financial measures for war-time protection. Best of all, he has reason to count on excellent morale if ever it comes to fighting the Japanese. From all these preparations he even draws the conclusion — and with reason — that probably the danger of war is already past, for Japan does not at present relish the prospect of war on a major scale.

The third factor is Russia. China has no more made a military alliance with Russia than Japan has with Germany — formally. Yet the alignment of forces is perfectly evident to every student. In any protracted war between China and Japan, the intervention of Russia — not as a certainty but as a possibility — would have to be taken into consideration. The mere possibility of Russian intervention is enough to make Japan think twice.

So long as the Japanese could bamboozle and cow the Chinese into giving up further bits of territory, they would have kept that game up indefinitely. But now that the Chinese have stiffened, now that they are willing to risk a real war in order to halt the continual whittling away of Chinese sovereignty, the situation has changed.

There is Russia — with her self-sufficient Far Eastern Army, with a steel and concrete fortified line, with fifteen completely mechanized divisions, 1,000 tanks and 1,000 aëroplanes that can menace Tokyo and Osaka and carry hostilities to Japanese soil.

There is "Manchukuo" — with 3,000 miles of border and 6,000 miles of railways to defend, and with an area the size of France and Germany combined to hold in submission in face of an actively hostile population of 30,000,000 Chinese. This alone would keep ten Japanese divisions fully busy in the event of war between Japan and China. What surplus strength Japan has for

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invading China and waging a protracted war there — a war in which there would be no decisive victories — is a question the Japanese can only settle for themselves.

And, finally, there is China, embittered by years of bullying at the hands of a nation which in her heart she really despises, hardened by a period of disillusionment in international diplomacy, and finally taught the lesson of ultimate reliance upon herself. At the head of this nation, keyed up at last to the modern tune of nationalism, eaten up by bitter hatred of the invaders, and unified by one single powerful emotion, is a determined, wily, modern statesman-soldier. So much of China's national consciousness has been suppressed in past years by the Government that when eventually it explodes, as it will if Japanese pressure is continued, the world will be startled. The explosion will have more spectacular results than the last Shanghai War. The only alternative is a prompt application of the old philosophy of "live and let live."

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NAVAL BASES IN THE PACIFIC

By William Henry Chamberlin

THE problem of naval bases in the Pacific assumed new significance from the beginning of the present year, for that was the date when the political and naval agreements concluded at the Washington Conference in 1922 formally terminated. The three outstanding achievements of the Washington Conference were the Nine Power Treaty; the acceptance of a 5:5:3 ratio for capital ships by the three leading naval Powers, the United States, Great Britain and Japan; and the adoption of a self-denying ordinance in the matter of the construction of new bases and new fortifications in certain of the Pacific possessions of the three nations in question.

All these achievements are now of purely historical interest. The Nine Power Treaty, under which all Powers with Pacific interests except the Soviet Union (then unrecognized by most of the large countries) agreed to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China, was to all intents and purposes set aside by Japan's action in occupying Manchuria in 1931 and 1932 in the face of condemnation by the League of Nations and protests by the United States. In addition, Japan, through its Foreign Office spokesman, has put forward a claim to a preëminent position vis-à-vis China, with the right to veto any loans offered China by other countries which it might regard as "political." Such a claim is scarcely compatible with the coöperative régime envisaged at Washington. As neither China nor the Western Powers recognized it as valid, a note of uncertainty and instability has been introduced into Far Eastern international relations.

The Washington naval agreements have now gone the way of the political. Japan gave the prescribed two years' notice of denunciation of the Naval Treaty on December 29, 1934. Neither the conversations which took place in London toward the end of 1934 nor the conference which was held there a year later could find any formula of adjustment between the Japanese demand for full parity of naval strength with Great Britain and America and the unwillingness of the latter Powers to accept such a drastic modification of the Washington ratio. Several factors tended to make the Japanese representatives unyielding on the question of parity. The issue had become one of prestige; navalist agitation in

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Japan represented the lower ratio as a stigma of inferiority. Japan's continental responsibilities and risks had become greater as a result of the establishment of Manchukuo and the "forward policy" which was being inaugurated in North China. Another point stressed by Japanese naval experts with whom I have discussed the question is the enlarged cruising radius of warships and the greatly increased speed and efficiency of land and naval aircraft. These changes, it is argued, deprive Japan of the degree of security which the Washington ratio provided in 1922.

It is unlikely that Japan intends to utilize its new freedom in naval construction for the purpose of endeavoring to match the American or British navies keel for keel. There are formidable budgetary objections to any such attempt, especially at a time when the Army is absorbing some two billion yen of appropriations for a six-year plan designed primarily to strengthen its aviation and mechanized branches. Japanese admirals have always chafed under the category limitations which were laid down at Washington. What they welcome is the ability to build as many ships as they choose of any given type. Japanese strategic plans in the event of a Pacific war do not contemplate long-distance operations, with their battle fleet steaming thousands of miles away from its home bases to attack the American coasts. What is rather foreseen is the adoption of defensive tactics, in which relatively small swift ships — cruisers, destroyers and submarines — taking advantage of Japan's fringe of islands, can, it is believed, hold at bay and repulse an American or British naval force compelled to fight at immense distances from its bases.

Bases, it should be noted, are of equal value with ships in modern naval warfare, especially when the potential theatre of hostilities is as wide as the Pacific Ocean. The strongest navy in the world is seriously crippled as regards offensive striking power if it is obliged to sail many thousands of miles to attack its opponent, with no base on the route at which it can put in for refueling, repairs and general overhauling. Indeed, in some respects bases are more important than the actual numbers of ships of the line. Japan would probably view with more alarm and resentment the construction of a powerful American naval base in the Philippines or in Guam, which the well-known British naval critic Hector Bywater has described as the key to the Western Pacific, than the starting of work on several new battleships or heavy cruisers.

At Washington the three leading naval Powers agreed to forego

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

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the further fortification of certain Pacific possessions. In the case of the United States, these were the Aleutian Islands, the Philippines, Guam, Wake and Samoa; for Great Britain, they were Hong Kong and its South Sea Islands; for Japan, they were the Kuriles to the north and, to the south, Formosa, the Lu Chu and Bonin Islands, and the widely scattered groups of the Caroline, Marshall and Marianne Islands, former German possessions held by Japan under League mandate.

This agreement undoubtedly served to diminish the likelihood of an armed clash in the Pacific. In this respect it has operated in much the same fashion as wide demilitarized zones would along the frontiers of two land Powers. If the Aleutian and Kurile Islands bristled respectively with American and Japanese naval, air and submarine bases, the resultant tension, mutual fear and suspicion would inevitably be enhanced.

From a technical naval standpoint, the agreement not to construct naval bases has represented a greater sacrifice for the United States than for Japan. A Japanese naval base in Formosa would not increase the likelihood (not very great, in any case) of a Japanese attack on California or Hawaii. Bases in Formosa and in the Mandated Islands would, indeed, tighten the Japanese pincers about the Philippine Islands. But most American military and naval writers are in any event inclined to write off the Philippines as a certain Japanese conquest in the early stages of hostilities. On the other hand, an American naval base in Guam on the scale of Pearl Harbor (our Hawaiian base) or Singapore, and less than 1,500 miles from Yokohama, would not unnaturally be regarded in Japan as a direct menace to the Empire. Guam's high strategic importance is appraised as follows in a recent study of the strategy of a theoretical Japanese-American war:

> The nerve center of the Japanese Empire and its life-lines to Asia and the south, our objectives, are well within reach from Guam, and we could ask nothing better than to see our fleet established there with its chain of communications running to Pearl Harbor and the United States by way of Wake Island-Midway or (better yet) by way of the Carolines, the Marshalls, and Pearl Harbor.[1]

The Aleutian Islands are also of potential value to the United States. Attu, the westernmost of them, is only 800 miles from the nearest Japanese possession and about 2,000 miles from Yoko-

[1] "War in The Pacific," by Sutherland Denlinger and Charles B. Gary. New York: McBride 1936, p. 241.

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hama. A heavily fortified, well-equipped naval base at Dutch Harbor or at some other point in the Aleutians would appreciably increase American offensive naval power in the North Pacific.

The Philippines at the present time are protected against external aggression by potential American strength rather than by the forces actually stationed there. The American military establishment in the Philippines consists of about 4,000 American troops and 6,000 Philippine Scouts, the latter a Filipino force which is enrolled in the American Army. The American Asiatic Squadron, consisting of the flagship cruiser *Augusta*, thirteen destroyers and twelve submarines, with a few auxiliary vessels, is regularly at Cavite, the naval station on Manila Bay, during the winter months. During the summer the submarines and destroyers go to the North China ports, Chefoo and Tsingtao, for exercises and manœuvres. The Cavite navy yard is equipped for handling only small vessels; in fact, there are no facilities for docking large warships west of Pearl Harbor.

The American agreement to abstain from fortifying the Aleutians and Guam and to construct no new fortifications in the Philippines was a substantial concession to Japan's security and doubtless helped largely to win Japanese consent to the establishment of the 5:5:3 naval ratio. It meant that the United States voluntarily renounced certain strategic advantages of its Pacific possessions. It meant that, in the event of an American-Japanese conflict, the United States, unless it were acting in alliance or agreement with some other Power with oriental bases, would be severely handicapped in striking directly at its enemy.

In the latter part of 1936 Great Britain launched a trial balloon in the shape of a proposal that the agreement restricting bases and fortifications should remain in force after the lapse of the other provisions of the Treaty. The suggestion was coldly received in Washington and does not seem likely to bear practical fruit until and unless some new basis of understanding among the Pacific powers is attained. The American view is that the self-denying arrangement regarding naval bases was an integral part of the broad political settlement effected in the other Washington treaties and that there is no reason to retain this single feature when the rest of the arrangement has been scrapped.

What prompted Great Britain to make such a proposal? Several reasons are possible, alone or in combination. The British Foreign Office has always contained officials who favor avoiding a breach

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with Japan at all costs, and who wish Britain to hold a mediating position as between Japan and the United States. A proposal that would operate to the strategic advantage of Japan as against the United States might therefore be evaluated in Tokyo as a concession to the Japanese viewpoint, calculated to offset the effect of Great Britain's virtual alignment with the United States in rejecting the Japanese claim for parity.

A consideration of a quite different character also probably helped inspire the British move. Great Britain is bound to react sensitively to any southward advance of Japanese naval striking power. British interests in the South Pacific are numerous, important and varied. There lie the vital lines of communication with the dominions of the southern hemisphere, Australia and New Zealand. There lies the rich colony and protectorate of Malaya, which produces about 45 percent of the world's rubber and about 30 percent of the world's tin. There lies the vast and fertile tropical archipelago of the Dutch East Indies, against which any attack would be regarded in London as very nearly equivalent to an attack on the British Empire itself. From the British standpoint, then, the continuation of the present arrangement, under which Japan is precluded from creating any new naval base in Formosa or in the South Sea Islands, would be an eminently desirable objective. This is especially true because of the virtual completion of the mighty British base at Singapore, which has very great political as well as naval significance.[2] With a powerful modern base at Singapore and an advanced outpost at Hong Kong, Great Britain has nothing to gain and much to lose from alterations in the present system of bases and fortifications in the Western Pacific.[3]



The city of Singapore is located on the southern shore of the

[2] *Cf.* "The Strategy of Singapore," by Nicholas Roosevelt, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1929.

[3] The British naval force permanently stationed in Asiatic waters, although larger than the American, represents only a small part of the British Navy. It consists of eight cruisers, one aircraft carrier, nine destroyers, fifteen submarines, five sloops and sixteen gunboats.

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island of the same name, at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, near the eastern end of the Straits of Malacca. But the Base, which I recently had the opportunity of visiting, is tucked away on the northern side of the island, as well screened from observation and attack as possible. It fronts on the narrow Straits of Johore, which separate Singapore Island from the mainland; and it is in this secluded channel that the giants of the British Navy, should an emergency ever summon them to the Far East, will lie at anchor, waiting their turn for scraping and refitting. An area of about four square miles, not all of which is yet in use, has been reserved for the Base; and an impressive piece of reclamation work has been carried out on what was formerly a mangrove swamp.

The three main features of the Base are the huge floating dock, which had to be towed out to Singapore in several parts, and which has already been utilized by visiting warships; the cavernous solid concrete drydock, third largest of its kind in the world; and the quay, 2,200 feet long, which juts out into the Straits from the drydock. The drydock is the most impressive single sight of the Base. It is 1,000 feet long, 130 feet wide and about 80 feet in depth, and is provided with elaborate pumping machinery, located in a furnace-like underground chamber. It is capable of handling the *Queen Mary* or any warship afloat. Some dredging and excavation work are required before the dock is ready for use; but this is a matter of, at the most, a few months. The basic work, the laying of the massive concrete walls and foundations, has been completed. Numerous warehouses, storage tanks, repair shops, administrative buildings and bungalows for the residence of the naval and civilian personnel are scattered about on the territory of the Base. Only one vessel, the supply ship *Terror*, was in the Straits of Johore at the time of my visit. But it is expected that visits of warships will be frequent in the future and a squadron of lighter type ships may ultimately be stationed there.

Singapore is more than a naval base. Coördination there of land, air and naval arms is clearly foreseen. At the village of Selatar, about two miles from the Base, is one of the largest airports in the Orient. Passenger airplanes of Imperial Airways and of the Royal Dutch airline are constantly arriving and departing. The village acquires a distinctly military atmosphere from the presence of about 600 officers and men of the Royal Air Force and its steel hangars, large barracks and elaborate anti-aircraft defenses. The

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present air force at Singapore consists of two squadrons of bombing planes, equipped with torpedo bombers, and one squadron of the large flying boats which are especially well adapted for service amid the islands and channels or the surrounding region. Work is proceeding on two new airdromes, for exclusively military use, and there is every likelihood that the air force will be substantially augmented. Reconnaisance flights and bombing of targets in the water are practised steadily and intensively. A volunteer reserve flying force is also being built up. Aviation is evidently counted on very considerably in the plans for the security of Singapore. Another key point is the town of Changi, on the northeastern corner of the island, at the eastern entrance to the Straits of Johore. Here one finds sixteen blocks of barracks with accommodations for some 1,400 officers and men, a score or more of anti-aircraft guns, along with mines, searchlights, and other appurtenances of coast defense. There also are heavy guns, with a range of twenty miles, in carefully camouflaged emplacements.

The original decision to construct the Singapore Base was a direct result of the non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. And the perceptible speeding up of work on the Base during the last few years was in fairly direct proportion to the accelerated pace of the Japanese advance on the mainland of Asia. No amount of diplomatic reserve can obscure the fact that Singapore is primarily a bulwark against Japan.

No other Power but Japan is in a position to threaten Great Britain's interests in that part of the world. The only espionage that is feared in Singapore is Japanese. One alleged attempt to smuggle out documents revealing secret facts about the Base led to the spectacular suicide of a Japanese business man who was supposedly implicated in the case, and to the imprisonment of two of his accused accomplices. The importance which Japanese naval circles attach to Singapore is evident from the following excerpts from the book "Japan Must Fight Britain," by the retired Japanese naval officer, Lieut.-Commander Tota Ishimaru:[4]

Two conditions are essential to the successful development of British strategy in the Pacific. One is the completion of the base at Singapore, the other the presence there of a Fleet at the critical moment. The base will shortly be finished, but without a Fleet there at the right time and in a condition to operate, the Japanese Fleet would have a free hand, and Australia, New Zealand, India, and

[4] "Japan Must Fight Britain," pp. 209, 252. Lieut.-Commander Ishimaru's political thesis, that Japan must fight England, was specifically repudiated by the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs. This fact, however, does not affect the validity of his strategic speculations.

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the other possessions, together with the command of the sea in the Indian Ocean, would fall into the hands of the enemy. . . . Singapore, like Hong Kong, even more than Hong Kong, is a base essential to British operations. Were it invested, the danger of attempting to enter it would be so great that the British Fleet would have to find a base elsewhere, and there is none that is secure nearer than Australia. Therefore it would be to our advantage to attack it, whatever the risk.

Singapore is 1,625 miles distant from the southern end of Formosa and 2,520 miles away from Sasebo, the large naval base on Honshu, Japan's main island. In view of these distances it could scarcely serve as a starting point for a direct attack on Japan. But then a frontal attack on that magnificent natural fortress, the Japanese Island Empire, would hardly enter into British plans in the event of a conflict. A powerful naval and air force concentrated in Singapore could nevertheless perform several functions simultaneously. It could act as a sentinel for India, cut Japan's main trade route to Europe, afford some protection to the neighboring Dutch Indies, and make difficult any expedition against Australia.

Another consideration that may have figured in the British decision to build up Singapore is the present uncertainty regarding the status of the Philippines after 1946. There is little likelihood of external aggression against the Islands so long as the American flag is there. Japanese policy toward the Islands at the present time is reserved and discreet. There is careful self-limitation of Japanese emigration, and the Japanese authorities have avoided anything that savors of a hectoring or bullying attitude in connection with such issues as the leasing of hemp plantations to Japanese in Davao and the limitation of Japanese textile exports. But if a complete severance of all ties, political and economic, between the United States and the Philippines actually occurs when the Commonwealth period comes to an end on July 4, 1946, a new and unstable situation will arise. No one can foresee with absolute certainty whether the Philippines, if thrown on their own resources and exposed to the severe crisis that may ensue after the withdrawal of the right of preferential access to the American market, will be able to preserve political and social stability, whether the withdrawal of American influence may not in time be followed by the coming of the Japanese. The Philippines lie on the flank of the sea route from Singapore to Hong Kong and Shanghai and adjoin the Dutch East Indies on the south. Neither Great Britain nor France, the one with large vested interests in China and possessions in Malaya, the other

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with its big colony of Indo-China, could regard Japanese domination there with detachment.

It is the general testimony of American naval officers in Far Eastern stations that relations with their British colleagues have never been so wholeheartedly cordial as during recent years. A recent visit of the American Asiatic Squadron to Singapore was noteworthy in this respect; the reception was overwhelmingly hospitable and the American Admiral was entertained as the house guest of the British Governor of the Straits Settlements. One local newspaper, the *Singapore Free Press*, saw in the visit an omen for future Anglo-American naval coöperation in the Pacific. And there, as in other British communities in the Far East, one hears expressions of regret that Mr. Stimson's overtures for cooperative action in 1931 were so coolly received by Sir John Simon. This cordial attitude is in marked contrast to the coolness in British-Japanese naval relations which set in after the alleged maltreatment of three British sailors by the police of Keelung, the chief port of Formosa. Failing to obtain what they regarded as proper satisfaction for this incident, the British authorities have suspended for the time being the ordinary exchanges of courtesy naval visits between British and Japanese warships.

Pinpricks like the Keelung affair and the more solid fact that Singapore was built primarily as a defense against Japan do not signify that war between Japan and Great Britain is imminent or inevitable or probable. Throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century Russia was regarded as the enemy of the British Empire, the potential menace to India. Yet no Anglo-Russian conflict occurred; and in the World War the two countries were found on the same side. Today there are strong forces that militate against any outright clash between Britain and Japan. Japan retains substantial respect for Great Britain's sea power and is even more impressed by British financial and economic strength. For its part, Great Britain would certainly be very reluctant to risk becoming embroiled in conflict with the strongest Asiatic military and naval Power at a time when the European situation is so threatening and uncertain.

The fact remains that Great Britain, concerned to protect its great volume of investment in China, is playing a very active rôle in Far Eastern diplomacy and finance — a much more active rôle than is the United States. American policy has been essentially passive during the last few years. In contrast, Great Brit-

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ain through its financial envoy, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, took an active part in encouraging China to make the momentous shift from a silver to a managed paper currency. And there have been several tentative British efforts, all blocked by Japan, to arrange some form of financial advance to China. Discreet British diplomatic inquiries in Tokyo regarding Japan's intentions in China have served, on several occasions, to restrain Japan from undertaking some of her more far-reaching military schemes.

While Great Britain has been constructing the huge Singapore base as an expression of its unwillingness to permit any drastic alteration of the *status quo* in East Asia, the United States and Japan, restrained by the terms of the Washington Treaty, have remained within the limitations set in 1922 regarding the construction of naval bases. Allegations have been made that Japan has fortified its mandated islands, and the League of Nations Mandates Commission has gone so far on occasion as to observe that harbor and public works development in some of the larger islands seems out of proportion to economic necessities. But no concrete evidence of illegal action is forthcoming.

As yet neither the United States nor Japan has indicated whether any use will be made of the release from treaty restrictions on the establishment of naval bases. The policy of each country will doubtless be influenced by that of the other. Before the American Government and public come to a decision that may some day prove to have been a serious influence for war or peace in the Pacific they should weigh the following questions:

What obligations, if any, will the United States assume toward the Philippines at the expiration of the Commonwealth period? Are American political, trade and investment interests in China important enough to warrant the additional expense and the increase in the risk of war which would be involved in the construction of an American naval base in a location where it would challenge Japan's sense of security in her home waters? Should the Pacific Fleet plan to be able to carry on offensive operations in the distant waters of the Western Pacific or should it set as its main strategic problem the easier task of defending the line Alaska-Hawaii? How far is closer coöperation with Great Britain in the Far East possible and desirable?

Fortunately these problems can be studied without any sense of strain and urgency. There is no immediate crisis in our relations with any of the Far Eastern nations that calls for hasty action.

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CHOICES BEFORE THE BALTIC STATES

By Benjamin Akzin

WHEN the representatives of the small nationalities on the western border of Russia made their plea for independence in 1918 and 1919 several reasons were brought forward why it should be granted. One was the principle of national self-determination, just proclaimed by President Wilson. Another, dear to the heart of British politicians of the old school, was the desire to weaken Russia. A third, uppermost in Clemenceau's mind, was the idea of surrounding the "Red area" with a "sanitary cordon" which would preserve the rest of Europe from being contaminated by Communism. A fourth reason, advocated by French military strategists, was the desirability of setting up a group of states under Allied influence between two potential military allies — Russia and Germany. Thus anyone could choose his particular reason for favoring the independence for the border nations. In the final analysis, the real reason they gained independence was Soviet Russia's extreme political weakness in those years; but they accomplished their aims amidst the blessings of Europe and America. And the chief reason European leaders approved was because they desired to isolate Russia from the rest of Europe, and in particular to separate her from Germany.

On the whole, the border states fulfilled what was expected of them. They proved intensive hothouses of modern nationalism, with its various advantages and defects. Because the popular mind was so busy creating new national systems, and — perhaps — because of the familiarity of the local population with some extremely unattractive features of early Communism, they remained immune to communistic doctrine. How far they contributed to the weakening of Russia must remain unsettled; but if all the Baltic territories had remained Russian, and if Moscow had been able to cope successfully with the various national problems involved, undoubtedly Soviet Russia would have been a tremendously stronger entity. As for their function in separating Germany and Russia, two possible allies, this indeed was a major service of the border states from 1920 to 1933. During that time only one link was missing in the pro-Ally front of the border states: Lithuania. Poland's annexation of Wilno had left the Lithuanians no choice but to fall back on Russia and Germany.

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Since Hitler's advent in Germany the border states again have begun to play an important part in the political system of Europe due to their geographical position between Germany and Russia. Now, however, these two Great Powers no longer face one another as potential allies: they have changed into deadly enemies. In this situation the border states have served for several years as an effective buffer. Despite the fact that Germany was not yet thoroughly prepared for military undertakings, and despite Russian reluctance to become embroiled abroad, the atmosphere of hostility between the two nations, constantly kept alive by verbal and press attacks, has been so intense that if the two territories had been contiguous frontier incidents would have been sure to occur and these might in turn have led to war. That there still is peace in Europe, then, is due in part at least to the existence of the chain of border states between Russia and Germany.

But will the buffer suffice to ward off war indefinitely? Perhaps. There is much to be said for the British policy of postponing radical decisions in the international sphere. For, despite everything, it is not at all certain that "war must come." Internal changes may take place in Italy or Germany or Japan, which may result in the diversion of one of these nations from projects of aggression. This is not likely; but neither is it impossible. To postpone war is therefore a highly important task of present-day diplomacy. And among the factors operating to postpone war, the border states have their place.

We cannot conceal from ourselves, however, that there is sufficient fuel ready at hand to start a war almost at any time; and clearly in any European war Russia and Germany will be involved as two of the opposing belligerents, Russia to preserve the *status quo*, Germany to satisfy its desire for expansion. What would be the attitude of the border states in this event? The answer is of great interest to the outside world, and of overwhelming importance to those small states themselves. Public opinion there is not yet crystallized, but the process is well under way. The factors at work will be analyzed in the following pages.

II

A truly remarkable change in orientation has taken place in Poland. Until 1933, that is to say while Soviet Russia and Germany were potential allies, Poland clung steadfastly to the French alliance, ready and willing to tackle Germany despite the

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

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danger of a simultaneous attack by Russia. In 1933 Russia veered into the French orbit, and as a consequence partnership with France became much safer for Poland than it had been before. Yet at this very moment Poland developed a sudden tendency to forego the guarantees of a French alliance and to seek salvation in an attitude of isolated neutrality backed by non-aggression treaties with both Germany and Russia. However, this was a flimsy hope: isolation from France hurts Poland much more than it could possibly hurt France. If Germany were to make a choice between attacking France backed by Russia and England, or attacking Russia, a powerful nation not devoid of allies, or attacking Poland, a much weaker opponent who had chosen to isolate herself from her former friends, she clearly would pick on Poland as the most convenient opponent, treaty or no treaty.

To escape this danger, Polish statesmen went so far as to play for a while with the idea of actively making common cause with the Germans in a campaign against Russia and Czechoslovakia. That so much overreaching seemed necessary indicates how little security Poland can hope to find in an attitude of neutral detachment.[1] To avoid the risk of having to serve as a marching-ground for Russian soldiers on their way to Germany, it was willing voluntarily to assume the part of a marching-ground for German soldiers on their way to Russia! The Polish Government came close to doing just that; but the pendulum swung back in time. Warsaw perceived what overwhelming risks the scheme involved. In the first place, the probability is that if Poland definitely sided with Germany the latter's aggressive powers would be so increased that she would precipitate the very war which Poland, essentially a satisfied nation, is so anxious to avoid. Further, if the German-Polish coalition were victorious, Poland would probably have to submit to a continuing and oppressive German hegemony. Its only possible compensation would be a further increase in its Russian, Ukrainian, or Lithuanian minorities — and the numbers of these already constitute a severe strain on the internal structure. Nor would the victory be at all certain, in view of the probable intervention of powerful Western nations in the conflict; while a defeat, though it might not disrupt the essential unity of Germany, would probably end in disaster for Poland. Lastly, the risks that would be presented by a general war might

[1] On this subject see Akzin, "La Pologne à la croisée des chemins," in *L'Esprit International*, 1935, p. 210–223.

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lead the Germans at the last minute to seek relief in the direction of a comparatively easy little war against Poland — a sufficient outlet for all German ambitions, and a fairly safe course in view of the thorough dislike which Poland by that time would have incurred in Russia, France and Czechoslovakia.

These arguments seem to have been operating in Poland in the last year, and today the Polish Government shows definite indications of realigning itself with France. The evolution is by no means complete, and the writer does not venture to predict the outcome. But the following prognosis can be offered. If Poland decides to stay with Germany or to remain on the fence, the present European tension may be relieved in the end, without a general war ever occurring, by the simple means of a two-sided conflict between Germany and an isolated Poland. If, on the other hand, Poland takes its place with the Franco-Russian-Czech alliance, it will find itself, should war come, in a risky position but nevertheless supported by a coalition sufficiently strong to offer reasonable prospects of victory. Even more important, however, is the fact that Poland's definite adherence to such a bloc would make that bloc so strong that Germany might recoil before the danger of defeat, and thus war might be averted altogether.

III

To the north of Poland lies Lithuania, a country of two and a half million inhabitants. Lithuania continues to nourish deep resentment against its southern neighbor for having taken by sheer force the richest part of its traditional patrimony, a region with a million inhabitants and including the former Lithuanian capital, Wilno. This resentment against Poland has conditioned the whole of Lithuanian foreign policy since 1920. In turn, it is due to the unsettled relations prevailing between Lithuania and Poland that the two other Baltic countries, Latvia and Estonia, despite their many affinities and common interests with Lithuania, have hesitated to associate themselves with it too closely lest they also incur Polish hostility. And thus it came about that Lithuania, finding little active sympathy among its natural allies or among the Western nations allied with Poland, turned toward Germany, the other "aggrieved" state of that part of the world, and even — despite fundamental differences in political and social outlook — toward Soviet Russia.

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The practicability of any close Lithuanian relationship with Russia was lessened by the absence of a common frontier: the area taken over by the Poles lay between. As for the initial sympathy felt towards Germany, this was largely swallowed up in Lithuanian impatience at having to play the part of an impotent martyr. Smarting under the blow which the seizure of Wilno dealt their national pride, the Lithuanian people decided to find partial compensation, and incidentally to relieve their pent-up rage, by a similar *coup de force*. They accordingly occupied the city of Memel. This happened in 1923, in a period when Germany was particularly weak and just when French troops were already preparing to march into the Ruhr. From that time on, German-Lithuanian friendship not unnaturally cooled off quite considerably.

Lithuania was not merely resentful towards Poland; it also was fearful. In Poland, as in Hungary, the ruling caste of large landowners is accustomed to dominate a peasantry of other nationalities and hence is not inhibited in its expansionist aspirations by regard for mere ethnographical frontiers. Casting an eye over surrounding countries, Polish expansionists long ago perceived that the simplest and safest road to glory lay in the annexation of the remaining part of Lithuania, a country relatively without friends and at the same time united to Poland by ancient religious and political ties. Following the Memel *coup*, voices were not lacking in Germany suggesting a Polish-German understanding at the expense of Lithuania. One solution contemplated that Germany should receive back most of the provinces she had lost to Poland, while the latter in compensation would receive most or all of Lithuania. Alternatively, it was suggested that Lithuania be divided, Poland receiving the southeastern part of the country and Germany the northwest, with a view to permitting further German expansion toward Latvia and Estonia.

In recent years, as German expansionist trends grew more and more marked and as the German-Polish understanding matured, the Lithuanian Government felt that the dangers of a joint attack against it had become uncomfortably real. More and more it tended to seek salvation in friendship with Russia and in solidarity with Latvia and Estonia. Lately Lithuania has almost become willing to let bygones be bygones with regard to Wilno, if only it could be assured of its present *status quo*, if only it could be relieved of the fear of a Polish attack. It has been able to register

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some success in this connection. Last year, when the Memel controversy with Germany was at its height, the Soviet Government officially declared that an invasion of Lithuania would not leave Soviet Russia indifferent. On the other hand, Latvia and Estonia, impressed by the new defensive trend of Lithuanian policy and the lapse of the former tendency to foster an anti-Polish irredenta, and even more impressed by the common danger of German expansion eastwards, seem to be making up their minds that they would have to come to the assistance of their southern neighbor in case it was attacked. Of course if Poland actually took its place with the *status quo* states Lithuanian fears would be greatly relieved.

But whatever friendships it may form, Lithuania remains the most vulnerable of all the border states. Its own powers of defense (like those of Latvia and Estonia) are negligible. To the factors already mentioned add the fact that Lithuania lies on the direct route from East Prussia to Moscow, and it will be understood that any war spells disaster for Lithuania and that its chief preoccupation must be to preserve peace. Are there any active contributions to peace that Lithuania might conceivably make? Two are possible: a very careful handling of the Memel situation, with a view to avoiding any incidents which might precipitate a war; and a definite alignment with those nations which are ready to oppose aggression in Europe. Lithuania now seems to have decided to act cautiously in Memel; nevertheless, no one would dare say for certain that some shattering incident, provoked or unprovoked, might not occur in the little Baltic port. The second contribution is one which Lithuania began making long ago, for whatever it may be worth. The fact is, of course, that Lithuania's small resources neither frighten its potential enemies nor give much consolation to its potential allies. Still, with what little force it commands, Lithuania pulls steadfastly with the powers of consolidation.

There is a third conceivable Lithuanian contribution: to renounce Memel entirely. The Lithuanian Government does not seem to consider this possibility seriously. And indeed, the forces and appetites that form the essential cause of European unrest today — Germany's urge for expansion — are so Gargantuan that to attempt to satisfy them by throwing Memel to Germany would be childish. From the Lithuanian point of view, to cede Memel to Germany would be to acquiesce pointlessly in an amputation of territory — pointlessly because it could not con-

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ceivably mitigate the danger of war.[2] Nor would it make any difference from a military viewpoint, for within a day after war had broken out Memel would be occupied by German troops and all its port facilities and the man power of its population would be at Germany's disposal.

Once a war has started, there will be no such thing for Lithuania as neutrality. It has only the choice which Belgium had in 1914. In the prevailing circumstances, what this choice would be is not open to doubt: it will side with Russia and against Germany. Meanwhile, it watches closely the position which Poland will assume, hardly knowing what to pray for. If Poland sides with Germany, the odds against Lithuania are overwhelming for the duration of the campaign; but final victory would mean reunion with Wilno. If Poland sides with Russia, the military picture is somewhat brighter; but at the end of the period of suffering there appears no glittering prize.

IV

The two million inhabitants of Latvia, Lithuania's northern neighbor, would not weigh heavily in the balance of a European war, but individually they enjoy the reputation of being the best fighters east of Germany. The Lettish regiments were the pride of the Russian infantry in the days of the World War, and later they served as the backbone of the early Red armies. The country's strategic position is determined by its common frontier with Russia (the slower of the two prospective major belligerents) and by the absence of a common land frontier with Germany (which will probably be the more rapid in mobilizing and advancing its troops). Moreover, its extensive Baltic shoreline makes it a likely spot for German landing operations. In general, resistance to Russian invasion would mean the rapid overrunning and destruction of most of the Latvian territory by Russian troops, with the probability that southern Latvia would serve as a first line of battle between them and the German armies. To side with Russia might mean that the main battlefields would remain further to the southwest, with merely the danger of German attacks on the Latvian coast and from the air.

The sympathies of the Lettish people are with neither of the prospective antagonists. Russia is a former sovereign power

[2] This is not to say that in a sane world, where territorial disputes were solved by popular vote in areas under dispute, Memel would not return to Germany by overwhelming vote.

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which tried to impose on them its political and cultural domination, and represents in addition a thoroughly disliked political and social system. Germany is the nation which supplied the haughty and oppressive landlords of other days, landlords who have not become reconciled to the freedom of their former serfs; those former serfs regard that nation neither with forgiveness for the past nor with confidence in the future.

Like Estonia, Latvia would remain if it could outside the opposing blocs now being formed in Europe and would try equally hard to maintain its neutrality if ever war broke out. But would the belligerents respect Latvian neutrality? Hardly. It lies too close to — if not on — the battle-line. Besides, the very existence of Lithuania would plainly be involved in any general future war. If Lithuania, or part of it, fell into German hands, Germany's desire to regain her historical predominance in the "Baltic provinces" — Latvia and Estonia — would soon result in the submission of those countries. On the other hand, a Latvia which had declined to join in the struggle might not escape the wrath of a victorious Russia. The truth of the matter is that, within the last two years, Latvia has already made up its mind. It realizes the extreme improbability of being permitted to stay neutral; it realizes further that if it did so it would lie helpless and isolated at the mercy of the victor once the war was over; therefore it has decided to take its stand with one of the opposing parties.

Latvia is not willing to stake its future on the mere question of "defending its neutrality," which would mean joining in the attack on whatever belligerent first penetrated its territory. Its stand is dictated by the consideration that Russia is, on the whole, satisfied with its frontiers whereas Germany is land-hungry and looks toward the East. For that reason, it is fairly confident that it could maintain its independence in case victory lay with its Russian ally. It thinks that if it joined a German bloc, and that side emerged victorious, German troops would simply forget to leave when the war was over. In case of defeat, Latvia's independence is of course compromised in either case.

Moved by these considerations, the present Latvian Government — an authoritarian dictatorship — is preparing to cast the country's lot with Soviet Russia, Lithuania and the other nations which are willing to defend the *status quo* against aggression. Aside from purely practical reasons, this choice is another demonstration of the tremendous force of nationalism as the supreme

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moulder of European opinion. Latvia's antipathy for Russia springs mainly from a desire to preserve the existing economic and social system; its antipathy for Germany flows from the desire to preserve its national independence. The latter antipathy is the stronger.

V

Estonia with its 1,200,000 inhabitants lies to the north of Latvia, somewhat aside from the main theater of battle. Its value from the German point of view consists in the close approach it offers to Leningrad in case of a German-Russian war; while the Soviets take it into consideration because it lies just on the outskirts of their great northwestern industrial center and also because the lines of communication which pass through it would become extremely important if an equivocal Polish attitude rendered the roads further south unsafe.

As far as political and social factors are concerned, the situation in Estonia is almost identical with that in Latvia. As in the case of its southern neighbor, Estonia faces a choice between antipathies rather than a choice between sympathies. This fact, as well as the country's extreme vulnerability to an attack from the East, almost precludes the possibility of its joining the anti-Russian group. On the other hand, it lies further from Germany than Latvia does, and so the danger of German annexation appears less real. Moreover, the cultural and political influence of Finland and Sweden, always strong among Estonians, adds to their determination to keep neutral. Latvia and Estonia have signed a treaty of defensive alliance with Lithuania; and all three countries have participated recently in general staff conferences with Russian military leaders, including Marshal Gegoroff, Soviet Chief of Staff, during the visit he paid to the Baltic States this past February. Despite these indications, it seems that Estonian opinion is not yet reconciled to the idea of giving up neutrality. Estonia will try to keep neutral if possible. If it must choose sides, the choice is made: it will march with Russia, Latvia and Lithuania.

VI

The furthest north among the border states is Finland, a nation with 3,800,000 inhabitants. No objective reason exists why Finland could not remain essentially and serenely neutral in case Germany and Soviet Russia engaged in a death struggle. It does

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not lie in the direct line of fighting. Its inhabitants are sturdy soldiers, and Moscow would not dream of wantonly adding them to the list of its enemies if it could arrange to have them remain neutral. For them to be neutral is all that Russia could ask, for in that case the flank of Leningrad would be secure and a line of communication would remain open with northwestern Europe. Even the Germans, though they regard Finland as an ideal military, naval and air base for operations against Russia, would not risk invading the country unless sure of a friendly welcome. German landing forces that met resistance there would find themselves in a sad plight.

Indeed, Finland is the only one among the border states, and one of the few states in Europe, in the enviable position of not being a playball of international politics, of being a master of its own fate, of being permitted to decide for itself whether it wants war or peace, and of probably having this decision respected by all the belligerents.

Should it of its own accord decide in favor of war, the probability is that Finland would side with Germany. Powerful Finnish elements are sympathetic with the present political tenets of Germany. There is no tradition of distrust toward Germany, and no reason why distrust should develop. Finland has had to deal with Germany only once in its history — in 1918, when Germany intervened in Finland in the fight against Communist Russia. From that struggle Finland emerged independent; the Germans withdrew; and the Finns have retained a sense of gratitude to them. On the other hand, distrust toward Russia is traditional. Imperial Russia tried to smother self-government in Finland and reduce the country to the status of a "coördinated" province. Short-lived democratic Russia hesitated in 1917 to acknowledge Finnish independence. Red Russia tried to subdue Finland by force and only withdrew in face of strong resistance. In addition, the vast region of Karelia, lying just across the Soviet border, is inhabited by people closely related ethnically to the Finns — a glittering prize to be won in case of victory. There is nothing that Finland could win if it joined an anti-German coalition, even if it were victorious. All these circumstances create a fertile soil in which to propagate the idea of a "crusade against the communist revolution." The strongly individualistic Finnish farmer would in any case be quite susceptible to that argument.

Of course other forces would operate to keep Finland neutral.

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These can be reduced to four. One is the natural desire to preserve peace, when peace can be had for the asking. Another lies in the tremendous economic advantages which would accrue to a neutral Finland out of commerce with a belligerent Russia. A third is the influence of the strongly socialistic proletariat of Finnish cities. A fourth is the pervading habit of emulating the Scandinavian states, whose peaceful, civilized outlook makes them symbols of true progress in Finnish eyes. So long as the Scandinavian countries remain neutral, nothing will induce Finland to join Russia — unless Germany, angered by the extent of Finland's neutral trade with Russia, were to bombard Finland from the sea or from the air. And even if the Scandinavian countries rallied to the defense of the Covenant of the League and perhaps joined an anti-German coalition, Finland would still hesitate: the dislike of Russia is too strong. It is not to be wiped out by diplomatic visits like the one paid recently to Moscow by Foreign Minister Holsti, though doubtless that will help smooth the path for more normal relations between the two neighbor states.

VII

Each of the border states has now been treated as an entity. But the question arises whether the conflicting attitudes of political factions or of national minorities within each state may not threaten its national unity in case of war. The truth is that, except in Poland, no such complications are likely to arise. In the first place, none of the countries in question has any appreciable pacifist movement which would be in a position to make propaganda or organize effective resistance against participation in a war which the government favored. Further, the prevailing nationalist ideology leads members of the dominant nationality to rally around their state with a fervor and loyalty transcending all political and economic conflicts.

It cannot be sufficiently emphasized for the American reader how strongly nationalism is entrenched east of Germany. Fundamentally, it is stronger there even than in the Reich. The National Socialist emphasis on national solidarity seems almost artificial to a people already thoroughly used to consider its nationality and its national state or states as matter-of-fact phenomena. Further east this is not so. There constant friction between nationalities living at close quarters has made every person painfully sensitive to anything affecting national interests. The

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states which have been created there are first and foremost manifestations of the active and conscious political and cultural domination of national majorities in given regions. The members of each majority feel a profound sense of national solidarity which swallows up political and economic differences. Whatever course promises to better the chances of survival of the "national state" can be sure of the loyal support of the dominant nationality.

The issue at stake in the cases of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia — in the order of decreasing intensity — is how best to maintain the political and cultural domination of the Lithuanians, the Letts, and the Estonians respectively. Now it happens that these peoples think that their domination is threatened by Germany rather than by Russia. Hence their decision to join the Russian bloc if they cannot remain safely neutral. Of course this decision is particularly applauded by the socialist and communist groups. But actually the decision is being reached under the leadership of governments belonging to the semi-fascistic Right. True, in the three countries under discussion there exist still more extreme Right groups which are in opposition to the existing régimes. But even if they met with political success they would not be able, either in Lithuania or Latvia, to change the essentials of the national problem and to modify what seems the inevitable political orientation. In Estonia, where the danger of German hegemony is considered to be more remote, the success of the Right opposition might well strengthen the case for neutrality, with a tendency even to favor the anti-Russian bloc if once Russia began showing signs of internal disruption or military weakness. But even there that tendency would hardly result in definite pro-German action.

As for the national minorities in these States, a mere statistical analysis proves how little they would be able to affect government policy. The population of Lithuania (aside from Memel) consists of 75.1 percent Lithuanians, 7.3 Jews, 3.2 Poles, 2.2 Russians, 1.2 Germans, and one percent others; Latvia has 75.4 percent Letts, 11.9 Russians, 4.8 Jews, 3.2 Germans, 2.5 Poles, 1.2 Lithuanians, and one percent others; Estonia has 88.1 percent Estonians, 8.2 Russians, 1.5 Germans, 0.7 Swedes, 0.5 Letts, 0.4 Jews, and 0.6 others.

National independence is not at stake in Finland. Hence the probability that Finland will stay neutral. The Finnish labor

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movement is hardly strong enough (there are 83 socialist members in a parliament of 200) to engage Finland in a war on Russia's side, even if it wished to do so. But presumably it is strong enough to keep the country out of an anti-Russian war. National minorities are not a complication here either. The population contains 89.4 percent Finns, 10.1 Swedes, and 0.5 others.

In Poland, however, the picture is much more complicated. While our analysis has seemed to show that Poland's vital national interests would best be served by coöperation with the nations determined to resist non-aggression, there are important Polish elements which sincerely favor a policy of neutrality or even adherence to the German bloc. Whichever course Poland finally chooses, public opinion is likely to be much divided, and this might lead to serious internal conflicts in case military upsets occurred. This consideration is particularly serious in view of the half-hearted nature of the Polish dictatorship. It is severe enough to arouse the deep hostility of opposition groups; it has not been severe enough to abolish them or to bring about a superficial national unity like that achieved in Russia, Italy and Germany. There already exist strongly entrenched and well-organized forces of the Right opposition, of the socialists, and of the peasant party, each ready to try to take over the government at the first opportunity. Most serious of all is the country's "nationality map." No satisfactory statistics on Poland's minorities have ever been made available, but the best estimates would give about 64 percent Poles, 17 percent Ukrainians and Ruthenians, 10 percent Jews, 4 percent White Russians, 4 percent Germans, and one percent others, of whom a large part seems to be Lithuanians. With the exception of the Jews, who live dispersed all over the country, the minorities live in concentrated areas. A bloc of seven million Ukrainians, White Russians and Lithuanians live along the Russian frontier; another bloc of one million Germans stretch along the border of the German Reich. Obviously, Poland would run tremendous risks in any war, whatever rôle she chose to play. Hence the feverish search of Polish statesmen for a solution which will prevent war altogether, or, if the worst comes, will best ensure the preservation of Polish unity.

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THE MODERN DIPLOMAT

By H

EVEN the least thoughtful of diplomats must look nowadays with dismay upon the field of his professional activity. If it is the purpose of diplomacy to develop and diversify international relationships, to avoid international conflicts, to foster understanding and thereby promote confidence, tolerance and mutual esteem, then clearly it has failed and failed miserably. And today, to make its tasks still more difficult, new causes of conflict between nations are being added to those which the past has accustomed us to consider as usual, if not inevitable.

We have often relied upon the play of divergent and conflicting currents of opinion inside a given country to temper that country's foreign policy and mitigate whatever asperities it might from time to time display. In other words, we placed a certain measure of confidence in the ability of individuals to reason for themselves and to offer independent criticism. Such a view implied, of course, that a considerable number of persons had received an adequate education and as a result were capable of offering resistance to irrational emotionalism. In the world in which now we are living that conception of the rôle of the individual is no longer as generally valid as it used to be, and in large and important areas it is energetically repudiated. Education, far from taking as its essential purpose the development of an autonomous personality, is becoming a factory process for the wholesale manufacture of standardized automatons conditioned to respond to emotional appeals. In many lands, propaganda is substituted for education and a crude emotionalism has usurped the place of those qualities, moral and intellectual, heretofore intimately linked with the very idea of the human personality. Nor is the child the only victim. The adult is preyed upon by the same forces, and thanks to a directed press and the influence of the motion picture and the radio shows unmistakable signs of becoming incapable of independent thought and action.

Coincidently with the eclipse of the individual as such there has developed a new conception of the state, or rather a conception which has been known in history from time to time, particularly in the Orient, but which today can be described as new because of the vastly more powerful instrumentalities through

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which it can act both at home and abroad. We have thought of the life of the individual as composed of a complex network of coördinated loyalties: religious, domestic, professional, recreational and political. These loyalties are now being suppressed in the name of a single, all-embracing loyalty to a super-state, which relentlessly strives to appropriate to itself the whole man — soul, mind and body — and which demands from its followers not the rational and voluntary service of the citizen but the blind worship of the fanatic.

In its long history nationalism has at different times meant different things. In its more idyllic phase it espoused humanitarianism and became identified with the cause of liberty not only in some one particular country, but throughout the world. The nationalism of today is often of a very different kind. The difference can perhaps best be described in the terms of modern psychiatry: over-compensation or the striving of the individual to escape from some weakness or from the memory of some painful experience by developing out of all proportion qualities entirely opposite to, or at least incompatible with, those associated with the weakness or the painful experience. The timid and defeated boy, for instance, becomes the blustering and over-aggressive adult. In fact, the relationship between feelings of inferiority and superiority is often so intimate as to amount to cause and effect. Much of modern nationalism is essentially an attempt to escape from a painful past and to endow the resulting superiority complex with an ideology. And just as the individual who seeks to achieve by over-compensation a precarious adjustment between his weakness and the world of reality is apt to adopt a peculiarly aggressive type of intolerance and a will to domination, so does the nation swayed by a neurotic nationalism tend to express itself along similar lines.

An age which is witnessing the submergence of the individual in the nationalistic and totalitarian state has also seen a radical transformation in the scope and character of war. We have traveled a long way from the small professional army of the eighteenth century to the nation in arms, chemical warfare and the mechanized fighting forces of today. The abolition of any effective distinction between armed forces and civilian population began during the Great War. The results of war among modern industrialized countries can no longer be stated satisfactorily in the old and comparatively simple terms of victor and vanquished. There

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is no real victor in such a war, and its results are to be measured in terms of a general deterioration of the processes of civilization, if not of a destruction of civilization itself.

To the diplomat, the consequences of the emergence of these newer forces in international affairs are clear. The totalitarian state, in the founding and maintenance of which violence and intolerance have played an important part, tends eventually to seek an outlet for its feverish and emotional nationalism in aggression outside its boundaries. The extreme centralization of authority, the development of propaganda technique, and the suppression of public opinion mean that such aggression can be planned and carried out with a consistency and an efficiency before unknown. Finally, the nature of modern warfare has vastly increased the destructiveness of sudden aggression. At the very time, therefore, when the task of the diplomat has become more difficult, the consequences of his failure are more appalling in extent as well as in degree. What is he doing to meet this responsibility and avert these consequences?

Diplomacy is a conservative profession and clings to its traditional methods. Those who fill its leading positions are often older men accustomed by many years' service to a set way of doing things and adjusted to dealing with an official class which is very much the same the world over. The frequency with which a diplomat is moved from one country to another naturally makes him prone to fall in with traditional procedures and conventional points of view. If we look at the matter broadly and include in our survey not only the diplomat but others interested in international problems, we may distinguish four principal techniques.

There is in the first place the technique of routine. Its devotees fall into two categories, superficially different but fundamentally the same. There are those in countless diplomatic missions and consulates the world over who are carrying on a daily round of small duties, and often carrying them on conscientiously and well. There also are those, as a rule in high places, who are devoting themselves wholeheartedly to the solution of the larger problems of diplomacy, but whose approach, qualitatively speaking, does not differ from that of the first group. In each there is the same painstaking regard for the traditional procedures, the same unwillingness to penetrate beneath the surface of problems, the same instinctive fear of novelty.

Widely different from the technique of routine is that of the

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idealist. Here again there are distinctions to make. Starting from the premise that things are very wrong indeed and that fundamental changes are therefore in order, one sort of idealist espouses changes so general in form and predicated upon so optimistic a view of human nature and so contrary to the teachings of history that their application is obviously impossible. Another group ascribes to some one specific and often quite realizable change a broad reformative value which it cannot possess. Both manifestations of the idealistic technique are particularly characteristic of the United States. The reason is clear. In our vast country, bounded by oceans on two sides and with Canada to the north and Mexico to the south, we do not know the cramped feeling and the haunting fear that make an idealistic approach to international relations so particularly difficult in Europe. That is why so much of our idealism is misunderstood abroad and why it fails to produce the desired results; it also is why, as a defense reaction, we are so prone to ascribe to the European rather more than his share of original sin and of a tendency to intrigue.

Another of the approaches to international affairs — the economic — is also especially congenial to the American mind, nor will anybody with a knowledge of contemporary world problems contest its partial validity. Only when the scope of the economic factor is so extended as virtually to become economic determinism does it become dangerous. But with Americans it naturally tends to gravitate in that direction. When we are puzzled by some problem of domestic policy we often say (or at least we used often to say) that what is needed is "a good practical business man." In the same way we tend to emphasize the importance of economic and financial factors in international situations to the limit, and beyond.

The legal technique in international affairs has had many distinguished exponents. Specialists in international law and lawyers have held innumerable high offices and played various rôles in world politics, sometimes as advisers, often, particularly in the United States, in an executive capacity. It is fair to say that on the whole those who have adopted this technique have tended to see international relations in terms of contracts and juridical mechanisms rather than in terms that are more fundamental and realistic. Their chief instruments have been argument and rebuttal and an appeal to reason. But obviously that sort of activity covers a relatively restricted field.

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If now we put side by side in our minds the picture of international relations as they exist today, and the four principal techniques by which they are handled, a startling fact emerges. Not one of the techniques puts the men who operate it into direct touch with or gives them any adequate control over the forces which actually are shaping international relations at the present time. The exponent of the routine or traditional technique is not interested in these forces; he does his daily task and asks no questions. The idealist is absorbed by his great dreams or by his favorite little panacea. The economist will listen to nothing but economics, and the international lawyer is indignant and bewildered when his treaties are violated and his arguments flouted. We are in somewhat the same position as the doctor before bacteriology became a recognized branch of medicine. We have no adequate picture of the disease entity and we are ignorant of the causative agent and of how it is transmitted. As a result, we treat symptoms.

To influence the forces which today are shaping the relations of states we must pass over most of the people who are dealing with those relations day by day in what we are accustomed to consider a practical way, and we must fix our attention upon the creators of ideas and upon those who can invest ideas with the emotional appeal necessary to their wide propagation. In other words, we must go to the primary school teacher, the professor of history, the newspaper editor and correspondent, the film director and the popularizer of certain theories concerning the nature and function of the state. And in our investigations of these persons and their activities it is to the sociologist, the psychologist and the psychiatrist that we must appeal for help. These specialists have done much in recent years to increase our knowledge of both the normal and the abnormal behavior of groups and individuals. To help discover a realistic and more hopeful approach to international relations we should enlist their services for study along some such lines as the following:

Left to himself, the average individual in the average country is chiefly concerned with supporting himself and his family and winning the esteem of his local community. Foreign countries normally play little part in his thinking and even less in his emotional life. Foreigners are vague beings, probably somewhat inferior, but certainly remote. That is the situation at one end of the scale. At the other end of the scale is a government which in cer-



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tain instances has all sorts of complicated international schemes collectively designated by the term "foreign policy" and personalized in statements that *x* country "wants" this or "resents" that. Just what is the relationship between the peaceful sentiments of the average individual (or at least his indifference to adventurous national projects) and the aggressive foreign policy of the government to which he owes allegiance? What happens between these two points, and why?

Behind the surface differences of race and nationality there of course lie a host of other differences shaped through the centuries by environment and tradition. What is the nature and scope of these differences? Should they be distinguished in kind or degree from the differences of people belonging to the same country? How are they stimulated so as to become pathological, and how can they be kept within reasonable bounds? Are they compatible with a supra-national ideal? The sort of investigation indicated by these sample questions deserves to be undertaken seriously. It should not be impossible to develop a tolerance, even some real understanding and appreciation, of the differences indicated. In other words, might we not, while following quite calmly and deliberately our own way, learn to take satisfaction in the fact that other people are following different ways? What can be done to break down the concept that people who are like us are good, but that people who are unlike us must for some reason be inferior? Could not history be so taught in the schools that it will furnish a basis not merely for a proper regard for our own country but respect for other countries as well?

We constantly hear about national honor and national prestige. Exactly what do those concepts mean? Who defines their content at any particular time? How is the definition reached and by what means is it made acceptable?

But even comprehensive and accurate knowledge of the forces which today shape international relations would not be sufficient. When the sociologist, the psychologist and the psychiatrist have made some progress in investigating the kind of question we have suggested, then we must appeal to the philosopher to fashion the new knowledge into a coherent whole and reformulate our values. It is not a panacea that we need and seek, not another of those programs which deceive by their very precision and completeness, but rather a new philosophy of international relations which will stir individuals, whether in an official position or not, to think

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about those relations more actively and open-mindedly, less formally and more humanistically.

In view of the momentous problems which confront the modern diplomat there is nothing academic about the question, "Can diplomacy be successful?" The answer to that question is "No," if diplomacy keeps its traditional point of view and follows traditional methods. "Yes," if it sets out courageously to understand the forces and explore the human motives which really determine international relations in our day. "Yes," if it tries with heart and mind to discover an answer to the question recently propounded by Mr. H. G. Wells in the pages of this review: "Is there not a broader, more general pattern of human civilization which we might possibly emphasize and bring into fuller operation than it is at this present time, in order to prevent this idiotic and unnecessary game of national antagonisms from culminating in war and possibly the destruction of civilization?"

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FRANCE AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR

By Bernadotte E. Schmitt

DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES FRANÇAIS, 1871–1914. 3e série (1911–1914), tome X, 17 mars–23 juillet 1914; tome XI, 24 juillet–4 août 1914. Paris: Costes, 1936, Fr. 60 per vol.

ON August 4, 1914, the German Government published a "White Book" and two days later the British Government issued a White Paper (or "Blue Book"). Each of these compilations of diplomatic documents was intended to explain the origins of the war in such a way as to free the issuing government from all blame. Ten days later the Russian Government followed suit with an "Orange Book," and in due course a Serbian "Blue Book" and two Belgian "Grey Books" appeared. Apparently at the outbreak of hostilities the French Government did not feel the need of publicly documenting its conduct. Were not German armies actually invading France? There may also have been the feeling that since the war had arisen in an Austro-Serbo-Russian quarrel, and since France had been dragged into that war because of the Franco-Russian alliance, the less said about that alliance and about French diplomacy the better. But the intense interest aroused throughout the world by the varicolored "books" apparently led the French Government to the conclusion that a contribution by it to the question of war responsibilities would be useful to the Allied propaganda. At any rate, on December 1, 1914, a "Yellow Book" was published. Unlike the earlier "books," it was not confined to the weeks immediately preceding the outbreak of war but contained a few documents dating from 1913. These 1913 documents offered an unflattering picture of German militarism, which was portrayed as deliberately preparing for a European war. The authenticity of two of them (nos. 2 and 6) was challenged by Germany.[1] But this charge of falsification made little impression on the Allied and neutral world, and during the war the Yellow Book

[1] No. 2 was a secret German memorandum, secured by the French intelligence service, on the necessity for the German army law of 1913. Ludendorff declared the document apocryphal. Of course, the French may have been imposed upon; but there is no doubt that the document was obtained by them in Berlin. In no. 6, Jules Cambon, French Ambassador in Berlin, reported the remark of Moltke, the German Chief of Staff, to the King of the Belgians in November 1913 that "war was necessary and inevitable." Moltke denied having used such language.

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was regularly quoted by those who wrote on the crisis of July 1914.

Only after the war did it become apparent that the Yellow Book was neither complete nor entirely reliable. The historians Émile Bourgeois and Georges Pagès were allowed to quote from unpublished documents in their report to the Senate entitled "Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre," as was also former President Raymond Poincaré, first in his lectures "Les origines de la guerre" and then more fully in the spirited fourth volume of his memoirs "Au service de la France." Furthermore, the publication of the complete German, Austrian and British correspondence covering the fateful month of July 1914, and the release by the Soviet Government of certain documents from the Russian archives, threw light on things about which the Yellow Book had been silent.

These revelations led in particular to the examination of one document in the French collection, namely document no. 118. This was a telegram from Ambassador Paléologue in St. Petersburg, dated July 31, according to which the Russian general mobilization had been ordered, apparently on that day, "on account of the general mobilization of Austria and of the measures of mobilization taken secretly but continuously by Germany for the last six days." Postwar historical research had conclusively established the fact that the Russian general mobilization was ordered on the evening of July 30 and the Austrian about noon on July 31. Pressed for an explanation of the statements made in no. 118, the Quai d'Orsay allowed it to become known that they did not form part of the original telegram, which, in fact, consisted of nine words: "La mobilisation générale de l'armée russe est ordonnée." After that damaging admission, confidence in the Yellow Book was naturally shattered, even in France. Historians made as little use of it as possible, especially since other documents which it contained had also been called into question.[2] The publication of the complete French correspondence for July 1914 has therefore been awaited with intense interest.

In the Austrian, British, German and Russian documentary compilations, the period from June 28, 1914, to the outbreak of the general war in August was treated as a unit. The editors of

[2] Certain sentences were known to have been transposed in no. 101. No. 102 was known to consist of several documents.

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the French series originally intended to follow the same plan, but examination of the documents convinced them that such a division, however tempting, would not be sound from the historical point of view. For the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife, though it now looms in retrospect as a great dividing point in modern history, did not at the time stand out so clearly, as can be seen from the diplomatic correspondence of the first three weeks of July. The Serajevo tragedy aroused considerable anxiety, but it was merely one of the various issues then disturbing Europe. The threat of a general conflict did not yet seem imminent. It is only on July 20, with the appearance of an article in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, that the danger of an action undertaken by Austria-Hungary with German support became evident. And it was the news of the Austrian ultimatum sent to Serbia on July 23 which really opened the crisis. For this reason, the editors of the French series have taken the period from March 17 to July 23 as one unit, and the period from July 24 to August 4 as another.

All the documents in the Foreign Ministry relating to the European crisis have been published: the editors assure us that the system of registering documents in that office has enabled them to make sure that none of them has escaped their notice. The archives of the War and Navy Ministries have also been drawn upon, as well as all reports to the Government which influenced its decisions, including those from the military attachés abroad. The French have certainly gone much further than any other belligerent towards publishing all their military and naval papers for the period of the crisis.[3] Evidently every possible effort has been made to secure all relevant materials and to publish them, "sans en excepter ceux qui contiennent, sur des États amis, des appreciations mal fondées ou des jugements inexacts" (XI, viii). The editors point out, however, that minutes are not kept of the meetings of the cabinet and that therefore the decisions of the French Government cannot be "documented."

The French Government published its Yellow Book, as we

[3] The private papers of Abel Ferry, Under-secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Adolphe Messimy, Minister of War, were placed at the disposal of the editors, though no papers of Prime Minister Viviani could be found. Maurice Paléologue, French Ambassador in St. Petersburg, allowed them to use the original copies of his telegrams and part of his diary. Bienvenu-Martin, acting Foreign Minister up to July 29; A. de Margerie, Political Director at the Quai d'Orsay; and Philippe Berthelot, Assistant Political Director, preserved no personal papers for the period of the crisis. Raymond Poincaré had already made use of his papers in his own writings.

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have seen, with some delay. It thus had more time for "editing" than did the German, British and Russian governments. The editing apparently involved about two-thirds of the documents included and took four forms. In the first place, the chronological sequence of the documents (most carefully observed in the new publication) was often ignored. Thus no. 102 in the Yellow Book consisted of telegrams 311 and 315 from St. Petersburg, while no. 103 was a combination of telegrams 307 and 308. The order of events in the Russian capital was thereby distorted, in order to make the Russian action appear in a more favorable light. In four cases (nos. 51, 86, 129, 151 of the Yellow Book, or nos. 153, 192, 591, 720 of the present publication) the dates were changed; in the last case, Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality is represented as occurring on August 3 instead of August 4.

The second and most common form of editing was the omission of inconvenient passages. The reviewer has noted twenty-four such omissions which can be considered serious. A few examples must suffice. On July 24 Paul Cambon, Ambassador in London, remarked that "Germany had no interest in stirring up a general war" (XI, 23); furthermore: "If Russia takes the part of Serbia, she will have taken the initiative of an aggression against Austria, and Germany will have to support the latter Power" (XI, 12). As this was precisely the German contention, it is not surprising that these statements were suppressed in the Yellow Book (nos. 32, 33). When Viviani received the German ultimatum on the evening of July 31, he declared that he had "no information about an alleged total mobilization of the Russian army and navy" (XI, 438), which was put forward as the justification of the German ultimatum. This was true, for the telegram from the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg announcing the mobilization (XI, 432) had not been received at the moment of the conversation. But the Ambassador had telegraphed on the previous day that because of disquieting information concerning German preparations, "the Russian Government has decided to proceed secretly to the first measures of general mobilization" (XI, 359); consequently this sentence had to be omitted from the Yellow Book (no. 102). Passages in Paul Cambon's telegrams which revealed the vacillation of Great Britain (Yellow Book, nos. 98, 110; XI, 281, 459) or British criticism of Sazonov (Yellow Book, 80; XI, 202) were not unnaturally omitted. So also were the rare statements which

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showed Germany in a favorable light, such as the declaration of Jagow, the German Foreign Minister, when questioned by Jules Cambon, that he was ready to exert pressure on Austria "en dessous main" (Yellow Book, 74; XI, 167), or the assertion of Schoen, German Ambassador in Paris, that "his country asked only to collaborate with the other Powers in the interest of peace" (Yellow Book, 78; XI, 198). On July 29 Bienvenu-Martin recognized that the German attitude had changed somewhat (XI, 246); but this admission was suppressed in the Yellow Book (no. 85); so likewise was the statement of Dumaine, Ambassador in Vienna, that Tschirschky, his German colleague, had admitted that Germany might intervene at Vienna (Yellow Book, 93; XI, 284). Twice Dumaine reported remarks of his Serbian colleague Yovanovitch which threw a somewhat lurid light on the effect of Serbian agitation and propaganda within the Hapsburg monarchy (X, 516; XI, 220), which of course were omitted from the Yellow Book (nos. 12, 83).

Another device was to add to rather than subtract from a document. In a few cases, this took the form of merely amplifying the original language, without changing its meaning (Yellow Book, 28, 56, 101, 155; XI, 20, 98, 305, 775). More often, words, phrases, even whole sentences were added. Thus the French chargé in Berlin telegraphed on July 4 that "the German Government does not seem to share the uneasiness which is manifested by a portion of the German press with respect to a possible tension between the Governments of Vienna and Belgrade" (X, 472); to which was added in the Yellow Book the words, "or at least it does not wish to have the appearance of doing so" (no. 9). On July 6 Paléologue reported that Sazonov had warned Austria against seeking the perpetrators of the crime at Sarajevo on Serbian soil (X, 477); to the Ambassador's matter-of-fact telegram the Yellow Book added the sentence: "May this warning not be in vain" (no. 10). To a telegram from Berlin reporting the views of the Russian chargé (XI, 61) the Yellow Book added: "The impressions of M. Broniewski as to the *arrière-pensées* of Germany are very pessimistic" (no. 43). Two more serious examples may be noted. On July 29 Paléologue telegraphed that "the Russian General Staff has ascertained that Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against Russia" (XI, 274); in the Yellow Book there is this addition: "and is pressing forward the mobilization that has begun on the Galician frontier" (no.

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91) — which was not true, as the Austrian general mobilization did not begin until August 1. Another addition to the same telegram was a statement that Sazonov "will support all British efforts in favor of peace." On July 31 Dumaine telegraphed from Vienna at 6 p.m. that the Austrian general mobilization had been ordered (XI, 431) — as indeed it had been, shortly after noon. But when his telegram was published in the Yellow Book, the words "ce matin à la première heure" were inserted (no. 115). By this means it could be made to appear that, contrary to fact, the Austrian general mobilization had preceded the Russian.

Lastly, in a number of cases the text of a document was deliberately changed. On July 25 Paléologue quoted Sazonov as saying, "I even think that if the Austro-Hungarian Government proceeds to act, Serbia should submit to invasion without resistance and denounce the infamy of Austria to the civilized world" (XI, 34). In the Yellow Book this is made to read: "I think that even if the Austro-Hungarian Government proceeds to act, we should not break off the negotiations" (no. 38)! A statement forwarded from Paris to Viviani, who was on the seas returning from Russia, that "it has been decided in principle to mobilize against Austria" (XI, 90) was toned down for the Yellow Book to read "the mobilization was considered" [*envisagée*] (no. 50). On July 30 Paléologue reported Sazonov as saying that on the previous evening "the General Staff had suspended certain secret precautionary measures, knowledge of which might alarm the German General Staff" (XI, 342). The reference was to "the first measures of general mobilization," about which Paléologue telegraphed a few hours later (XI, 359). But since it was the French thesis that Russian mobilization was ordered only on July 31, Paléologue's statement had to be changed to read: "the General Staff had suspended all measures of military precaution in order that there might be no misunderstanding" (no. 102). This was in line with another even more striking alteration. Paléologue had expressed his approval of direct conversations between Russia and Austria on the ultimatum to Serbia because it was speedy. "I prefer this to any other procedure," he said, "because the military preparations no longer leave more than a little time to diplomatic action" (XI, 103). No wonder this was modified to read in the Yellow Book: "I prefer this to any other procedure and it is likely to succeed" (no. 54).

The most serious change of all had to do with the action of the

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French Government itself. On July 30 Abel Ferry telegraphed to London a comparative statement of the military measures taken by Germany and France respectively. One sentence reads: "The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany on Saturday, in France on Sunday" (XI, 316). But in the Yellow Book it was stated that the French action was on "Tuesday" (no. 106). On the following day Paul Cambon, arguing with Sir Edward Grey for a British promise of assistance, urged that England should not repeat "her error of 1870" when she remained neutral in the Franco-German war (XI, 459). In the Yellow Book this became "the error of Europe" (no. 110). On August 1, Viviani telegraphed to London that "Russia was determined, in coöperation with England," to work to the very end for the realization of [an Austro-Russian agreement]" (XI, 523); but in the Yellow Book, it is France and not Russia which is thus described (no. 127). There are many other minor alterations which might be recorded, but enough has been said to show how unscrupulous the French Government was in tampering with the text of its documents. In this it was neither more nor less conscientious than other governments, all of whom edited their documents in greater or less degree. If more French documents seem to have been mutilated than British or Russian or German, the explanation presumably is that the Quai d'Orsay took its time in publication, whereas other foreign offices rushed into print as quickly as possible.

Since the Yellow Book was so carefully edited, it would be reasonable to expect that the complete French correspondence for July 1914 would provide a good many surprises and even yield some fateful secrets. This has been true of nearly all the post-war publications of documents. It is not true, however, of these new French documents. Since most of these documents have not hitherto been published, a great deal of new detailed information is provided, but they contain no revelations of consequence and throw little new light on the motives of French policy.

The first disappointment in the new documents is that there are very few communications from Belgrade. The French Minister, Descos, was taken ill on July 14, shortly after the sudden death of Hartvig, the Russian Minister, and asked to be relieved. His successor, Boppe, did not reach Belgrade until July 25, the day when the Austrian ultimatum expired. Between July 14 and 25, that is, during the critical period when the

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Serbian Government had to determine its policy towards Austria, neither telegram nor despatch was sent from the French legation. Descos was an acute observer who was not particularly friendly to Serbia; the absence of reports from him is to be the more regretted because the government at Belgrade has published no documents except the inadequate Serbian Blue Book of 1914. It is interesting to note that the French Government gave no advice to Serbia prior to the Austrian ultimatum. Concerning that ultimatum, the French Foreign Ministry had no prior information. In the Yellow Book a document was printed, dated July 20 (no. 14), which gave a summary of the forthcoming demands, but this was not received until July 24 (XI, 32).[4] It has been alleged that the Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum was largely the work of Berthelot. There is no evidence of this in the French documents, but it is of course possible (in the reviewer's opinion, however, most improbable) that Berthelot made suggestions privately to the Serbian minister in Paris, Vesnitch.

A diverting touch is provided by a document from Cetinje. One of the Sarajevo conspirators, the moslem Mehmedbashich, escaped after the crime to Montenegro, where he was arrested at the request of Vienna. The Austro-Hungarian Government demanded his extradition, but he managed to escape, for which profuse apologies and not altogether convincing explanations were offered by the Montenegrin Foreign Minister. The French Minister in Cetinje reported that the Montenegrin Government did not dare face the indignation which surrender of the prisoner would arouse among Serbs everywhere, and continued: "A subordinate official intelligently took the initiative in effecting the disappearance of the prisoner and actually no one knows where he has fled to. . . . The Minister of Foreign Affairs declared to me on his honor that the Montenegrin Government was in no way connected with the escape. In any case I do not believe that the guilty official will see his future advancement impeded by the initiative which he took in this matter" (X, 537).[5]

[4] The British Ambassador in Vienna was given a strong hint as to the character of the forthcoming note on July 16; he telegraphed the news to London and apparently informed his Russian colleague, who immediately passed the information on to St. Petersburg. Curiously enough, neither the British nor the Russian Government thought it necessary to inform Paris.

[5] In his despatch, the French Minister stated that Mehmedbashich had spoken to the Montenegrin about a meeting of the Sarajevo conspirators at Tours. After the outbreak of the war, this was communicated to the Sûreté Générale for enquiry; no reply seems to have been made. It is generally believed that Toulouse, rather than Tours, was the place of the meeting.

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Russia, however, rather than Serbia, was the primary concern of France. A few writers believe that Russia and France seized upon the murder at Sarajevo as an opportunity to precipitate a long-planned war against the Central Powers. There is no documentary support for this view. On the other side there are those who consider that France was in no way responsible for the fatal *dénouement* of the crisis and was the innocent victim of German militarism; this contention is also hardly justified by the documents. Between these two extremes, many insist that France, while not desiring war, might have prevented it by restraining her impetuous ally, especially in the matter of mobilization. These new documents show that French policy was not governed by any such moral considerations (if they can be so described). The French Government regarded the alliance with Russia as the sheet-anchor of its position in Europe, exactly as the German Government regarded its alliance with Austria. In both, the bad had to be taken along with the good. There is no evidence in these documents that the French Government desired war; but if the interests of Russia could be defended only by war, then France, as the loyal ally of Russia, had to go along; and it was not for France to tell Russia what were the interests of Russia. The matter is neatly summed up in two documents. When the German Government, through its ambassador in Paris, suggested that France should counsel moderation on Russia, Viviani replied:

> Russia would be rightly astonished by such an attitude on the part of her ally. It would be only in case Germany should give counsels in Vienna which were heeded that France might eventually call attention to this at St. Petersburg in order to reassure the Imperial Government as to the possible repercussions of a conflict to which Russia, no more than other Powers and [even] less than they, is unable to remain indifferent (XI, 190, passage omitted in Yellow Book, no. 76).

And Paléologue said:

> The idea of a *démarche* at Vienna *and at St. Petersburg* appears to me difficult to reconcile with the full approval which the government of the Republic gave yesterday to the sincerely conciliatory and moderate policy of the Russian Government.
>
> After having declared to the Russian Government that "France appreciates as much as Russia how highly important it is for the two countries to affirm their complete agreement and that it is ready to give full support to the action of the Imperial Government for the purpose of maintaining the general peace," we shall weaken our position by lending ourselves to a *démarche* which would seem to affect our solidarity [*nous désolidariser*] with our ally (XI, 248).

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It comes to this: that France was afraid to abandon Russia lest she have to face Germany alone; and with Tangier and Agadir fresh in memory, no French Government could assume that Germany would leave an isolated France alone. The documents create a feeling in the mind of the reader that the French Foreign Office and the French General Staff, after the Austro-Serbian rupture, regarded war as altogether probable if not inevitable. Consequently the preoccupation of the French Government was not so much to avoid a conflict which was bound to come some day, though it would do nothing to provoke that conflict, as to make sure that France entered the war in as favorable a position as possible.

As it happened, the French President, Poincaré, and the French Prime Minister, Viviani, were scheduled to make a visit to Russia in the latter part of July. The murder at Sarajevo was not deemed sufficient reason for postponing it. Since Viviani was utterly inexperienced in foreign affairs, the Quai d'Orsay prepared a number of memoranda for him, three of which are now published (X, 500, 501, 502). The last of these is a list of topics to be discussed with Sazonov: the crime at Sarajevo occupies the fourteenth place in the list of seventeen. But by the time the French statesmen had reached Russia on July 20, a strong Austrian note to Serbia was known to be imminent, and from Poincaré's memoirs it seems that this was the chief topic of discussion with Sazonov. Our knowledge of what was said and agreed upon has hitherto depended on Poincaré's own statements and upon a report handed to the British Ambassador a few days later (published in 1926 by the British Government). The Russian documents published by the Soviet government a few years ago[6] contained no memoranda on the Franco-Russian conversations, for the simple reason that none could be found in the archives. Probably none was drawn up due to lack of time, and no despatch was sent to the Russian Ambassador in Paris because he was present in St. Petersburg. The last hope, therefore, of learning what Sazonov and Viviani, the Tsar and Poincaré, said lay in the French documents. And once more we are disappointed. There is nothing about these conversations in the official French correspondence, no doubt because both the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg were present at the conferences: there was no reason why they

[6] *Cf.* the writer's article "Russia and the War," in FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1934.

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should inform each other of what they already knew. Nothing was found in the official or personal papers of Poincaré, nor in the personal papers of the Ambassador. Nowhere have the editors been able to find any document relating to the question. We are therefore thrown back on the statement confidentially communicated to the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, which was also telegraphed to Paris for the information of the Quai d'Orsay (XI, 19):

1. Perfect community of views on the various problems with which the Powers are confronted *as regards the maintenance of the general peace and the balance of power in Europe, more especially in the East.*

2. Decision to take action at Vienna with a view to the prevention of a demand for explanations or any summons equivalent to an intervention in the internal affairs of Serbia which the latter would be *justified* in regarding as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.

3. Solemn affirmation of the obligations imposed by the alliance between the two countries. (Paléologue's italics)

This only states that France and Russia will pursue the same policy, and in view of the previous history of Franco-Russian relations, more especially in the years 1912–1913, it is hardly conceivable that the French statesmen intended to give Russia a blank check. Yet because the Austrian action was so much more violent than had been anticipated, Russia was driven to take drastic counter-measures; and because Poincaré and Viviani were at sea returning home and therefore inaccessible, France was not consulted about the steps taken. In the end, the French Government found itself presented with the *fait accompli.*

It is therefore important to know how far the French Government was informed of the military measures being ordered in Russia. On July 25 Paléologue telegraphed that mobilization against Austria had been decided on in principle, but would not become effective until Austria attacked Serbia; nevertheless certain preparatory measures would be taken "clandestinely" (XI, 50). On the following day he reported that these preparatory measures were being taken also in the military districts near the German frontier (XI, 89). The first information was relayed to Viviani, but he made no comment on it (XI, 190); the second apparently was not. As long as the Russian mobilization was directed against Austria alone, there was no occasion for French worry, since Jagow, the German Foreign Secretary, had declared that in these circumstances Germany would not mobilize (XI, 134).

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But the question of general mobilization was already looming up. On July 27 Sukhomlinov, the Russian Minister of War, declared that "if Germany took the initiative in any military measures towards either Russia or France, the Emperor Nicholas would immediately order general mobilization" (XI, 124). That same evening the Russian military attaché in Paris, Colonel Ignatiev, approached General Joffre with the question whether, if Germany mobilized only part of her forces against Russia, France would feel herself compelled under the Franco-Russian alliance to order mobilization (XI, 233). The fact that this question had to be asked (at the request of the Ambassador, Izvolsky, who had been at St. Petersburg with Poincaré and Viviani) seems to prove that Russia had not received a free hand from France. Likewise, Joffre's answer, that the Government would have to decide, shows that the French General Staff was not pushing for war. But there is no indication that the French Government gave any consideration to the question: perhaps Bienvenu-Martin and Messimy felt that the question could not be considered until the return of Poincaré and Viviani. In any event, no suggestion seems to have been made to Russia that general mobilization should not be ordered or at least not without the approval of France.

On July 29 Paléologue despatched two telegrams stating that the mobilization against Austria had been ordered (XI, 274, 283). In the second telegram, he added the statement that because of the tone of the latest communication from the German Government, the Russian Government had decided "secretly to commence general mobilization". This was not quite the truth, for the government had decided to order general mobilization and the telegrams were just about to be sent off when the order was countermanded by the Tsar, in consequence of a conciliatory telegram just received from William II. But Paléologue could only report the information given him by Sazonov. In view of the great importance of the news, the Russian Foreign Ministry suggested that Paléologue's telegram to Paris be sent by the Russian cipher, which was supposedly more difficult to break down, and the Ambassador agreed. But when his secretary, Chambrun, reached the Foreign Ministry with the telegram, he was told that the order for general mobilization had been cancelled, and he therefore took the responsibility of omitting from the telegram the sentence about general mobilization. Returning to the embassy, he informed Paléologue of what he had done. The

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Ambassador, however, did not think it necessary to inform Paris that the Russian Government had ordered and then cancelled general mobilization. It was not until 9:15 p.m. of the following day, July 30, that he telegraphed that, in reply to German measures, "the Russian government has decided to proceed secretly to the first measures of general mobilization" (XI, 359) — by which time the general mobilization had been ordered, though Paléologue apparently did not know it.[7]

Meanwhile Sazonov had informed Izvolsky that war with Germany seemed imminent and Izvolsky had inquired whether Russia could rely on France. He was given the desired assurances; but Viviani sent a telegram to St. Petersburg in which he asked that "in taking any precautionary measures of defense to which she thinks she must proceed, Russia should not immediately take any step which may offer Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilization of her forces" (XI, 305). On the basis of the information available, this was a reasonable request. But suppose that Viviani had known that the Russian Government had already ordered and then countermanded general mobilization, and had done so without consulting the French Government, would he have used different language? It is impossible to say, the reviewer believes, even in the light of the sequel to the telegram.

The telegram was shown to Izvolsky, who was somewhat puzzled by it. After an interview with M. de Margerie, he telegraphed that the French Government did not wish to interfere with Russia's military preparations but wanted them to be "as little public and challenging in character as possible". The military attaché reported that Messimy, to whom he had gone for an interpretation in military language of de Margerie's statement, advised Russia to continue her military preparations but "to refrain as far as possible from movements of troops on a large scale". These Russian telegrams, when published some years ago, were often interpreted as showing the insincerity of the advice given by Viviani to Sazonov. Poincaré in his memoirs denied the accuracy of Izvolsky's language, but adduced no proof. Unfortunately, there is no record of the Izvolsky-Margerie conversation in the files of the Quai d'Orsay — which is hardly surprising, for if Margerie did use the language ascribed to him, he would in all

[7] That Paléologue was expecting general mobilization is evident from a telegram of July 28 (XI, 216), in which he names the two officers who are to be attached to his embassy in that event.

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probability not have recorded it. But from the private papers of Messimy and Abel Ferry it would seem that Ignatiev reported the wishes of the French Government with fair accuracy, for in one document this formula can be found: "Ne pas arrêter la mobilisation russe. Mobiliser, mais non concentrer." In other words, the French Government did not object to secret Russian mobilization but advised against a public order. How would it have reacted to the knowledge that general mobilization had already been ordered (although rescinded)? The answer is anybody's guess.

Although the order for general mobilization was sent out between 6 and 7 p.m. on July 30, the red posters announcing it were not put up in St. Petersburg until the early morning hours of the next day. Paléologue heard the news by 8:30 a.m., and his telegram to Paris was despatched at 10:43, the delay being due to the confusion arising from the military occupation of the central telegraphic office. The message was sent by way of Scandinavia and did not reach Paris until 8:30 p.m. At exactly the same hour a telegram arrived from Vienna, announcing the mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian Army.

As the telegram from Vienna was sent at 6 p.m., the statement in no. 118 of the Yellow Book that the Russian general mobilization had been caused by the Austrian mobilization seems to be a deliberate falsification. But the telegram from Vienna was put down in the register as having been sent at *5 heures* i.e. 5 a.m., instead of *17 heures*, i.e. 5 p.m. Since the General Staff report of 7 a.m. on August 1, also states that the Austrian mobilization had been ordered at 5 a.m. on July 31 (XI, 468), it would seem that the error was made on July 31 and not at a later date when the Yellow Book was being prepared. An annotation by Berthelot on another document (XI, 431) reads: "Mobilisation autrichienne générale le 31 au matin (5 h.). Mobilisation russe suit (10 h.)". The editors state that it cannot be determined whether this annotation was made at the time or was drawn up when the Yellow Book was being prepared. According to a telegram from Jules Cambon, the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg had telegraphed that Russia had ordered general mobilization in reply to the complete Austrian mobilization (XI, 402). It is therefore possible that the French Foreign Ministry believed that the Austrian mobilization had preceded the Russian and therefore felt justified in editing Dumaine's telegram (XI, 431) so as to

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make the fact clear. So far as the writer knows, the exact hours when the Austrian and Russian mobilizations were ordered were not established until after the war. When it was that the Quai d'Orsay learned the truth is not known.

According to the Russian documents, Messimy informed Ignatiev about midnight on July 31 that "the government is firmly resolved on war". This is confirmed by the telegram which Messimy sent to the military commanders at 12:02 a.m. on August 1: "The order for mobilization will probably be issued today, August 1, in the afternoon. Proceed at once to all operations within your own area which will facilitate mobilization" (XI, 462).

When the French ministers took their decision on the evening of July 31 they were not sure of the attitude of Italy, Great Britain or Belgium, although they hoped for the best. On July 30, Barrère, the experienced Ambassador in Rome, who had for years been seeking to detach Italy from the Triple Alliance, had to report that "the attitude of Italy in case of a conflagration is uncertain, although public opinion is always anti-Austrian" (XI, 332). On the following day, the Italian Foreign Minister, the Marchese di San Giuliano, when pressed by Barrère, hinted that Italy might remain neutral, but insisted that Russia must not be the aggressor. The annotation on Barrère's telegram by Berthelot reveals that the Italian minister's words were considered too vague and dilatory to have much practical value for France (XI, 411). It was not until August 1 that San Giuliano finally declared that Italy would remain neutral (XI, 482, 500), a decision confirmed the same evening by the Italian Council of Ministers (XI, 580). The French Government did its best to obtain this happy result by issuing an order to restrain the anti-Italian tendencies of the Tunisian press (XI, 386) and by cautioning the corps commanders along the Italian frontier against any military measures which might irritate Italy (XI, 567). When the official notification of neutrality was handed in at Paris, Viviani, who was something of a word-monger, could not refrain from telegraphing to London and Rome that Italy's decision showed that "she preserves the clear conscience of the Latin genius" (XI, 657).

The publication some years ago of Volume XI of "British Documents on the Origins of the War" made the British attitude towards France so clear that not much new information could

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be expected from the French collection. The situation was neatly described on July 27 by Sir Arthur Nicolson, the permanent Undersecretary of the Foreign Office, who believed strongly that Great Britain should range herself by the side of France:

> We depend on public opinion [he said to the French chargé]. That opinion would be shocked if Germany were to attack France, but it is not concerned with Serbia, in which the English are not interested and for which they would refuse to fight. The European aspect of the matter escapes them; later they will grasp it, little by little, perhaps too late. I believe most sincerely that if war breaks out, we shall take part in it with you. But we cannot at present, and I regret it keenly, take the attitude which you suggest (XI, 117).

Two days later, Grey said substantially the same thing in somewhat different language (XI, 281). On July 30 Paul Cambon, reporting that several members of the British cabinet were susceptible to German influence, expressed the fear that "Mr. Asquith, with his habit of temporization, will not dare to take up a resolute attitude" (XI, 363). The Ambassador then communicated to Grey a telegram from his brother Jules Cambon, the French representative in Berlin, who declared that "only the eventuality of English intervention would impress the Emperor, his government and all the interests" and bring about a change in German policy (XI, 378). But Grey refused to commit himself on July 31 or August 1 (XI, 459, 532). In the Quai d'Orsay there was a suspicion that Sir Rennell Rodd, the British ambassador in Rome, who was said to be a close friend of Jagow, was partly responsible for the British hesitation (XI, 458). At the moment when the French Government ordered general mobilization (3:55 p.m. August 1: XI, 507), there was no assurance that Great Britain would come in.

It was not until the evening of Sunday, August 2, that the French Government received the well-known declaration of Grey to Cambon that Great Britain would protect the northern coasts of France against a German attack; but even this was subject to parliamentary approval (XI, 612). At 2:30 p.m. of that day, however, Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, saw the French naval attaché in London and stated the terms on which the British Navy was prepared to coöperate with the French; and he requested the attaché to telegraph for instructions so that a discussion could take place the same evening (XI, 625). When Cambon asked Grey for a statement which could be presented to the French parliament on the following

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day, Grey replied that he did not know what he would say in the House of Commons: much would depend upon the question whether the neutrality of Belgium had been violated (XI, 638); it sounds almost as if he hoped for violation! On the next day the vigorous Churchill was going ahead as if everything had been settled (XI, 668). Cambon was accordingly horrified when Grey told him on August 4 that Britain was not prepared to send her army to the continent; the Ambassador persuaded the Foreign Secretary to bring the question before the Prime Minister and the Cabinet (XI, 754).

Belgium also caused concern to the French Government. True, on July 27 the secretary-general of the Belgian Foreign Ministry declared to the French and Russian Ministers that "in case of an international conflict Belgium would energetically defend her neutrality and the integrity of her territory" (XI, 149), but the French Minister thought the attitude of the government uncertain (XI, 292). There was considerable fear of Germany, and both the General Staff and the Catholic Church, including Cardinal Mercier, were opposed to France (XI, 372). The military attaché thought that public opinion in general was sympathetic to France, but the action of the Government could not be relied on (XI, 373). Grey and Cambon even wondered whether there were not some secret arrangement between Germany and Belgium (XI, 612); Grey remarked, it is worth noting, that the neutrality of Belgium "is not a Belgian interest, but an English interest which England ought to cause to be respected." As late as August 2, the Belgian Government, although it had received no assurances from Germany, was still confident, and the French Minister in Brussels also suspected some kind of connivance (XI, 586). There is not the slightest indication of any collusion between Belgium and France, or Belgium and Great Britain.

The French Ambassador in Berlin, Jules Cambon, was from the beginning of the crisis under no illusions. He seems to have expected the worst and he warned his government to be ready. The military and naval authorities should do what was necessary in order not to be surprised (XI, 49). France would be "the first objective" of the German armies, even if war broke out first between Russia and Germany, and therefore France should do, without any noise, everything that could be done before mobilization. Cambon believed that the German Chancellor, Bethmann

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Hollweg, really desired peace, but that he was helpless against his foreign office and the military (XI, 168). The military attaché declared that the German army expected to go through the French "like butter;" and if the French Army should resist the first onslaught, the high command would be so surprised that they could not act (XI, 293). Cambon was convinced that peace depended upon England's making clear to Germany that she would not remain neutral (XI, 326, 378).

On July 27 the French legation in Luxembourg reported that mobilization was said to have already begun at Metz (XI, 118), and two days later it telegraphed that troops were being concentrated along the French frontier (XI, 249). Foch, then commanding the 20th Corps at Nancy, reported on July 30 that Metz had been in a state of war since July 25 (XI, 313). In Berlin, Cambon heard the rumor that mobilization had been decided on and would be proclaimed on the following day (XI, 322). Late in the day it was reported from Nancy that a telephone message between Metz and Strasbourg had been intercepted, according to which German mobilization would be ordered that same evening (XI, 343). On July 31 reports of German mobilization were received from Luxembourg and Belfort (XI, 412, 427), both of which had to be denied shortly afterwards (XI, 430, 440).

The French Government apparently refused to be stampeded by these reports. Rather it relied on the information collected by the Intelligence Service of the General Staff and transmitted several times a day from July 27 on. These reports are so detailed that they carry conviction of their accuracy. At 6 p.m. on July 30 it is stated that "it does not appear that there is mobilization yet" in Germany (XI, 338); and at 8 a.m. on July 31, that "the reports announcing German mobilization for today are not confirmed" (XI, 384). It is only at 7 a.m. on August 1 that the General Staff asserts that under cover of "threatening danger of war" (proclaimed on July 31) Germany was proceeding to "an actual general mobilization" (XI, 468). Joffre was therefore able to demand general mobilization of the French Army (XI, 473), which was ordered at 3.55 p.m. on August 1 (XI, 507), or about five minutes before the German mobilization. Jules Cambon learned of the German mobilization from the extra editions of the newspapers about 7 p.m.; his telegram reached Paris at 12.05 a.m. on August 2. Curiously enough, the report of the General Staff at 7 a.m. on August 2 states: "The order of general

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mobilization is said to have been issued in Germany on July 31 at 8 p.m." (XI, 562).

The various military measures taken by France between July 26 and August 1 are fully revealed, but it is not necessary to recount them. The situation is well described by Viviani in a circular telegram of July 31 (XI, 388):

> On the one hand, each of the two countries [France and Germany] wishes to leave to the other the responsibility of having ordered mobilization first, especially in view of the attitude of England, which Germany still hopes to see keep out of the conflict; on the other hand, neither France nor Germany is willing to be surprised by the mobilization of the other and each continues to make preparations, without resorting to acts of mobilization properly so-called.

In the end the two governments acted quite independently, each ordering mobilization without knowledge of the other's action or intention.

After mobilization the chief concern of both governments was to influence Great Britain by charges that their frontiers were being violated. In this, the French seem to have acted honestly. Viviani gave prompt notice of German violations on August 2 (XI, 578); on the next day, however, he informed London that no violation had occurred at Longwy, as alleged (XI, 655). The General Staff also learned that an alleged violation at Saint-Marie-aux-Mines, which had been reported to London, had not taken place (XI, 672), and that a French detachment had crossed the frontier near Wissembach (XI, 653). A few hours later the German declaration of war was handed in (XI, 678), so that it was not necessary to pass these rectifications on to London.

The famous order to the French troops to keep behind a line ten kilometres from the frontier is published in full, so that the line may be traced on a large-scale map (XI, 333). When it was learned that the Germans had invaded Luxembourg, the line was extended to the northwest (XI, 568, 569). Then on August 4 stringent orders were issued that French troops should not enter Belgian territory (XI, 715). The French were determined to leave the initiative in military moves to their enemy, and there can be no doubt that this restraint was of the greatest value in securing English and neutral sympathy.

Of all the collections of documents for July 1914, the French is perhaps the most prosaic, for it does not contain anything com-

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parable to the minutes of the Austro-Hungarian ministerial councils, the marginal notes of William II and his telegraphic correspondence with Nicholas II, or the outbursts of Bethmann Hollweg to the British Ambassador in Berlin. Yet there are recorded several interesting incidents that might be mentioned. The Serbian Minister in Vienna, fearing that Russia would not come to the support of his country, insinuated that Serbia might find it better to abandon the Entente and come to terms with Austria (XI, 55). On the other hand, the Counsellor of the Austrian embassy in Paris declared that in normal circumstances his chief, Count Szecsen, would have been recalled (XI, 486), presumably because he had expressed the opinion that the Serbian reply should have satisfied Austria-Hungary. Incredible as it may seem, the French Minister in Serbia protested when Pashitch informed him that the Serbian Government had decided to defend Belgrade instead of abandoning it; Boppe's argument was that this might endanger the lives and property of foreigners! (XI, 286). And the French Government supported him (XI, 310).

On the day before he returned to Paris, Viviani telegraphed the Quai d'Orsay to arrange for Stephen Pichon, Léon Bourgeois and Alexandre Ribot, all former Foreign Ministers, to see him at the Foreign Ministry on his arrival (XI, 191). It is not known, however, whether the interviews took place. On August 1 at 4 p.m. the wireless station on the Eiffel Tower informed the Foreign Ministry that Nauen (the German wireless station) had just sent to all German warships a signal repeated three times, which was a measure used only in connection with mobilization (XI, 508): the German mobilization was in fact ordered at 5 p.m., *i.e.*, 4 p.m. Paris time. Early on the morning of August 2, the Nord railway received a telegram from Brussels, according to which the Belgian railways had been notified by the German railway office at Cologne that the French Ambassador in Berlin and the personnel of the embassy would arrive at the Belgian frontier station, Herbesthal, that afternoon or the next morning (XI, 565). The explanation is probably that the German intention had been to declare war on France on August 1; in that event Jules Cambon would have had to leave Berlin immediately, and the German railways had been warned to be ready to transport him to the frontier. Viviani indignantly telegraphed to Cambon not to leave Berlin except on formal orders from Paris (XI, 576) as if the Ambassador could help himself if war were

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suddenly declared! Cambon actually did depart without receiving orders from Paris. Farges, the French consul-general at Bâle, was treated to two strange experiences. On July 28 the Austro-Hungarian consul-general called upon him as if to say farewell, "in case events obliged him to break off official relations" (XI, 226); Farges courteously expressed the hope that peace would be maintained. Then on August 4, Farges received a letter from the German consul-general, who said that the outbreak of war filled him "with consternation," "all the more so because I love your beautiful country where I spent twelve unforgettable years as consul-general at Marseilles." He wished for information about a young officer who had been wounded two days before at Delle (XI, 767) — proof that German soldiers were on French soil as early as August 2.

The documents will not change existing views to any great extent. They will not establish the innocence of France in the minds of Germans. On the other hand, the French will be able to find in them a justification of the policy they pursued in July 1914; and in spite of Herr Hitler's recent declaration repudiating Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, they will continue, on the basis of these documents, to hold Germany primarily responsible for the Great War.

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THE GREAT NEW MIGRATION

By Countess Waldeck

JUST as the world's millions of years show in the layers of rose, grey and violet rocks of the Grand Canyon, so the history of the past twenty years shows in one generation of refugees after another. These generations of refugees represent the politics that failed.

This new and widespread migration is comparable in size and extent only to the great displacement that took place in the fourth and fifth centuries, when Asiatic peoples began pressing the Germanic tribes southward into the Roman Empire. Apparently we must now accept it as a recurring factor in international politics. A number of states have been driving out quantities of their citizens because they hold political views opposed to those of the government or because they are of a different race from the national majority. In many cases they have not expelled these citizens directly; but by moral, political and economic pressure they have succeeded in making life intolerable for them and compelled them to take refuge abroad.

Since the end of the war 1,500,000 Russians have fled from Soviet Russia, 1,500,000 Greeks from Anatolia and the Turkish provinces, 350,000 Armenians from Asia Minor, 120,000 Bulgarians from Greece, 25,000 Assyrians from Iraq, 115,000 Germans from Germany and 8,000 more from the Saar. These figures add up to about four million. Unquestionably that is less than the actual number, for some groups of refugees are omitted altogether: for instance, the Hungarians who fled before the red terror and the Hungarians who fled before the white terror, the Italians who fled before Mussolini, the Spaniards who fled before Primo de Rivera and the Spaniards who fled before the Republic. Furthermore, statistics about the new migration are bound to be incomplete. The countries of origin understate the number of their refugees, out of regard for the sensibilities of a humanitarian world; and the countries that receive them do not bother to keep exact statistics as to their number and economic status.

Moreover, the League of Nations agencies designated to help the refugees give such a narrow definition of the term "refugee" that their statistics do not reveal the full extent of the new migratory movement. According to the official League definition, a

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Russian refugee is "any person of Russian origin who does not enjoy or no longer enjoys the protection of the Government of the USSR and who has not acquired another nationality." All the other categories of refugees are similarly defined. Of course this sort of definition excludes all the refugees who have managed to acquire another nationality during these last twenty years. They none the less left home under political pressure and therefore are part of the great new migration.

Nothing in the League Covenant expressly authorizes international help for refugees except a phrase in the preamble stipulating that one of the League's objects is "to promote international coöperation by the maintenance of justice," and Article 23 of the Covenant, which prescribes that "members of the League will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children, and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organizations."

The League was quite successful in its task of directing the stream of migration; but it never was able to dam this stream at the source, or even limit it appreciably. Hopes were entertained at first that the bulk of the Russian refugees might be repatriated. But by 1924 it became clear that the Soviet Government would not take back adherents of the Tsarist and Kerensky régimes who had fled abroad; indeed, out of a million and a half of these it proved possible between 1922 and 1924 to repatriate only 13,000 with full amnesty. Similar failure attended the attempts made at the 15th Assembly of the League in September 1933 to bring pressure on the German Government to ameliorate its policy towards the Jews. Yet the fact remains that between 1921 and 1928 the League enabled more than two million people to find new homes and new opportunities to earn their livelihood. More than an achievement of the League, this was the achievement of one man: Dr. Fridtjof Nansen.

The League appointed Dr. Nansen as High Commissioner for Refugees in 1921, and up to his death in 1930 almost everything that was done for the refugees was instigated and influenced by him. When he took over his office he was about sixty. He radiated a nobility and strength that matched the ice-blue purity of his eyes. They were the eyes of a man who for three years — alone, his fate unknown — had wandered in the frozen Polar Zone. He was something of a hero and something of an archangel, and he set in motion the imagination of everybody who heard about him.

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Moreover, his humanitarianism was backed up by a great capacity for practical organization.

The problems which he confronted were different for each category of refugees. There were, for instance, the Greeks and Bulgarians who had been forced to emigrate as a result of the Balkan Wars, the World War and the Græco-Turkish War in 1923 — chiefly the latter. They did not quite belong within the narrow bounds set by the official term "refugee," for while the Russians and Armenians had no government to care for them and no country to receive them, the Greeks and Bulgarians had both. The provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne for an exchange of the Greek and Turkish populations thus involved merely the problem of repatriating a great number of people to small and impoverished countries. Even so, the complexity of the task made it necessary to set up two special commissions, one in Athens, the other in Sofia. The Greek Refugee Settlement Commission, headed for much of the time by the late Charles P. Howland, of New York, was established in September 1923 and liquidated December 31, 1930. The Bulgarian commission went to Sofia under the League protocol of September 8, 1926; its work was completed early in 1932. The two undertakings were financed by three international loans arranged on behalf of the Greek Government and one for the Bulgarian Government. Thus provided, and armed with full powers from the Greek and Bulgarian Governments, the League officials completed the work of resettling the Greek and Bulgarian refugees, in one case in seven years, in the other in six years — a miracle of inventiveness, altruistic energy and persistence.

The action taken on behalf of the Russian and Armenian refugees was fundamentally different. The stream of Russian refugees poured forth between 1918 and 1924 as an immediate consequence of the Russian Revolution and Civil War. Most of them went first into the countries bordering Russia, with the idea of waiting there until the Soviet régime should "blow up." But when they realized that it was not going to blow up they spread all over the world.

The Armenians had forty years of massacres under Ottoman rule behind them when the World War started. The outbreak of war was a signal for the Turks to pursue their policy of extermination more ruthlessly than ever. A quarter of a million of those who escaped the slaughter went to Russian Armenia, and many

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of these, having joined the Allied armies, fell for the Allied cause. That is why when Turkey was beaten at the end of the war Allied statesmen vied with one another in professions of indebtedness to the Armenians. For a moment there seemed to be a real chance that an independent Armenia would be set up. But with the rebirth of Turkey under fierce Mustapha Kemal all hope of settling the Armenians within the former borders of Turkey vanished.

In this instance Dr. Nansen had to deal with people without a country and without protection from any government. Thus it became his first task to regulate the legal status of persons without nationality and without identity papers. This latter lack hampered the refugees in moving from one country to another in search of work. The so-called "Nansen Passport" [1] opened new doors to them.

To discover means of livelihood for the refugees was more difficult than to regulate their legal status, and only a great organizer like Dr. Nansen could have succeeded. He not only was able to find work for the refugees in various countries, but he obtained visas, arranged for cheaper railway tickets and advanced money to them into the bargain. About 135,000 Russians went to China, 75,000 to Germany, and several thousand refugee families were settled in Brazil; while 140,000 Armenians were settled in Syria and 50,000 in Russian Armenia (Erivan region). An offer from France to find places for all refugees who were able to work bettered the situation still further; up to 1925 the French received 400,000 Russian refugees and 63,000 Armenians.

By 1928 the refugee problem seemed so well on the way to solution that the Assembly of the League arranged for the Nansen Office gradually to be wound up. Its subsidies were to be decreased gradually and the office was to cease to exist by 1938. Alas, this hope soon met shipwreck! The outbreak of the economic crisis tragically affected the lot of refugees everywhere. And then Herr Hitler's accession to power in Germany and the massacres of Assyrians in Iraq set fresh streams of migration in motion.

It had been the good fortune of the "first generation of refugees" that they poured forth into a world that was comparatively willing to receive them. The depression which gripped the world

[1] The "Nansen Passport" was successively extended to the various categories of refugees under the protection of the League, but did not reach to the political *sans patrie* from Hungary, Italy and Spain, who were not considered as coming within the League's province. In 1927, on the recommendation of the League, governments began giving a document similar to the Nansen certificate, the so-called "International Passport."

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from 1928 onwards, and the unemployment resulting from it, caused the refugees to be regarded everywhere as a burden. Labor legislation was tightened up so as to secure preferential treatment for native labor as against the labor of foreigners. In almost all countries the depression stimulated the so-called "national spirit," and this, searching for a scapegoat for the manifold difficulties of the time, became increasingly hostile to all foreigners, refugees above all. Unemployment thus hit the refugees more than any other group. In some countries today 50 percent of all refugees are unemployed. Many governments think it justifiable to rid themselves of them entirely. They refuse them extensions of their permits to work and serve notice on them to quit the country as soon as their certificates of identity expire. Almost all countries try to bar new immigration. It became a common experience for a refugee to find himself on a frontier, trapped between a country that had spat him out and a country that would not let him in. In that predicament he was practically forced to disobey the orders of one government or the other by making an illicit entry and illicitly taking work. In 1935, in France alone, 4,000 Russian refugees were said to have expulsion orders standing against them. As they had committed the crime of taking work contrary to orders, most of them were in jail — thus burdening the French Treasury very considerably. A case is on record where a single refugee cost the French Government about 29,000 francs. The total cost of maintaining the refugees who are in French prisons is estimated at 12,000,000 francs for the past two years alone. The method seems cruel, sterile and excessively expensive.

From 1928 onwards all the endeavors of Dr. Nansen and his office were turned to the one and immediate task of mitigating cases of cruel hardship. In 1928 Dr. Nansen called a conference of the representatives of governments and made certain "recommendations" to them, aimed at getting them to waive standing rules restricting the employment of foreign labor and particularly urging states not to expel a refugee from their territories until it was certain that he would be received somewhere else. Though these recommendations were repeated in annual resolutions of the League Assembly, most of the governments have not felt bound by them. The Convention drafted by the Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission for Refugees in 1933, and which was meant to make the above recommendations more effective, has been ratified to date by only five governments — Bulgaria,

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Czechoslovakia, Norway, Denmark and Italy. Lately the French Chamber and Senate have voted a law authorizing France's accession to the Convention, and the Belgian Government has submitted to Parliament a draft law of ratification. Even the governments acceding to the Convention made reservations, as regards the right of refugees to work. Moreover, the Convention makes provision only for the Russian and Armenian refugees — the so-called Nansen refugees — and to a certain extent for the German refugees. The League refused to extend these arrangements to other categories of exiles, leaving each government to decide for itself the treatment it would give them.

As mentioned above, at one moment it looked as if the great postwar stream of migration had dried up. To be sure, there were the Hungarians, Italians and Spaniards who had had to flee before the dictatorships which seized power in their respective countries. Most of them went to live in Paris. But these groups, though they often contained the flower of their respective nations, did not count numerically in comparison with the masses of Russian and Armenian refugees. The League refugee organizations never bothered much about them and estimates as to their number are mere guesswork.

Then suddenly, unexpectedly, the stream broke loose again. In 1932 it seized up 25,000 Assyrians and threw them out of Iraq. Then in 1933 it swept 115,000 Germans out of Germany.

It would take too much space to tell the whole painful story of the Assyrians during the last fifty years. Only this: like the Armenians they entered the World War on the side of the Allies and had to flee before the Turks. When the war was over, grateful Allied statesmen talked about establishing an independent Assyrian kingdom. But as little came of it as of the projected independent Armenia. The only chance for the Assyrians was to settle in the new kingdom of Iraq. This kingdom had been placed under a British mandate, where it was meant to remain for at least 25 years. But in 1932 the British Government thought that Iraq was sufficiently developed to stand on its own feet, and the mandate was brought to an end. The effect upon the relations of Iraquis and Assyrians was disastrous. The bald fact is that the Assyrians were massacred in great numbers, and the rest took refuge near Mosul, where they remained until the Nansen Office settled most of them in Syria.

The last to be caught up by the stream of migration were the

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Germans. The German refugees are divided into two separate groups: German Jews who were obliged to leave their home land as a result of legislative measures enacted against them; and liberals, pacifists, Socialists and Communists who left Germany for political reasons. Of the 115,000 German refugees, roughly 100,000 are Jews. The other 15,000 are composed of Christians "with a grandmother" (*i.e.*, Christians not of purely "Aryan" origin according to Nazi laws), and of political refugees, both Catholic and Protestant. The German exodus came as a shock to the civilized world. Practically everybody who in world opinion had stood for what was currently called "German culture" suddenly became a refugee. An exceptionally high number belonged to the professional class, with the balance small tradesmen and clerks. Very few had been employed in agriculture or in manual work. Except for the group of 30,000 who settled in Palestine, they have had to be absorbed slowly, almost individually. At present about 10,000 are in France, 7,000 in the United States, and 4,000 in the Netherlands. About 18,000 were repatriated to countries of Eastern and Central Europe, and a few hundred went to South Africa.

Like the other categories of exiles, the Germans had to cope with the consequences of the economic crisis. Things were complicated for them by the fact that the "High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany" was not attached to the League but was set up as an entirely autonomous organization. The reason this was done originally was in order to spare embarrassment to Germany, still a member of the League. Of course an autonomous organization lacks the moral authority enjoyed by the Nansen Office. But though Germany now has withdrawn from the League, and though the former High Commissioner, an American citizen, Mr. James G. McDonald, has urged that the work for the German refugees should be integrated with the League, no steps in that direction have so far been taken. The League obviously fears to take any action with regard to the German refugees which might hinder the return of the Nazi Government to Geneva.

In spite of all these difficulties a comparatively large number of the German refugees in a short time found places of refuge, either temporary or permanent. Various Jewish organizations placed larger funds at their disposal than the Nansen Office had ever possessed; and of course the many distinguished scientists, scholars, men of letters, musicians and artists among them were everywhere welcomed as assets.

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The stream of the great migration is likely to swell rather than to dry up. In Germany, for instance, the measures driving Jews out of professional life are being actively pressed. Exclusion from schools and universities, from the "Labor Front" (the Nazi labor organization) and from the "Reichsorganisation" (membership in which is obligatory for all who wish to practise a trade) closes almost every avenue of earning a livelihood. For the young Jews there is no hope. Before long, some two hundred thousand (or more) will have to leave Germany or starve. And there is a danger that other dictatorships will profit by the German example to get rid of their Jews or of other racial minorities, and of course of their political opponents too.

Jewish and other private societies will rise to the new emergency as they are already doing to the current emergency. But the fact is that mass emigration and mass settlement can only be undertaken successfully as part of a general attempt to secure a general pacification of Europe. The problem presented is one of international politics. As such, it should be handled by an authoritative international agency — and fortunately one still exists in the form of the Nansen Office of the League of Nations. This League institution has had experience in handling mass settlements on a great scale. All other refugee offices should be integrated with it. More than any private organization, it can command the confidence of governments controlling comparatively empty territories. There are several such, especially in South America, which could profit immensely by receiving large blocks of selected settlers but which are afraid that miscellaneous refugees might be Communists.

The League could and should float a loan — say $10,000,000, at five percent — to finance the work of settlement. This loan, which would take care of about 50,000 families, should be raised by the country where the settlement takes place. The country of origin would accept part of the loan as payment for the emigrant's transportation to his new home and for the farm machinery which he takes along. The country where he settles would agree to admit this equipment without import duty. With the other part of the loan the settler would pay for his new land and house, animals and seeds, and for provisions to see him through until after the first harvest. The increased value of the cultivated soil, the creation of electric power, etc., would make the loan profitable for the new country. It would be worth while for the old country to ac-

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cept the bonds because it gets rid of persons which it lists as "undesirable," besides giving occupation to transportation companies and industries and creating new outlets for exports. The League would guaranty interest on the loan. The settler would start payment of interest three years after the first harvest. The loan should be amortized in twenty years. Precisely because the League's political prestige is damaged for the time being, it should carry forward its humanitarian work with new energy and vision. That work would alone justify its existence.

The comparatively few refugees who have had the opportunity of coming to the United States — and they usually are the most vital and the most resourceful, both in material and in spiritual respects — enjoy a great advantage over their fellows who find themselves in some European country. This is not to say that their lot is precisely easy. A friend of mine in New York, a man of grim humor though kind of heart, used to put this question to refugees fresh from the boat who came to see him: "Have you read what is written in the palm of the hand of the Statue of Liberty?" The refugee would answer in the negative. "Well," my friend would reply, "this is what is written: *Nobody is waiting for you here.*"

That nobody has waited for him anywhere is the sad fate of the refugee of our times. Yet his situation is better in America than anywhere else. France and England are countries with a set social order. The refugee there must always remain on the fringe of national life. Even if he is able to earn his livelihood — even if he is able to make a success — he still stands outside of things French and English. The United States is younger, its social order is not frozen. The refugee "belongs" in America as soon as he finds a job. One has only to prove one's usefulness to be as much at home as one can ever hope to be anywhere.

Even legally a refugee in the United States has an advantage. He is not a refugee but an immigrant.[2] He rubs shoulders with other aliens who are on the way to acquiring citizenship. Looking around him, he sees on every hand men of wealth and fame who

[2] That is why there are no American statistics on refugees. Immigrant aliens admitted to the United States between 1920 and 1924 (the period of the great migration) are as follows: 15,799 Armenians from Turkey (probably refugees); 18,122 Hungarians and 7,171 Hebrews from Hungary (how many of them were refugees cannot even be guessed); 6,993 Russians (probably most of them refugees); 49,795 other races from Russia (chiefly Hebrews). Of the 450,844 Italians who came to the United States during this period, only an infinitesimally small number were refugees. Immigrant aliens admitted from Germany during the three fiscal years 1934, 1935 and 1936 were as follows: 6,753 Hebrews (mostly refugees); 9,181 other races, mainly German (partly refugees).

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themselves were immigrants not so long ago. This is infinitely encouraging to him. As a result, he remains comparatively immune to the exile's usual nostalgia and psychological strain.

The refugee is probably more difficult to assimilate than the ordinary immigrant. He has a stubborn way of loving the land where he was born — shown, often, by the fact that he was willing to suffer every kind of deprivation rather than accept what he considered an unworthy conception of its proper rôle and destiny. Yet his contribution to a democratic country like the United States can be immense. Artists in exile may bring here the mellowest fruits of music and the European theatre, scholars in exile may plant here new offshoots of the great tradition of European learning, doctors in exile may perhaps find here the remedy against cancer and even old age, and chemists may discover a pill that saves humanity the trouble of eating! More important than all this, however, is that the refugees present America their gratitude for democracy.

A refugee from the terror and intolerance of dictatorship knows better than anybody else the meaning of freedom and tolerance. He loves the country that gives him once again the chance to work, to earn a livelihood, to think and to do as seems to him right — above all, the assurance of being valued according to his personal and professional usefulness quite apart from his racial origins or his religious and political creed. In the United States, the refugee is exhilarated by new-found or re-found freedom and tolerance. He appreciates them. He praises them. To those who have never known anything else, these values are as undramatic as the air they breathe. Yet democracy and freedom are far from being so much a matter of course as the air. Freedom must be so loved that if need be it will be defended. Refugees are the natural propagandists of liberty and democracy, and there is no democratic society so mature as not to be helped by their presence in its midst.

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REPERCUSSIONS OF THE SPANISH CRISIS IN LATIN AMERICA

By Enrique Gil

IN ITS early stages the Spanish civil war awakened loud repercussions in the Latin American countries. Both the masses and the élite, particularly in Argentina and Brazil, took an intense sentimental interest in the progress of the military revolt. This was last summer and autumn, when many feared lest the overwhelming success of either General Franco or the Spanish Government might provoke analogous upheavals in Latin American countries.

But as the struggle settled down into a war of attrition, in which several of the major European Powers, more or less openly participated, Latin America's interest became less avid. Not that the daughter republics were unconcerned with the fate of the motherland, only that gradually they came to see the conflict being waged there primarily through the reflecting glass of their own domestic problems. What was going on in Spain served to clarify and sharpen the political and social issues facing the Latin American peoples in their own countries. We began to ask ourselves the questions: Has democracy failed? Has fascism or communism any chance of being accepted here as a system of government to replace democracy? But though the Spanish struggle caused us to feel the importance of these questions, the success of one side or the other in that conflict will probably have little direct effect on the answers we give. To us Latin Americans, Spain has today become largely an example of what to avoid, an example of the dangers of partisanship and the absence of a sense of fair play, social discipline and order. This is not to say, of course, that Latin Americans will not continue to follow the conflict in Spain with close attention or that certain groups will not seek to exploit that conflict for their own purposes.

During the opening weeks of the war, most of us in Latin America adopted, in our minds at least, the rôle of either loyalists or rebels. The streets in front of newspaper bulletin boards constituted miniature battlefields and the patience of the police was severely taxed to preserve order. Today the crowds have disappeared, and the newspapers actually are having some difficulty in keeping their readers interested in the daily news from Spain. This

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does not indicate that Latin Americans have become indifferent to the Spanish tragedy. But the periodical repetition and exploitation of its horrors by the press, the sport of making news out of ruins, festering wounds and massacred children, have benumbed public sensibility. As the adjectives are repeated, day after day, they end by falling like dead shells. The public's capacity for emotional reaction is exhausted.

At the very start of the revolt, the support which the rebels accepted from the Moors was a difficult phenomenon for us to reconcile with the Spanish people's historical and psychological background. Spaniards have always had a proud abhorrence of outside interference. Our surprise increased as gradually it became apparent that Spanish territory was being used as a battlefield by Nazi, Fascist and Communist Powers, and that the Spanish people were in large degree mere innocent bystanders — guinea pigs for the experiments of the two socio-political forces now struggling for supremacy in Europe. As the war increased in intensity we began asking ourselves: Does it lie within the capacities of the Spanish people to stop of its own will this useless struggle? Many Latin Americans believe that the answer is in the negative. A general conviction prevails that the Spaniards will cease killing each other only when the outsiders have become exhausted. For us who love Spain so deeply this thought makes the plight of the motherland doubly painful.

II

When Franco, supported by the regular army, the deposed clergy and the land-owner class, revolted against the legally constituted Government, his example became a danger for the incipient democracies of Latin America. In these countries — except perhaps in Argentina — we have generals of the old school, who, though often well meaning, are unfortunately susceptible to the flattery of politicians avid for office, personally or by proxy. It is always possible to justify the forcible abrogation or suspension of the Constitution by alleging deficiencies in the democratic system, and by declaring that the moral and economic salvation of the country depends on some general's sacrificing himself to the imperative demands of patriotism and establishing a more or less veiled dictatorship. An article in the London *Times* of November 4, 1936, entitled "Mexican Eyes on Spain — Temptations to Generals," was on the whole far-fetched and based on a fallacious

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parallel between Spain and Mexico. Nevertheless it undeniably contained an element of truth, equally applicable to several other of our countries in that it refers to the almost universally accepted system of establishing governments by military uprisings.

Yet it must not be concluded that Franco's example was the only one which could affect the domestic situation in the Latin American republics. More than one government might have been jeopardized if the Spanish Government had succeeded in quenching the rebellion through the instrumentality of the extreme Left. The equilibrium on which some of our republican institutions depend is occasionally so precarious that any radical movement, either from Right or Left, may upset them. In the event that the Spanish Government had promptly defeated the rebels mainly through the aid of the extreme Left the masses in many parts of our continent might have become unruly.

I do not wish, however, to take too pessimistic a view regarding the possible outcome of violent reactions either to the Left or Right. The political health of our young communities seems to me robust enough to make them largely immune against serious infection by any foreign virus. Of the two possible reactions, I admit that at present the one from the Right represents, particularly in Argentina, the greater potential danger.

This consideration leads directly into the second part of my subject, namely, a survey of local problems which, though not determined by present Spanish events, have points of contact with them.

III

The world as a whole seems to be passing through a period in which the individual feels tempted or obliged to suffocate all generous emotions in the effort to ward off the potential dangers lurking around him on every hand. This constitutes almost a reversion to the dark ages, when freedom of thought and speech were crimes and pillage a virtue. Only a few years ago, reason, kindness and respect for the ideas of other people were proclaimed as the qualities that would lead mankind to a happier destiny. But so great has been the moral upheaval that today unreason, selfishness and arbitrary force have taken their place in public esteem. We were taught in our youth to believe that the conduct of the state and of its external manifestation, the government, should be guided by certain almost immutable moral principles

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drawn from Natural Law and shared in common by all civilized people regardless of race and religion. The state was supposed to set the standard for the individual's sense of right or wrong; and acts which were considered crimes for an individual were likewise held to be crimes if committed by the state. There thus existed a parallel code of morals for the individual and for the state; in fact, it was this identity in ethical standards which gave the state its authority.

In other words, the Christian spirit seemed to be taking an increasingly stronger hold over the minds and hearts of men, and fine phrases and thoughts were often actually carried into practice. Few dared openly to vaunt their contempt for freedom of thought and press or for the personal liberty of the individual; nor were we obliged to stand by and watch the unblushing worship of violence and hear about the merits and positive benefits of war. Acts of violence were done. But to hear the open promulgation of the theory that a nation had the moral right arbitrarily to deprive another nation of its territory by force would have been as shocking as to see some one appear naked at a *séance* of the French Academy. The writer recalls how when he was young the Buenos Aires newspapers sang the praises of our civilization, so advanced that policemen carried only the traditional English stick. In the world of today many a man of forty or forty-five, who certainly does not think of himself as old, feels quite out of place. Perhaps I simply have not advanced with my times.

IV

We in Argentina are not, of course, totally free from the virus of Fascism. Only recently in the upper chamber of our Congress, after Senators Palacios and Bravo had attacked a bill to repress Communism, Senator Villafañe made a vitriolic speech against democracy and universal suffrage. Such onslaughts against the fundamental principles of our political institutions, even if sincere, cause alarm. But they do not mean we are headed for Fascism.

At the unveiling of the monument to President Saenz Peña, author of the law establishing the secret ballot and compulsory vote, Buenos Aires witnessed one of the most impressive demonstrations ever staged in that city. For the occasion there had been formed a Popular Front composed of the Radical, Socialist, Progressive Democrat and Communist Parties, representing in all over eighty-five percent of the electorate of the Republic. But

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this was the Popular Front's only public act; it was followed by the withdrawal of the Radical Party, controlling seventy percent of the voters; while the Socialists, for their part, were unwilling further to accept on any terms the support offered them by the Communists.

We may conclude, then, that Argentine democratic organizations are impervious to both Fascism and Communism. The average Argentine thought it absurd when some of the participants in the Saenz Peña demonstration paraded with clenched fists aloft, just as they consider the Nazi and Fascist salutes ridiculous on the rare occasions when they are exhibited. The fact is that neither Communists nor Fascists constitute more than a small minority in Argentina. There are no reasons for the existence of either of them as a political force, and it would be an error to attribute too much significance to the stir one or the other at times creates. The Argentines as a people have a penchant for new fads, be it clothes, amusements or political doctrines. Communism and Fascism, particularly the latter, will disappear from Argentina as did mah-jong, minature golf and the "art nouveau" of the architects of 1900 — although, I admit, the latter left some pretty ugly reminders of its transitory existence.

Just at present, it is true, there is a tendency in certain Argentine quarters to exaggerate the Communist bogey. It might amuse some of my American readers, especially those acquainted with Argentina, to know that there are persons in Buenos Aires who openly accuse *La Nación* of strong Communist tendencies. I say this might be amusing, because when I visited the United States on the eve of the presidential election last autumn I found that all those opposed to Mr. Landon were indiscriminately lumped together and branded as "Communists." There exist people in Buenos Aires to whom you are a Communist if you favor the secret ballot and universal suffrage; if you talk about social justice and economic reforms; if you argue that the less privileged classes should be properly protected and that workmen should receive wages sufficient at least to cover the bare needs of their families; if you point out that the Spanish Government is that country's legally-elected, constitutional and legitimate one.

If the pending bill for the repression of Communism were finally enacted by our Congress, anyone daring publicly to make the speech President Roosevelt delivered at Madison Square Garden before the November election might find himself in jail.

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Indeed, some of the conservative leaders finally noticed the evident incongruity between the official honors bestowed upon President Roosevelt, whom our people received with genuine enthusiasm, and some of their own party policies in social, economic or political matters. It became particularly imperative to explain away this incongruity after President Roosevelt's remarks in his recent inaugural address concerning a government's duty to insure a decent standard of living to all of its citizens. The difficulty was solved by the simple process of asserting that President Roosevelt is not a statesman but merely a spiritual pastor!

V

Whatever the subject under discussion, it always is hard to draw sufficiently general conclusions to cover all of the Latin American countries. The rule holds good in the present case.

The Government of El Salvador was, for instance, the first to recognize the "Junta de Burgos." Its action even preceded that of Berlin and Rome. Since then no other American government has followed Salvador's lead. From Brazil I am informed that the struggle in Spain is not regarded as between two "sovereignities" but between two opposing ideologies supported by foreign nations. While the part of Brazil's population with Left tendencies favors the Valencia Government, the majority of the country leans toward Burgos, not because of sympathy with the military dictatorship but out of dislike for anarchy and Communism. But in Brazil the Spanish war has not really been an important issue.

In Chile, on the other hand, the events in Spain seem to have had a marked influence. This was noticeable in elections held in the provinces of Atacama and Coquimbo during August 1936, when a well-known candidate of the misleadingly named Radical Party, which had long enjoyed a majority in those provinces, was defeated because he was supported by the Chilean *Frente Popular* and thus lost the votes of many of his own conservative friends, particularly co-religionists and large land-owners. At present, the *Frente Popular* is openly espousing the cause of constitutional government in Spain, while its opponents with equal fervor desire the victory of Franco.

If the war in Spain had produced really serious repercussions in Latin America we might logically have expected to hear echoes of them at the Buenos Aires Conference. Actually the Conference observed almost complete silence concerning the Spanish conflict.

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The principal topics discussed at Pan American meetings have always pertained primarily, if not exclusively, to the Western Hemisphere. Particular efforts to observe this self-imposed limitation were made at the Buenos Aires Conference in view of the very unsettled conditions prevailing in the rest of the world. Faced with the danger of a new general conflagration, the peace-loving American countries resolved to unite their efforts for the protection of mutual interests adversely affected by the European turmoil. Adhesion to the democratic principles so brilliantly expounded by President Roosevelt, and reiterated by the delegates of other republics, hardly offered sufficient reason for the Conference to express an opinion with regard to Spain. Any such expression might have been construed as a violation of neutrality or as a breach of the consecrated American principle of non-intervention.

It should be mentioned, perhaps, that at the plenary session of December 20 the Mexican delegate, Señor Beteta, delivered a courageous speech justifying, juridically and morally, the aid his country had given to the legitimate Spanish Government. But the Conference as a whole refrained from entering into any debate on the merits of the Mexican position. In like fashion, the joint resolution on behalf of peace in Spain, which was presented the following day by the Central American delegates, was not given consideration by the Conference. Adoption of this resolution by the Conference would have amounted to a tender of good offices to the parties in conflict, and this was hardly a practical proposal since by that time the Spanish civil war had evidently developed ramifications extending far beyond the confines of the Iberian Peninsula. Perhaps, too, the delegates deemed it more seemly not to pass resolutions on a strictly European problem in view of the fact that the Conference had failed to settle the Chaco question.

The only formal act of the Conference relating to Spain was the tribute rendered her at the plenary session of December 23. After the assembly had listened to stirring speeches by the delegates from Honduras and the Dominican Republic, the President of the Conference, Dr. Saavedra Lamas, moved that the delegates stand for a minute in homage to Spain. The deep silence in which this tribute was carried out by all the American representatives showed how profoundly men of peace and good will are moved when confronted by passions beyond their power to control.

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FASCISM IN BELGIUM

By Harold Callender

MUCH has been heard recently of the possible division of Europe on the basis of political doctrines. It has seemed as if a kind of Fascist International were forming, as if intensely nationalistic authoritarian movements were tending toward a counter-revolutionary internationalism of the extreme Right as an offset to the revolutionary internationalism of the extreme Left. Italian Fascists and German Nazis have been fighting on Spanish soil against Communists and Left sympathizers from half a dozen other countries. Sir Oswald Mosley has visited Rome and sung the praises of Signor Mussolini. Léon Degrelle, the newly emerged leader of a Fascist movement in Belgium, broadcast in French in January from one of the officially controlled radio stations in Italy. In France many admirers of Mussolini are to be found, and Frenchmen have been found even to extol Herr Hitler (among them Bertrand de Jouvenel, son of the late Ambassador). Among Fascists and near-Fascists belonging to different countries, even those traditionally hostile to each other, there is a recognized temperamental congeniality, an open acknowledgment of common inspiration and origin, a sympathy which sometimes gives indications of transcending conflicting national interests.

Fascists often boast that there is little if any good to be found in other countries than their own; yet except in Italy, Fascism itself is an importation. The Nazis, who exalt the Nordic "race" above all other breeds, have borrowed their political creed largely from Rome. Mosley, who talks like an old-fashioned British imperialist, is a pupil of Britain's Mediterranean rival. Degrelle admits the kinship of his doctrines with those of Mussolini and even sympathizes with the foreign policies of the two great Fascist powers. These movements, then, though professing to excel in patriotism, are not indigenous in either their forms or their principles. Mussolini once said that Fascism was not an article of export; but when the foreign demand grew he changed his mind and concluded that Fascism had risen to a "world plane."

It is all the stranger that Belgium should have proved susceptible to the propagation of Fascist doctrine because that country has had to endure hardly any of the social or national stresses

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which caused or were pretexts for the rise of Fascism in Italy and Germany. There neither is nor has been any such economic disorganization in Belgium as there was in Italy before the March on Rome. There has not been unemployment comparable to that in Germany when Hitler rose to power (indeed there is little social suffering and Belgium is relatively prosperous). Belgium has no foreign grievances like those of Italy and Germany which derived from the peace treaties, and her nascent Fascism shows no traces of imperialism. When one recalls the fears and discontents upon which Fascism fed in Italy and Germany, it appears that the establishment of a Fascist movement in Belgium would be like making bricks without straw. The emotional raw material so capably utilized by Mussolini and Hitler seems lacking. Moreover, with its two languages and cultures (one cannot speak quite definitely of two races, though there are racial differences), the country would seem difficult to weld into a regimented mass. Nevertheless, the Belgian Fascist movement under Léon Degrelle has made sufficient headway to disturb the older parties and disquiet the coalition government of M. van Zeeland.

This extraordinary movement, which does not call itself Fascist but "Rexist," was hardly known until the end of 1935. Degrelle was just the leader of a noisy group of youths within the Catholic Party, long divided by numerous factions. The mission of his group, as he saw it then, was to "cleanse" the Catholic Party from within, and the name they adopted was "Christus Rex" — "Christ the King." When the van Zeeland Government was meeting the financial crisis in March 1935, Degrelle was vainly striving to be chosen for a safe Catholic parliamentary seat at Liége. He failed, and turned his attention to other parties. Among those who gave him aid were even certain Liberals. The movement now dropped the word "Christus" although its insignia still bear a cross and a crown as relics of its Catholic origin and became known by its present strange name of "Rex."

But in spite of the similarity of the phraseology in which the Rexist movement expresses itself, in spite of its alien symbols, salute and ideals, it is not quite the same as its Italian and German models. It does not so openly repudiate democracy, though it does repudiate economic liberalism. It has no uniformed militia and is not militaristic. It does not specifically advocate dictatorship, though that is the end toward which it tends. It seems rather less fanatical than either Italian or German Fascism. It has usu-

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ally avoided the violence which characterized the early days of those two movements (it is still too weak in any case to use force), and it does not seem to contain the toughs that made the Fascist militia and the Nazi Storm Troops instruments of terrorism.

In 1931, when the tide of Hitlerism was rising fast, I visited half a dozen German universities to observe the political tendencies of the students. After many talks with teachers and students in widely separated regions, I found that two things had left the most lasting impression: the intensely emotional nationalism which seemed to be sweeping over the youth of the country, and the amazing seriousness with which these youngsters took their bizarre political creed. When they ragged and tormented a liberal or pacifist professor until his life became unbearable, they seemed to get no fun from it. When they struck or demonstrated against an insufficiently nationalistic dean, it was not a lark but a duty. These young Nazis were all terribly solemn. They rarely smiled. Life was a grave affair and politics were serious.

In striking contrast was my experience in Brussels recently, when I talked with Degrelle and many of his followers. They seemed equally in earnest, but they had not lost their ability to smile. One day I was in the office of the *Pays Réel*, the Rexist newspaper, waiting while a member of the staff gathered together some Rexist pamphlets for me. One that I particularly wanted was called "Les Principes Rexistes." After a long search I was told that it was out of stock. "Comment," I said, "Il n'y a pas de principes Rexistes?" A roomful of young men, all ardent apostles of Degrelle, laughed wholeheartedly at the jibe. I imagine that anyone who knows the Nazis would hesitate to make such a joke in the office of the *Angriff* or the *Voelkischer Beobachter*. Since an almost preternatural solemnity and fanaticism are characteristic of Fascism elsewhere, it seems significant that the Belgian Rexists are Fascists who sometimes can laugh, even at themselves.

"We are more middle-class, more respectable, than the Nazis were when they began," said one of Degrelle's associates. Others agreed that the Belgians were not so given to extremes or so inclined to mysticism as the Germans, and hence they could hardly become so intense in their politics. Moreover, the sturdy Flemish burghers, in their long struggle against tyranny, acquired a love of liberty and a suspicion of the state which have not died out and which constitute an obstacle to dictatorship. What the Nazis call the "Fuehrerprinzip" does not have the same appeal to this

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lowland population as it does to many Germans. The tradition of independence if not of liberalism probably explains Degrelle's avoidance of a sweeping condemnation of democracy or bids for arbitrary personal power like those made by both Mussolini and Hitler. "The spirit of the country is against dictatorship," he said. But he desires the dissolution of parties and a concentration of executive power which certainly tends toward dictatorship.

Probably few Belgians — certainly not all of those who supported him in the last election — regard Degrelle as a person to whom absolute or overwhelming power ought to be entrusted. He has not won anything like the blind devotion which is vouchsafed by exalted young Nazis to Hitler or which Mussolini explicitly demands by asserting that "The Duce is always right." Degrelle does not even profess infallibility, and that, for a Fascist, is a handicap. He is a bright-looking and handsome young man who considers himself, not unwarrantably, to be endowed with a peculiarly potent appeal to crowds. He speaks of his talent as "electrical." Whatever it is, it is effective. Degrelle has held political meetings far larger than any others in Belgium. Thousands of people much older than he — he is only 30 — have listened to him eagerly and have voted for him.

There are a variety of reasons for this, and not all of them are connected with Degrelle's indisputable personal charm. Some were well expressed to me by a distinguished Belgian of the upper middle class who himself had voted for Degrelle. "It may be," he said, "that Degrelle was at the peak of his influence this past autumn, as a result of the election last spring and his subsequent campaign against Communism at the time of the strikes. His success has come because of widespread discontent with the old parties, which are disorganized and consist of officers without troops. The Catholic Party, which governed virtually from 1840 until recent years, is split into many divisions — there is a farmers' branch, a labor branch, a Flemish branch and a Walloon branch — and is too much under the thumb of the clergy. National interests are neglected for partisan interests and privileges. Recently a Minister wanted to dismiss an incompetent official, but the Chamber threatened to insist upon the Minister's own dismissal instead. You cannot govern under such conditions. The executive is too weak in relation to Parliament and must always compromise with partisan groups. We must sift and attenuate popular control, since it cannot be abolished."

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These observations upon the weakness of the Belgian state and divisions within it might have been taken literally from critical essays recently written on the alleged crisis of parliamentarism in France by M. André Tardieu. They represent the impatience of the conservative portion of the middle class with the fumbling and log-rolling of democratic parliaments, and with the cost of a state machine which they are inclined to attribute to its socialistic propensities. With them goes also a fear of Communism and a desire to erect a strong state as a barrier against it. These, of course, are the apprehensions upon which Fascism is founded, and it is the critics of parliamentary government who entertain such feelings that often unconsciously pave the way for Fascism. First parliamentary government is shown to be inefficient or venal, or both; then the thesis is advanced that a "strong" executive is the only alternative to Communism — and the battle for Fascism is half won. It has become difficult to criticize democracy without playing into the hands of the Fascists or the fascistically inclined; for to expose its defects, in order to remedy them, inevitably involves an at least partial justification of the Fascist indictment of it.

The Belgian gentleman cited above is not a Fascist, yet he has furthered the cause of Fascism. So have numerous other middle-class people who, as one put it, admire the Rexists for "waking up the country" and would like to see them control perhaps 25 percent of the Chamber, "but not a majority." They see in Degrelle's movement an idealism and nationalism which appeal to them. They do not desire dictatorship. They imagine, as many Germans did in 1931 and 1932, that they can support a Fascist movement as a means of stimulating a lethargic state to more efficient action, but stop short of a Fascist revolution.

We may say, then, that it was because of middle-class discontent, on both economic and political grounds; because of an almost universal recognition of the need of reforming the machinery of the state; and because of the apparent decadence of the traditional parties, that a Fascist movement suddenly appeared in Belgium. It was not born of an acute crisis nor of any mood of despair, as elsewhere, but of a general *malaise*.

The devaluation of the currency and the Brussels Exposition improved the economic situation in Belgium in 1935, but in the autumn of that year Degrelle began a sensational campaign in which he accused leaders of the Catholic Party of corruption and

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of exploiting their official positions for private advantage. The president of the Catholic Party and a Senator, both bankers, retired from office. This was a feather in Degrelle's cap. He continued his violent attacks against a score of other politicians. To many shopkeepers and peasants he seemed the personification of outraged public virtue. It was mainly as a result of this muckraking campaign, carried on without the restraint which would have been imposed by the more severe libel laws of Great Britain, for example, that Rex obtained 281,000 votes in the May 1936 elections, winning 21 of the 202 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 12 out of the 167 seats in the Senate. This success was not enough to endanger the government but was enough to cause it disquietude. Van Zeeland and his associates began a counter campaign. But they could not equal the Rexists in reckless assertions, and this put them under a handicap.

At this point some new factors came into play. Almost at the same time as the Belgian elections, France chose a new Parliament. The Popular Front took power. There followed the "stay-in" strikes which provoked fears of revolution. Throughout the summer Belgium was disturbed by similar labor demonstrations on the part of miners, textile workers and metal workers. As a result, social legislation (40-hour week, minimum wages, etc.) was adopted similar to that hastily passed by the Blum Government in France. Here was just what the Rexists might have prayed for — a chance to wage a campaign jointly against Communism and against the diplomatic association with France, whose foreign policy had begun to awaken considerable apprehensions. The two objectives harmonized perfectly. The French Government was tainted by the fact that it had Communist support and because it appeared to be bullied by Communist-inspired strikes. At the same time it had a kind of alliance with Soviet Russia which might (so it was said) drag Belgium into war on the side of Communism. The fact that the Franco-Russian treaty was the work not of Blum but of Barthou and Laval was forgotten. The Rexists made the most of the bogey. Degrelle had hardly mentioned the Communist danger; but in August he began a vigorous campaign against it. We have no concrete evidence such as election figures to show what success he had; but his meetings were largely attended and he undoubtedly increased his influence.

Thus the fear of communism combined with the fear of war

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and with suspicion of France, notably among the Flemish, to provide an opportunity for a second dashing advance of Rex; and these fears and this suspicion are not likely soon to vanish. They produced last autumn the King's declaration of foreign policy which amounted to a resumption of Belgian prewar neutrality. The Rexists had cleverly seized upon movements of opinion and prejudices which the Government could not ignore. In this sense Degrelle has proved himself an able campaigner.

Germany also enters the picture. In his speech the King gave the occupation of the Rhineland by German troops and the consequent alteration of the military balance in Western Europe as the reason for Belgium's change of foreign policy. Germany had become more powerful and strategically better situated. Belgium wished to avoid offending her and was unwilling to give her any pretext for attack by continuing her close military relations with France. This was the official attitude. Degrelle took a similar line but went further. He virtually adopted the thesis which underlies Hitler's foreign policy by proclaiming the Communist danger and demanding that France break with Russia. So while the Belgian King and Government were moving away from France to a position of neutrality, Degrelle in effect took the German side.

Similarly bold and similarly disturbing to many thoughtful Belgians was his alliance with the Flemish nationalists, who have long been influenced by German propaganda and are regarded as still leaning toward the separatism which some of their leaders used to preach. So far, Rex's largest vote has been in the Walloon provinces, of one of which (Luxembourg) Degrelle is a native. But now he has begun to make a special appeal to the Flemish.

The great majority of the Belgians, some 6,500,000 out of a total 8,000,000, speak only one language. Of these unilingual inhabitants, 52.77 percent spoke Flemish at the time of the 1930 census. This Flemish-speaking portion seems to be increasing; for between 1920 and 1930 the population of the Walloon provinces increased by 3.85 percent and that of the Flemish provinces by 10.98 percent. Consequently the so-called Flemish question, or the problem of the use and teaching of Flemish as well as French, remains one that successive governments must consider.

The Flemish suffer from an inferiority complex. Their language, virtually identical with that of their Dutch neighbors, is not one of the major ones of Europe; and in Belgium it has labored under the additional handicap that French has long been the language

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of the educated, even in the Flemish provinces. With the advent of popular education, the lower classes insisted upon the use of their own tongue in the schools. Some consider this substitution of a local dialect for a world language a backward step; but it was a necessary sop to Flemish sentiment.

It was a concession which was first granted by the German administration in 1916 in an effort to win over the Flemish to the German side. At that time a group called Activists took advantage of the war to further Flemish nationalism, and in 1918 they formed what they called the "Raad van Vlaanderen," a kind of Flemish Parliament, which proclaimed the end of the Belgian dynasty in Belgian Flanders. Some 49,000 (a small minority) participated in the election of this "parliament." When the Belgian Government was restored, 40 of these Flemish nationalists were condemned to death for treason (though never executed), and some 220 were imprisoned. A similar Flemish movement arose in the Belgian army during the war, and the Front Party which they formed after the peace included the extreme nationalists. This party later became the Flemish Nationalist Party and advocated a vaguely-defined political autonomy for Flanders. Some wanted a federal Flemish state within Belgium; others talked of joining Catholic Belgian Flanders with Protestant Holland in a Volksstaat built upon a common language; still others had an imperialistic dream of a revival of the fifteenth century Burgundian state embracing Holland, French Flanders, Belgium and Luxembourg. It was the Declerq group of Flemish nationalists, who really want cultural autonomy though they may talk of wider aspirations, who recently made a kind of tentative alliance with the Rexists.

Very few Flemish would really care to separate from Belgium. The real issue is the status of the Flemish language. Since concessions were made to the desire for cultural equality the separatist sentiment has greatly diminished. Between 1930 and 1935 a series of laws was passed which will make Flanders virtually a unilingual territory. Flemish is taught not only in primary and secondary schools but also in the University of Ghent. It is used in the public administrations and courts. Flemish soldiers are segregated in separate companies in the army. Brussels, the capital, has a bilingual régime. The Flemish Nationalists have never polled more than 13 percent of the votes. In the last election they polled only 7.4 percent. Today we may say that the Flemish movement has simmered down to not much more than a watchful

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concern for the preservation of the language, and even the few extremists who still talk of separation or of a Greater Holland do not attach practical importance to their projects. In fact, Belgium has gone so far toward a solution of the language problem that Degrelle finds little to promise the Flemish, though he speaks of cultural autonomy in terms of separate ministries, especially for education, for Flanders and Wallonia. It is not because Flemish nationalism is a danger that Degrelle's flirtation with it was distasteful to many Belgians, but because the separatist sentiment with which it is associated might again make the movement susceptible to German influence. Degrelle himself contends, of course, that by conciliating the Flemish he is merely uniting Belgium.

By linking the Rex movement with Flemish extremists, Degrelle seeks to insure a stronger showing at the next election. If he succeeds, a tendency already at work would have been carried an important step further. If we regard the three government parties — Catholics, Liberals and Socialists — as moderates, which seems accurate enough, and put down the Communists, Rexists and Flemish Nationalists as extremists, we may say that in four years (from the election of 1932 to that of 1936) the moderates have lost materially and the extremists have gained. The Catholic percentage of the votes cast fell from 38.5 in 1932 to 28.9 in 1936, the Liberal percentage from 14.3 to 13.6, the Socialist percentage from 37.1 to 31.1; while the Communist percentage rose from 2.8 to 5.9, the Flemish nationalist percentage from 5.4 to 7.4, and the Rexists, a new extreme group, polled last year 11.8 percent of the votes. Thus the total moderate vote, which was 89.9 percent in 1932, was 73.6 percent in 1936; and the extremist vote, which was 8.2 percent in 1932, became 25.1 percent in 1936. This growth of extremist strength, both Left and Right, at the expense of the moderates, was a striking aspect of the last elections held under the German Republic. The same tendency in Belgium does not necessarily indicate the eventual annihilation of the moderates there, but it is a danger signal.

This is no less the case because the most formidable extreme movement, the Rexist, does not openly advocate dictatorship or a totalitarian state. Its program, like those of other Fascist movements, is very vague. It will take shape according to expediency when and if the movement advances. The Nazis were a party with certain anti-capitalist principles but with capitalist financial support; yet when they attained power, Gregor Strasser, with his

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radical economic program, was dropped, and the Left wing was decimated by the "purge" of June 30, 1934. In France, it was the effort to introduce an economic program which led to the split in the Croix de Feu movement. The Rexists have not yet reached this point; but they talk of acquiring a long lease of power (ten to twenty years), of reducing the rôle of Parliament and strengthening the executive, and of a corporative state somewhat on Italian lines. In the now classic Fascist manner they condemn individualism and liberalism along with Communism. Their pamphlets, considering the number of words they contain, reveal amazingly little regarding their aims. M. Pierre Daye, a Belgian writer who supports Degrelle, told me that the Rexists favor a corporative state, which would not be as centralized as that in Italy but would more closely resemble the system prevailing in Belgium before the French Revolution. He said there was no desire for a totalitarian régime in Belgium, but that the Rexists would favor a smaller Chamber, the referendum, and greater power for the King. He thought they would sponsor greater provincial and municipal autonomy and a diminution of the power of capitalists in public life.

The Fascist movements are alike in being essentially middle-class reactions against the Left, which for political purposes is identified with Communism. They themselves may contain Left elements and working-class followers who are unaware of the movement's real aims. They may even be to some extent anti-capitalistic in the sense that they profess a desire to control banks and great industries in the interest of the middle class. They depict parliamentary government as decadent, corrupt and inefficient, and they advocate in its place a strong and vigorous, if not arbitrary, régime. They likewise regard economic liberalism as obsolete and favor a kind of economic state within the political state in which regulation will be substituted for free individual enterprise. In Italy and Germany they have deified the state and exalted militarism as an end in itself. Since 1934 the two Fascist Powers have collaborated in the field of foreign policy. Circumstances have to a considerable extent rewarded this collaboration as against the leading democratic Powers, Britain and France. But in the relations between states it is interests and not doctrines which dominate in the long run; and Fascists of different countries, however they may agree regarding the alleged defects of parliaments and the need of planned economy, will not find it easy to reconcile their aspirations outside their own borders.

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THE PERENNIAL KAMCHATKA DISCORD

By Bruce Hopper

THE Kamchatka fisheries question is the hardy perennial of discord between Soviet Russia and Japan. From small beginnings it has now assumed the proportions of a major political issue. Its ramifications can best be presented by noting the stages of its growth.

Pre-revolution Period. The Tsarist Government exhibited an extraordinary disinterest in the riches of Russia's Far Eastern waters and permitted Japan to obtain a long headstart in their exploitation. The first privileges which Japan received from Russia were contained in that same Treaty of 1875 whereby Russia acquired Sakhalin and Japan the Kurile Islands. The treaty gave Japanese fishing boats and traders rights equal to those granted by Russia under the most-favored-nation clause. Subsequently, Japanese fish buyers conducted a brisk trade with the natives at the mouth of the Amur. But the special fishing rights exercised by Japan spring from Article 11 of the Treaty of Portsmouth as implemented by the Fishery Convention of 1907, which granted Japanese subjects the "right to capture, gather and manufacture marine products along the Russian coasts facing the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea." According to this convention, concessions (or fishing lots for lease) were to be distributed by auction with no discrimination as between Japanese and Russian nationals.

"Illegal" Period: 1917–1924. Difficulties over fishing rights did not develop between the two nations until the Russian Revolution severed diplomatic relations, thus preventing renewal of the 1907 convention when it expired in 1919. During the period of foreign intervention in Siberia, the Russians lost control of the fishing grounds. In 1921, Japan, declaring the 1907 convention void, proclaimed "free fishing," and protected her fishermen with warships. During this period Japan progressively took over control of the entire fisheries, built canneries on the Kamchatka shore, and doubled the output of her fish products. In an effort to legalize her enhanced position, Japan first attempted to negotiate with the Merkulov "White" government at Vladivostok, later with the Far Eastern Republic at the Dairen Conference (1921–1922), and again with the latter, this time supported by the Soviet Government, at the Changchun Conference in September 1922. These negotiations broke down (in so far as fishing was concerned) on the issue of payment for the fishery privileges that Japan had enjoyed and expanded during the "illegal" interim. On March 2, 1923, the Soviet Government decreed that the 1907 Convention was still in force. Then in April of that year came the first postwar auction: the Japanese not only took part, but paid the arrears in rent for their fishing leases, amounting to one million rubles.

Period of Soviet General Concessions Policy: 1924–1928. After that auspicious indication of good will by both parties, a temporary fishing agreement was drawn up in 1924, restoring the 1907 obligations. At that time the Soviet Government was embarked on the general concessions policy of inviting foreign

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investments in Russia. By the Treaty of Friendship of 1925 the two governments formally recognized each other and agreed to revise or cancel all pre-1917 treaties between Russia and Japan, with the exception of the Treaty of Portsmouth. The 1907 Fishery Convention was to be revised in accordance with the changed conditions of the industry. After two years of negotiation the new convention, with three additional protocols, was signed (January 23, 1928). Its term was set for eight years, subject to automatic renewal for twelve-year periods. Japan's rights to exploit Russian Far Eastern waters were reaffirmed, with the exception of 37 bays and inlets specifically enumerated. These rights include the right to catch fish, except fur seals and sea otters, the right to the free use of the littoral of the fishing lots for purposes of the industry (*e.g.* for buildings, canneries, etc.), and the right to export the products without payment of an export duty or license. The equality between Japanese subjects and Russian citizens at the annual auction of lots in Vladivostok was again formulated in treaty form. Rates, fees, etc., due the Soviet state were itemized, and a compromise formula was drawn up as between Soviet labor laws and Japanese fishing customs. With the signing of this convention the Kamchatka fisheries question seemed to have been settled.



Period of the First Five Year Plan: 1928–1933. But the hardy perennial was not so easily uprooted. Within a year the Soviets launched their First Five Year Plan, in which the program for the fish industry involved an effort to break the Japanese monopoly in the Far East. By the Convention of 1925, Soviet state enterprise had been excluded from the fish auctions, it thus was restricted to non-auctionable lots which supplied only 20 percent of the total catch. However, an extraordinary number of so-called private Russian firms appeared on the scene, with the result that the lots obtained by the Russians increased from 42 in 1928 to 313 in 1930. Fresh trouble appeared in the form of the yen-ruble exchange. The Japanese fishing interests had been making payments with Soviet currency, obtainable at depreciated rates at the Vladivostok branch of the Bank of Chosen. Following an inspection by local Soviet authorities that bank was forced to close on December 17, 1930. Thereafter the Japanese had difficulty in making payments because the official Soviet exchange rate was from five to six times more favorable to the ruble than was the rate on the illegal "black exchange." The Japanese government therefore demanded a lowering either of the fishing rents or of the ruble. There ensued another six months of negotiation, terminated by a compromise in April 1931, which permitted payments for that year to be made in debentures of the AKO (Russian Kamchatka

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Fishing Concern) to be purchased at the rate of 32.5 sen per ruble. After the depreciation of the yen by 40 percent in 1931, the Russians tried without success to boost the rate to 75 sen per ruble. General dissatisfaction caused the Japanese to request a conference to interpret the 1928 convention. Again protracted negotiations took place, resulting in the Hirota-Karakhan Agreement of August 1932, which increased the catch permitted the Soviet state enterprise by two and one-half times, and extended most of the existing Japanese contracts to 1936 without auction. Since new grounds were being opened to exploitation, the relative position of the Japanese continued to decline.

Period of the Second Five Year Plan: 1933–1937. By this time the Soviets had definitely abandoned the former policy of attempting to attract foreign capital into industrial concessions and were interested only in technical assistance. Concessions involving foreign capital had failed, *e.g.* Lena Gold Fields Co., Ltd., etc. Also, the Second Five Year Plan had for its formula the development to the utmost of the productive strength of the entire country, including the Far Eastern fisheries. In May 1935 Japan requested revision of the 1928 convention before the date of its expiration (January 23, 1936), and there began the latest of the long series of negotiations. What Japan now wanted was the extension of the existing leases for a 12-year period, the abolition of the auction method, and the limitation of Soviet output. Pending the outcome of these negotiations, the 1928 Convention, with the 1932 supplement, was extended to December 1, 1936. A new convention was finally drafted (but not published) and was ready for signature late in November 1936. The Japanese Foreign Office chose that moment (November 25, 1936) to announce the signature of the German-Japanese anti-Communist agreement. The Soviet Government countered this move with a refusal to sign the new fisheries convention, confining its action to a further extension of the existing agreement for another year. Consequently, the annual auction of leases, which Japan had sought to abolish, was expected to be held as usual in February of this year. In the meantime Japan was reported in the January 1, 1937, issue of *Manchuria* (semi-monthly publication of the South Manchuria Railway) to be prepared to protect "the Empire's legitimate fishery activities in Kamchatka sea with warships."

In the meantime there has been a continual expansion of Soviet fishing activity in the convention waters. And Japan's output, despite its gradual increase in volume, is becoming a relatively smaller part of the total catch. In 1924 Japan controlled 80 percent of the leases and accounted for 97 percent of the output of conserved fish. But between 1930 and 1934 Japan's leases of fishing districts increased from 296 to 369 whereas those of the Soviets jumped from 240 to 383. In 1927 Japan produced 92 percent of the canned crab; in 1934, Soviet canned crab from convention waters (129,500 cases, or 55.4 percent of the total) exceeded the Japanese share for the first time. At the beginning of the First Five Year Plan the Soviets had one conserving plant in Kamchatka; at the end of it they had 16. They expanded their exports from 1,584,700 gold rubles in 1928 to 20,343,700 in 1933. In the same period the Soviet employees increased from 3,017 (of which none was permanent and 1,599 were Japanese) to 16,707 (of which 5,927 were permanent and none was

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Japanese). The Soviet figure for the number of Japanese nationals engaged in the Kamchatka fisheries is 33,000; the Japanese figure is 22,227 in 1930 and 20,364 in 1934. Further, the Soviets have built can factories, barrel factories, saw mills, etc., to produce supplies and equipment formerly obtained in Japan.

The importance of the fishing industry to Japan is indicated by the fact that of the three million persons engaged in fisheries throughout the world, 1,521,916 are Japanese (of whom 57.9 percent use fishing as subsidiary employment). Japan's 364,582 fishing boats represent one-third of the world's total of such craft and with them she takes one-third of the world's total catch, amounting annually to between nine and fourteen million tons. Her annual catch is valued at about 300 million yen. In 1935 her exports of fish products were worth 82 million yen. From the convention zones she took in 1934 prepared fish products valued at 40 million yen and canned fish valued at 27 million yen. These figures give a clear idea of the value of Japan's fishing rights in Soviet waters, and explain why she is so perturbed over the prospect of their loss.

From the above one may conclude that the Kamchatka fisheries question does not lend itself to an easy solution. If Japan's fishing rights rested merely on a Soviet concession contract, they would probably have been liquidated before this. But they stem from the Treaty of Portsmouth, which the Soviet Government in 1925 recognized as binding. While the use of the term *servitude* might be seriously questioned in describing these rights, they do nevertheless constitute a limitation on Soviet sovereignty in certain territorial waters and along the adjacent shores of the USSR. According to the Soviet view, the Japanese northern fisheries do not contribute to Japan's food supply since they are utilized mostly for exports, and therefore constitute capitalistic exploitation, which during the "illegal" period attained monopolistic proportions. The Japanese, on the other hand, hold the view stated in the Diet of 1934, that: "The problem of fisheries in the northern waters is not less vital for Japan than the Manchurian problem." The suggestion is frequently made in Japan that the fish industry be transferred to the state in order better to compete with the Soviet state industry, for evidently the Soviet Government is determined to "overtake and outstrip" the Japanese on the basis of straight competition. But behind the economic issue as to who shall control the conserved salmon or crab markets of Europe and America loom political issues loaded with elements of danger for both sides.

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General: Political and Legal

SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1935. By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE *assisted by* V. M. BOULTER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 2 v., $13.00.

For the first time since 1925 the "Survey" is published in two volumes. The first has as its unifying theme the beginning of rearmament in Germany and its consequences on the policies of the other Powers. The second volume is devoted to the conflict between Italy and Ethiopia from 1928 to September 1936. The military and economic phases of that struggle are carefully recorded, in addition to the usual authoritative treatment of the diplomatic side. This is an indispensable source for the study of the breakdown of collective security.

IS IT PEACE? By GRAHAM HUTTON. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 364 p. $2.50.

A book worth reading, summarizing the events that have led the world to its present parlous state and presenting an analysis of the policies now being pursued by the major Powers, especially Great Britain, whose behavior the author does not hesitate to criticize adversely. Although an economist, he nevertheless realizes "the relative insignificance of purely economic factors in the formation of foreign policy in the short run."

ZERO HOUR. By RICHARD FREUND. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937, 256 p. $2.50.

A synthesis of current trends in world power politics, not so sensational as the title would indicate. The author is an Anglicized Austrian.

THE HUMAN COMEDY, AS DEVISED AND DIRECTED BY MANKIND ITSELF. By JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON. New York: Harper, 1936, 394 p. $3.00.

A composite of various materials, for the most part already published, by the distinguished American historian who died in 1936.

POSSIBLE PEACE. By W. MACMAHON BALL. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1936, 199 p. 3/.

An Australian view of the present international situation, by a professor in the University of Melbourne.

L'EVOLUTION DU RÉGIME PARLEMENTAIRE. By ERNEST MÉLOT. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1936, 262 p. Fr. 15.

A good description of the parliamentary machinery in Britain, France and Belgium.

LES MYSTIQUES POLITIQUES CONTEMPORAINES ET LEURS INCIDENCES INTERNATIONALES. By LOUIS ROUGIER. Paris: Sirey, 1936, 124 p. Fr. 12.

A concise, closely reasoned analysis of the political faiths which rule the world.

CHURCH AND STATE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. By ADOLF KELLER. London: Epworth Press, 1936, 382 p. 6/.

Recent trends in the major European countries.

THE PAPACY AND WORLD-AFFAIRS AS REFLECTED IN THE SECULARIZATION OF POLITICS. By CARL CONRAD ECKHARDT. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937, 310 p. $4.00.

The background of present papal policy in international affairs.

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ISRAËL. SON PASSÉ. SON AVENIR. By H. de Vries de Heekelingen. Paris: Perrin, 1937, 274 p. Fr. 15.

A former professor at the Catholic University of Nimwegen, Holland, gives a dispassionate historical summary of an age-old problem.

TEORIA DELLA INSURREZIONE. By Emilio Lussu. Paris: Giustizia e Libertà, 1936, 284 p. Fr. 12.

Advice to the proletariat on how to lead a successful revolution against the Fascist régimes, by a former member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, now an exile in France. The military factor appears to be somewhat over-emphasized.

VIEWED WITHOUT ALARM. EUROPE TODAY. By Walter Millis. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1937, 79 p. $1.25.

An American journalist travels in Europe and finds that war is not so imminent as is generally believed. He also thinks that Britain's reluctance to take a definite stand in regard to Germany is an aid to peace. With this and other of his conclusions, many observers of the European scene will very likely disagree.

SCHICKSALS STUNDE EUROPAS. By Karl Anton Prinz Rohan. Graz: Leykam-Verlag, 1937, 431 p.

A cultivated man's confused musings on love, God, politics and other matters. The author founded the *Europäische Revue*, and recently espoused the pro-Nazi "German Action" in Austria.

BORDERLANDS OF LANGUAGE IN EUROPE AND THEIR RELATION TO THE HISTORIC FRONTIER OF CHRISTENDOM. By Vaughan Cornish. London: Sifton Praed, 1937, 105 p. 6/.

A painstaking study purporting to show that the dual language situation in disputed borderlands often has a religious origin.

THE ALTERNATIVE TO WAR: A PROGRAMME FOR STATESMEN. By Charles Roden Buxton. London: Allen and Unwin, 1936, 176 p. 4/6.

This excursion into political idealism assumes that peace can be preserved by satisfying the claims of the "dissatisfied" nations as regards markets, raw materials, etc.

THE PROFITS OF WAR. By Richard Lewinsohn. London: Routledge, 1936, 304 p. 10/6.

An historical and interpretative study from which we conclude that the military leaders are the chief gainers from war.

AN INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE. By W. Bryn Thomas. London: Allenson, 1936, 173 p. 3/6.

How the League of Nations can in effect become the League to Enforce Peace.

PROJET DE TRAITÉ GÉNÉRAL POUR DÉVELOPPER LES MOYENS DE CONSERVER LA PAIX. By Carlos Saavedra Lamas. Paris: Pedone, 1936, 48 p. Fr. 15.

The peace plan of the Nobel prize-winning Foreign Minister of Argentina.

JURIDICAL BASES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY: A STUDY IN THE ORIGIN, GROWTH AND PURPOSE OF THE LAW. By Montell Ogdon. Washington: Byrne, 1936, 254 p. $4.00.

The first thorough study in English of the theoretical bases of diplomatic immunities.

KOLLEKTIVSICHERHEIT, BÜNDNISPOLITIK, VÖLKERBUND. THEORIE DER NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN SICHERHEIT. By Heinrich Rogge. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1937, 443 p. M. 10.

This book originated in the memorandum prepared for the International Studies Conference on Collective Security by the German experts, who, however, did not attend.

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TOD UND SIEG ÜBER DEN WELTMEEREN. By Joachim and Heinz Matthias. Berlin: Mittler, 1936, 212 p.

An illustrated, readable narrative of the world's great air flights.

AN ATLAS OF EMPIRE. By J. F. Horrabin. New York: Knopf, 1937, 141 p. $1.50.

Seventy simple but intelligible sketch maps, each with a page of explanatory text.

IN 1936. By A. C. Eurich and E. C. Wilson. New York: Holt, 1937, 620 p. $2.50.

An interesting attempt to give in book form an organic review of the year's events in the world of politics (national and international), education, science, the arts and sport.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1937. Edited by Walter H. Mallory. New York: Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1937, 207 p. $2.50.

The new edition, revised to January 1, 1937, of what has become a standard book of reference. Here in outline is the information necessary for an understanding of the significance of political news from abroad day by day. For every country of the World it gives the composition of the governments, the programs and leaders of the political parties, and the political affiliations and editors of the press. It includes a description of the organization and functions of the League of Nations, the World Court, and the International Labor Office.

ALMANACH DE GOTHA. 1937. Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1937, 1368 p.

The 174th edition of this international reference annual.

General: Economic and Social

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOCIALISM. By John Strachey. New York: Random House, 1936, 512 p. $3.00.

This successor to "The Coming Struggle for Power" and "The Menace of Fascism" adds little to the philosophy developed in those earlier works.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE FUTURE. By John Langdon-Davies. New York: Dodd, 1936, 276 p. $3.00.

An entertaining if not convincing blue print for the collective Utopia of tomorrow. The author ventures twenty-four concrete prophecies.

SOME INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE. By Hans Neisser. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936, 176 p. $2.50.

A theoretical study interpreting postwar economic phenomena.

CRISES AND CYCLES. By Wilhelm Röpke. London: Hodge, 1936, 224 p. 10/6.

A comprehensive synthesis and critique of current theories and policy, by a professor in the University of Istanbul.

PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY. By Frederick C. Mills. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1936, 581 p. $4.00.

Valuable as a source for figures and interpretations concerning the price mechanism in its relation to the economic life of the world, and in particular of the United States.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION. Paris: International Chamber of Commerce, 1936, 228 p.

THE IMPROVEMENT OF COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONS. THE PROBLEM OF MONETARY STABILIZATION. Paris: International Chamber of Commerce, 1936, 417 p.

These weighty volumes were prepared by a joint committee of the Carnegie Endowment and the International Chamber of Commerce. The first, with the sub-title "An Economists' and Businessmen's Survey of the Main Problems of Today", contains reports by Professors Ohlin and Gregory; the second, memoranda by various experts.

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RAW MATERIALS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL. By H. R. G. Greaves. London: Methuen, 1936, 166 p. 5/.

An argument for international planning as a substitute for war between the "satiated" and "unsatiated" Powers. Some of its facts and statistics are out of date.

CAN INDUSTRY GOVERN ITSELF? By O. W. Willcox. New York: Norton, 1936, 285 p. $2.75.

The results of directed economy in the sugar industries of ten countries, and the conclusions to which these experiments lead.

LA GUERRA DELLE MONETE. LA LOTTA DELL'ORO CONTRO L'ARGENTO E DELLA CARTA CONTRO L'ORO. By Mario Alberti. Como: Cavalleri, 1937, 308 p. L. 10.

The story of monetary policy in its international ramifications, readably narrated by an Italian economist.

THE THEORY OF GOLD SUPPLY. By W. J. Busschau. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 193 p. $3.75.

This, the first of the "Oxford Studies in Economics," concerns the factors governing the gold supply, with particular attention to the Witwatersrand.

THE GOLD CLAUSE. By Arpad Plesch. London: Stevens, 1936, 2 v.

Recent legal opinions and judicial decisions from various countries.

CENTRAL AND LOCAL FINANCE IN GERMANY AND ENGLAND. By Mabel Newcomer. New York: Columbia University Press, 1937, 381 p. $3.50.

An analysis of the trend towards a centralized tax system.

The World War

HISTOIRE DE LA GUERRE MONDIALE. VOLUME II. JOFFRE ET LA GUERRE D'USURE. 1915–1916. By M. Daille. Paris: Payot, 1936, 464 p. Fr. 30.

The third volume to appear in a series being written by French generals. General Daille's contribution covers the years 1915 and 1916 when the conflict settled into a war of attrition. Joffre naturally occupies a foremost place in this narrative, though the war is followed on all fronts. There are useful sketch maps of crucial engagements.

LA CRISE BOSNIAQUE (1908–1909) ET LES PUISSANCES EUROPÉENES. By Momtchilo Nintchitch. Paris: Costes, 1937, 2 v. Fr. 120.

An intimate history of one of the great crises leading directly to the World War, notable because the author was able to draw on the Serbian archives and because he is himself experienced in diplomacy, having been Jugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs.

DIE RÜCKFÜHRUNG DES OSTHEERES. Berlin: Mittler, 1936, 194 p. M. 3.55.

Published under the auspices of the Reich War Ministry.

MESOPOTAMIA: THE LAST PHASE. By A. H. Burne. London: Gale and Polden, 1937, 136 p. 5/.

The campaign from the capture of Baghdad to the end of the war.

DER ITALIENISCHE KRIEGSSCHAUPLATZ IN EUROPÄISCHEN KONFLIKTEN. SEINE BEDEUTUNG FÜR DIE KRIEGSFÜHRUNG AN FRANKREICHS NORDOSTGRENZEN. By Hermann Wendt. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1936, 489 p. M. 16.

An excellent piece of German military historical scholarship by a member of the Tübingen faculty. There is an appendix of 94 documents.

IZPITANIYATA V VOINATA 1915–18. By Alexander Girginov. Sofia: The Author, 1936, 359 p.

This book by an ex-minister of the interior covers the period of Bulgaria's participation in the World War.

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AMERICANS ALL. By Henry Joseph Reilly. Columbus: Heer, 1936, 888 p. $3.00.

The official war history of the Rainbow Division, so called because it was composed of National Guard units from all parts of the nation.

GERMAN-AMERICANS AND THE WORLD WAR. By Carl Wittke. Columbus: The Ohio State Archæological and Historical Society, 1936, 223 p. $2.00.

Though particular attention is given in this study to the German-language press of Ohio, there is also much information concerning the position of German-Americans throughout the Middle West during the war years.

WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE. VOLUME VI. 1918. By David Lloyd George. Boston: Little, Brown, 1937, 407 p. $3.00.

In this concluding volume of his memoirs Lloyd George takes us from April 1918 to the Armistice. In addition to his recollections regarding operations on various fronts, he has included some general reflections on the conflict as a whole and in particular on the partition of functions between governments and soldiers. As in his previous volumes, he is very critical of many of the generals, particularly Haig, though his praise for Foch is full.

International Relations of the United States

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN CANADIAN RELATIONS. By James Morton Callahan. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 576 p. $4.00.

A scholarly history of the relations between the two countries based in large part on the archives in Washington, Ottawa and London.

THE RECOVERY PROGRAM IN THE UNITED STATES. Washington: Brookings, 1937, 709 p. $4.00.

A very full and scrupulously careful analysis of the effects of the New Deal on American economy, illustrated with a wealth of statistical graphs and tables.

THE NEW DEAL. By the editors of *The Economist*. New York: Knopf, 1937, 149 p. $1.50.

A penetrating little volume that has the advantage of having been written three thousand miles from the seat of conflict.

ROOSEVELT TO ROOSEVELT. By Dwight Lowell Dumond. New York: Holt, 1937, 585 p. $3.50.

Abundant factual information, intelligently arranged, on the political and social history of the United States since 1900.

OUR INEFFECTIVE STATE. By William H. Hessler. New York: Holt, 1937, 281 p. $2.50.

An analysis of the shortcomings of America's national government, with suggestions for practical remedies, by an editorial writer on the *Cincinnati Enquirer*.

REBUILDING TRADE BY TARIFF BARGAINING. By George P. Auld. New York: National Foreign Trade Council, 1936, 74 p.

A handy little book which seeks to demonstrate to the American people the importance of and the means for expanding our foreign trade.

AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE AS A CREDITOR NATION. By John T. Madden, Marcus Nadler and Harry C. Sauvain. New York: Prentice, 1937, 333 p. $3.50.

An examination of the effects of American foreign lending since the war, by three professors in New York University. Their book reveals *inter alia* that on the whole the United States did not lose on its foreign investments and that at present we are, on the portfolio side, no longer a creditor nation.

CHURCH AND STATE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA. By William Adams Brown. New York: Scribner, 1936, 360 p. $2.75.

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An inquiry by one of America's religious leaders into a problem which has never been as serious in this country as in Europe, but which may come to be discussed here with increasing intensity.

THE FUTURE OF LIBERTY. By George Soule. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 187 p. $2.00.

A liberal calls attention to the fact that in America the liberty of the few often means something much less than liberty for the many, and he inquires into the methods for assuring real liberty for all.

WE CAN DEFEND AMERICA. By Major General Johnson Hagood. Garden City: Doubleday, 1937, 321 p. $2.50.

This candid, provocative book by a lately retired American Army officer is written with the staccato of a machine gun. The general tells the American public that it should make up its mind whether it wants a military establishment for offensive purposes or merely for the defense of its own territory; once this decision is made, he says, it should be carried out with ruthless logic, throwing sentiment and outmoded ideas to the winds. Bureaucrats, military or civilian, will not welcome this book.

A HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PEACE. By Thomas H. Healy. Washington: Ransdell, 1936, 336 p. $2.00.

Concerning America's organization for peace and for war.

WAR OUR HERITAGE. By Joseph P. Lash and James A. Wechsler. New York: International Publishers, 1936, 159 p. $1.00.

What many American students are thinking about their part in the next war.

Western Europe

HISTOIRE DE LA POLITIQUE EXTÉRIEURE DE LA FRANCE. 806–1936. By Louis-Paul Deschanel. Paris: Payot, 1936, 284 p. Fr. 24.

A popular synthesis which seeks to clarify the permanent lines of French diplomacy.

ESSAI SUR LE GOUVERNEMENT DE DEMAIN. By Henri, Comte de Paris. Paris: Flammarion, 1936, 294 p. Fr. 12.

The son of the pretender to the French throne (the Duc de Guise) outlines the ideal government for France: monarchic, hierarchic, authoritarian, corporative.

LES MAITRES DE LA FRANCE. LA FÉODALITÉ FINANCIÈRE DANS LES BANQUES. By Augustin Hamon and X. Y. Z. Paris: Éditions Sociales Internationales, 1936, 320 p. Fr. 12.

How French banking is controlled by a close feudal oligarchy.

LA MONNAIE FRANÇAISE DEPUIS LA GUERRE 1914–1936. By Gaëtan Pirou. Paris: Sirey, 1936, 114 p. Fr. 12.

An expert treatment written before France devalued, by a professor in the University of Paris.

LES FINANCES PUBLIQUES ET LES IMPÔTS DE LA FRANCE. By Louis Trotabas. Paris: Colin, 1937, 210 p. Fr. 13.

A handy little volume elucidating the complexities of French public finance.

FRANKREICH UND SEIN ÜBERSEEREICH IN DER WELTWIRTSCHAFT. By Adolf Günther. Stuttgart: Enke Verlag, 1936, 312 p. M. 15.

A thorough study of France's present economic position, both domestic and foreign, with particular attention to the trade with her colonies. The author, professor at Innsbruck, accompanies his text with copious statistics.

PRÉCIS DE LÉGISLATION COLONIALE. By Louis Rolland and Pierre Lampré. Paris: Dalloz, 1936, 533 p. Fr. 25.

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A comprehensive survey of the administrative, judicial and fiscal organization of the French colonial empire.

DIE VIERZEHN JAHRE DER ERSTEN DEUTSCHEN REPUBLIK. By Friedrich Stampfer. Karlsbad: Verlagsanstalt "Graphia," 1936, 636 p. Kč. 80.

One of the fullest and most objective reports on the German Republic so far published, by a former member of the Reichstag and editor of the *Vorwärts*.

HISTOIRE DE L'ARMÉE ALLEMANDE DEPUIS L'ARMISTICE. DE L'ARMÉE IMPÉRIALE À LA REICHSWEHR. By Benoist-Méchin. Paris: Michel, 1936, 418 p. Fr. 20.

This first part of a two-volume work is a detailed history of the German army from the armistice in 1918 to the liquidation of the provisional Reichswehr on the signing of the Versailles Treaty. The motif of the book is that the Army almost single-handed saved Germany from chaos in 1919.

MY BATTLE. By Adolf Hitler. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1937, 297 p. $2.50.

A new printing of the condensed version of the Nazi Bible with which we are already familiar. It is greatly to be regretted that the Anglo-Saxon world is not provided with an accurate, unexpurgated translation of this important political document.

L'ALLEMAGNE NOUVELLE. By Henri Lichtenberger. Paris: Flammarion, 1936, 287 p. Fr. 12.

A Frenchman, well-disposed towards Germany, finds that country increasingly difficult to understand. He believes that in the long run the religious question is more serious than the economic.

LE PARTI NATIONAL SOCIALISTE ET SES RAPPORTS AVEC L'ÉTAT. By Robert Pelloux. Paris: Hartmann, 1936, 98 p. Fr. 5.

A lucid *précis* published by the "Centre d'Études de Politique Étrangère."

LA DICTATURE DU FASCISME ALLEMAND. By Grete Stoffel. Paris: Les Éditions Internationales, 1936, 212 p. Fr. 20.

A description of the legal framework of the dictatorship with little attention to how it actually functions. The general tone is critical of the Nazis.

HITLER OVER RUSSIA? By Ernst Henri. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1936, 350 p. $2.50.

This latest sensation from the mind of the man or men (identity unknown) who wrote "Hitler Over Europe" compels our interest even if it does not convince us. Its thesis is that under the ægis of Hitler there is being formed in Central and Eastern Europe a bloc of Fascist states whose object is to conquer Russia, but that the Soviets will turn the tables on this scheme.

L'ÉVANGILE DE LA FORCE. By Robert d'Harcourt. Paris: Plon, 1936, 249 p. Fr. 15.

A vivid exposé of the place of youth in the Nazi movement.

THE YELLOW SPOT: THE EXTERMINATION OF THE JEWS IN GERMANY. New York: Knight, 1936, 287 p. $3.00.

Chapter and verse on the thorough persecution of the Jew in Nazi Germany. Not a pleasant book to read.

GERMANY'S NEW RELIGION. By Wilhelm Hauer, Karl Heim and Karl Adam. New York: Abingdon Press, 1937, 168 p. $1.50.

Statements of belief by leaders of the confessional Lutheran Church, the Catholic Church and the Neo-Pagan religion.

THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY. By Paul Tillich. New York: Scribner, 1936, 284 p. $2.50.

The philosophy of German Religious Socialism by one of its leaders, now an exile.

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L'ART DANS LE IIIe REICH. By E. Wernert. Paris: Hartmann, 1936, 144 p. Fr. 9.
A case study in regimented culture in a totalitarian state.

DER DEUTSCHE OSTEN. SEINE GESCHICHTE, SEIN WESEN UND SEINE AUFGABE. Edited by K. C. Thalheim and A. H. Ziegfield. Berlin: Propyläenverlag, 1936, 624 p. M. 22.
A magnificently printed and illustrated treatise on the rôle of the German people and their culture in the eastern borderlands.

THE DAVOS MURDER. By Emil Ludwig. New York: Viking, 1936, 96 p. 75 cents.
Written immediately after the murder of the Nazi agent Gustloff by David Frankfurter at Davos, Switzerland, in February 1936, this brochure seeks to place that act in its historical setting.

ÖSTERREICHS ERNEUERUNG, DIE REDEN DES BUNDESKANZLERS. By Kurt Schuschnigg. Vienna: Österreichischen Bundespressedienst, 1936, 2 v.
Speeches by the Chancellor of Austria.

THE DANGEROUS SEA. By George Slocombe. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 286 p. $2.50.
An English journalist's not very satisfactory compendium of facts concerning the recent history of the countries bordering the Mediterranean. This book only emphasizes the great need for a sound synthesis on the rôle of that sea in contemporary politics.

DER MITTELMEERRAUM. ZUR GEOPOLITIK EINES MARITIMEN GROSSRAUMES. By Hans Hummel and Wolf Siewert. Heidelberg: Vowinckel, 1936, 196 p. M. 5.80.
An only moderately successful attempt to explain the economic and political metamorphosis of the Mediterranean countries by the "geopolitical" method.

NOI TEDESCHI E IL FASCISMO DI MUSSOLINI. By Paul Joseph Goebbels. Florence: Beltrami, 1936, 102 p. L. 3.
Hitler's Propaganda Minister contributes to the ideological solidification of the Berlin-Rome "axis."

IL CONFLITTO ITALO-ETIOPICO. Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 1936, 2 v.
These two large volumes contain the original texts of some 215 documents concerning Italo-Ethiopian relations. Volume I covers the period from 1889 to October 1935; volume II continues down to July 15, 1936. There are several topographic maps.

THE NEW EDUCATION IN ITALY. By Howard Marraro. New York: Vanni, 1936, 506 p. $3.00.
This pro-Fascist treatise touches all phases of the Italian educational system.

LINEAMENTI DELL'ORDINE CORPORATIVO FASCISTA. By Bruno Biagi. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1936, 385 p. L. 18.
A convenient manual on the structure of the corporative state.

L'INSURREZIONE DELLE ASTURIE NEL DIARIO DI UN MINATORE. By Emanuel Grossi. Paris: Giustizia e Libertà, 1936, 64 p. Fr. 3.50.
A moving eye-witness account of the revolt in the Asturias in 1934.

BEHIND THE SPANISH BARRICADES. By John Langdon-Davies. New York: McBride, 1936, 275 p. $2.75.
Sidelights on the war in Spain by an Englishman who obviously knows and loves the Spanish people, and who wholeheartedly hopes they can defeat the rebels, whom he detests, and expel their fascist helpers from abroad. He himself holds extreme Leftist views, and does not hesitate to criticize the policy of his own government and the incapacity of his countrymen to appreciate the issues at stake in Spain.

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SPAIN — FRONT LINE OF DEMOCRACY. Washington, 1937, 30 p.
Addresses by Fernando de los Rios, Spanish Ambassador in Washington.

REPORTER IN SPAIN. By Frank Pitcairn. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1936, 141 p. 2/6.
A readable account of the early fighting, by a correspondent of Left persuasions.

I FALANGISTI SPAGNOLI: COSA VOGLIONO, PERCHÉ SI BATTONO. By Alberto Luchini. Florence: Beltrami, 1936, 41 p. L. 2.
An ecstatic program for Spain's "regeneration."

LE PORTUGAL RENAIT. By Léon de Poncins. Paris: Beauchesnes, 1936, 280 p. Fr. 15.
The history of Portugal since 1889 is the background for this eulogy of the blessings conferred by the Salazar dictatorship.

Eastern Europe

CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE WESTERN WORLD. By Gerhard Schacher. New York: Holt, 1936, 224 p. $2.75.
An authority on Central Europe discusses the economic alternatives facing that area. He favors the Little Entente as the basis for the economic organization of the Danubian countries. He has a strong anti-German and anti-Hungarian bias, but is less critical of Italy. Recent events have rendered parts of this very worth-while book out of date.

SOVIET MAN — NOW. By Helen Iswolsky. New York: Sheed, 1936, 86 p. $1.00.
The daughter of a Tsarist ambassador speculates on the differences between Communist principles and realities.

DAS POLITISCHE VERTRAGSSYSTEM DER SOWJETUNION 1920–1935. By Wilhelm Walter Hartlieb. Leipzig: Universitätsverlag Noske, 1936, 267 p. M. 8.
A chronological account of the road travelled by Soviet Russia from isolation, through a network of pacts, to participation in the French "system," together with a statement of the German objections to this Franco-Soviet connection.

BEHIND THE MOSCOW TRIAL. By Max Schachtman. New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1936, 142 p. $1.00.
The Trotskyite "inside story" of the "frameup" of Zinoviev, Kamenev and their fourteen "accomplices."

DIE AGRARPOLITIK DER SOWJETUNION UND DEREN ERGEBNISSE. By K. Michael. Berlin, Leipzig: Nibelungenverlag, 1936, 304 p. M. 13.50.
A miscellaneous collection of material extracted from Russian newspapers to show the failure of Soviet agricultural policy between 1930–1931.

CHANGING MAN. By Beatrice King. New York: Viking, 1937, 319 p. $2.75.
An authoritative though unsystematic appraisal of the Soviet education system. An interesting book for those who talk about the immutability of "human nature."

RETOUR DE L'U. R. S. S. By André Gide. Paris: Nouvelle Revue Française, 1936, Fr. 6.
A much-discussed book. The distinguished French author, long a supporter of the Communist régime, still looks with favor on many of its social policies but confesses his deep depression at the spirit of conformity which he found prevailing everywhere in Soviet Russia. He admits that except for Germany there is no country where there is less personal liberty for the individual.

LA GUERRE CIVILE EN RUSSIE 1918–1920. By G. Welter. Paris: Payot, 1936, 200 p. Fr. 15.
A good, concise history of the struggle between the Reds and the Whites and of the Allied intervention.

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INTERVENTION, CIVIL WAR, AND COMMUNISM IN RUSSIA. APRIL-DECEMBER 1918. By James Bunyan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1936, 594 p. $4.50.

Translations of a large number of Russian documents, letters, etc., bearing on Russia's domestic and foreign affairs.

LA VÉRITÉ SUR LE MASSACRE DES ROMANOV. By Alexandre Kerenski. Paris: Payot, 1936, 272 p. Fr. 18.

The ex-Premier adds very little to what we already know.

LA SIBÉRIE ET L'EXTRÊME-NORD SOVIÉTIQUE. By Charles Steber. Paris: Payot, 1936, 345 p. Fr. 18.

A useful summary (with maps) covering the natural resources of Siberia.

L'ÉVOLUTION CONSTITUTIONNELLE DE LA POLOGNE DEPUIS 1919. By Y. Delmas. Paris: Pedone, 1936, 124 p. Fr. 20.

The author of this objective study believes the constitution has been dead since 1926.

BULGARIA PAST AND PRESENT. By George Clenton Logio. Manchester: Sherratt, 1936, 480 p. 12/6.

This defense of Bulgaria's postwar behavior was written primarily to justify the author's activities on behalf of the Bulgarian Refugee Loan. It seeks to give a rounded picture of the country's political, economic and cultural life. It is sympathetic towards the authoritarian régime.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, SOVIET RUSSIA AND GERMANY. By Jaroslav Papoušek. Prague: Orbis, 1936, 59 p. 1/.

A defense of Czechoslovak policy by an official in the Czech Foreign Office.

THE GERMAN PROBLEM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By Josef Chmelař. Prague: Orbis, 1936, 93 p. 1/6.

An historical survey from the Czech point of view, moderate in tone.

LES PRÉCURSEURS DE L'INDÉPENDANCE TCHÈQUE ET SLOVAQUE À PARIS. By Madeleine Levée. Paris: Payot, 1936, 188 p. Fr. 15.

The author traces the history of the Czechoslovak independence movement at Paris during the early years of the war. Mme. Levée is the daughter of the president of the Czechoslovak National Council, the archives of which she used in preparing this study.

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR WESTERN EUROPE. By Colonel Emanuel Moravec. Prague: Orbis, 1936, 68 p. 1/2.

A realistic study by a professor in the Military College at Prague.

EIN MANN DER TAT. LEBENSBILD DES STAATSPRÄSIDENTEN DR. EDUARD BENEŠ. By Johann Petrus. Reichenberg: Nordböhmischer Verlag, 1936, 166 p. Kč. 22.

A popular biography of the President of the Czechoslovak Republic.

PORTRAIT OF A PEOPLE: CROATIA TODAY. By Dorothea Orr. New York: Funk, 1936, 246 p. $2.50.

A traveller's sympathetic description.

LIFE-AND-DEATH STRUGGLE OF A NATIONAL MINORITY. By Lavo Čermelj. Ljubljana: Jugoslav Union of League of Nations Societies, 1936, 259 p.

An historical survey of the status of Italy's Jugoslav inhabitants since the World War, based on statistics and documentary evidence.

DEUTSCHE BILANZ IN SÜDOSTEUROPA. By Lutz Korodi. Berlin: Stilke, 1936, 110 p. M. 4.

In the first part of this work, a former high official in Rumania assures the members of the Little Entente that they have nothing to fear from Germany. The second part describes the cultural position of the German minorities in these countries and Hungary.

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DER MEERENGENVERTRAG VON MONTREUX. By Dr. Joachim Suche. Munich: Duncker und Humblot, 1936, 73 p. M. 3.80.

A concise history of the Straits question since the World War and an analysis of the terms and consequences of the Convention signed at Montreux last July.

THE EFFECT OF THE WAR IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE. By David Mitrany. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936, 282 p. $3.00.

What modern warfare did to the methods of government and to economic life.

DER MYTHOS AUF DEM BALKAN. By Janko Janeff. Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1936, 146 p. M. 3.50.

France, England and Russia follow merely imperialist aims in the Balkans; only Nazi Germany really understands the mystery of the Balkan soul, with its paganism and anti-Semitism.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

CABINET GOVERNMENT. By W. Ivor Jennings. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 484 p. $5.50.

This is one of the important books of the quarter and will probably become a standard work on the subject. Mr. Jennings follows in detail the method in which a British cabinet operates from the time it is formed until it falls, with attention to such questions as the prerogatives of the Crown and the rights of the Lords. The author approaches his subject from the functional rather than the historical point of view.

THE BRITISH EMPIRE. By Johannes Stoye. London: Lane, 1936, 344 p. 2/6.

A German "geopolitical" interpretation of the Empire's structure and operation.

AUFSTIEG ZUR WELTMACHT. ENTSTEHUNG, ENTWICKLUNG, VOLLENDUNG DES BRITISCHEN WELTREICHES. By Anton Mayer. Berlin: Waisenhaus, 1936, 331 p. M. 5.80.

A rapid narrative of Britain's imperial rise from the days of Elizabeth to 1930.

LETTERS AND ESSAYS ON CURRENT IMPERIAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, 1935–6. By Arthur Berriedale Keith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 233 p. $3.00.

Some eighty-two short essays and letters to editors on a wide variety of imperial and international questions.

HOW IS THE EMPIRE? By F. Percy Roe. London: Pitman, 1936, 294 p. 6/.

A compact presentation of the major problems now facing the British Empire.

BRITISH METHODS OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE: A STUDY OF DEMOCRACY IN RELATION TO LABOR DISPUTES. By Ducksoo Chang. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936, 332 p. $4.25.

At a time when America's industrial life seems headed for a period of turmoil, this careful analysis of the means by which the British strive to maintain industrial peace is particularly appropriate.

ALTERNATIVE TO REARMAMENT. By Jonathan Griffin. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 215 p. $2.90.

This little volume is eloquent proof of the disorientation of British thought. The author realizes that Britain cannot hope to protect herself with armaments. He therefore suggests various steps to increase the possibility of her immunity in the next war: a fresh start on collective security, an international air force, the abandonment of the Empire, hoarding foodstuffs, etc.

KING GEORGE VI. By Taylor Darbyshire. London: Hutchinson, 1937, 256 p. 3/6.

An authoritative biography of the new monarch.

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GREY OF FALLODON. By George Macaulay Trevelyan. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1937, 447 p. $3.75.

One of England's foremost historians has written a sensitive biography of Lord Grey. It portrays not only the statesman but the man. In part it is based on Grey's personal correspondence and on unpublished documents in the Foreign Office.

THEATRE OF LIFE. VOLUME II. 1903–1936. By Sir Esme Howard. Boston: Little, Brown, 1936, 662 p. $4.50.

The English diplomat records the interesting events in his personal and official life since 1903. Among other posts he filled that of Ambassador to the United States (1924–30).

A SHORT HISTORY OF INDIA. By W. H. Moreland and Atul Chandra Chatterjee. New York: Longmans, 1936, 496 p. $4.00.

An experiment in collaboration between representatives of the British and the native elements in the Anglo-Indian administration. Their work is at once a good summary of India's history and a plea for coöperation between the British and Indian peoples.

INDIA AND THE WORLD: ESSAYS. By Jawaharlal Nehru. London: Allen and Unwin, 1936, 262 p. 5/.

Important writings and speeches by one of the outstanding Indians of our time.

INDIA'S MINERAL WEALTH. By J. Coggin Brown. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 335 p. $5.00.

A scientific compendium that draws attention to the economic potentialities of the sub-soil resources in India and Burma. Many photographs, maps, graphs and tables.

SOUTHERN INDIA: ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. By Gilbert Slater. London: Allen and Unwin, 1936, 383 p. 15/.

Reminiscences of the first Professor of Indian Economics at the University of Madras.

THE INDIAN PRINCES IN COUNCIL. By K. M. Pannikar. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 193 p. $1.75.

The record of the Chancellorship of the Maharaja of Patiala, 1926–31 and 1933–36.

STUDIES ON AUSTRALIA'S SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC. Melbourne: Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1936, 88 p.

A collection of six papers by as many authors, prepared for the Yosemite Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

DIE UNION VON SÜDAFRIKA. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1936, 90 p. M. 1.50.

Fourteen Germans and South Africans contribute essays on the political, legal, economic, geographical and diplomatic problems of the Union.

Near East

MOSLEM WOMEN ENTER A NEW WORLD. By Ruth Frances Woodsmall. New York: Round Table Press, 1936, 432 p. $3.00.

A description of the remarkable progress being made in the "emancipation" of women in the Near East and India, based on extensive research in the countries in question.

GREAT BRITAIN AND PALESTINE 1915–1936. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937, 111 p. 85 cents.

An objective, factual review of Palestine's turbulent history since the World War, issued by the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

SOME PROBLEMS OF THE PALESTINE MANDATE. By Nathan Feinberg. Tel-Aviv, 1936, 125 p. Mils 250.

Papers concerning political and legal questions created by the Jewish colonization in Palestine. The author is a professor at the Hague Academy of International Law.

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PALESTINE AT THE CROSSROADS. By Ladislas Farago. New York: Putnam, 1937, 286 p. $3.50.

An impartial description of both the Jews and the Arabs in Palestine by one who travelled extensively in that country during the troubles of 1936.

HAMANDAT VE-HAMOATSA HA-MEHOKEKET. By M. Lazarson. Tel-Aviv: Shtibel, 1936, 87 p.

A concise exposé of the legality of a Legislative Council in Palestine and its compatibility with the Mandate.

THE ROAD TO NAZARETH. THROUGH PALESTINE TO-DAY. By John Gibbons. London: Hale, 1936, 329 p. 7/6.

An Englishman's reaction to the conflict in Palestine.

HALF THE WORLD IS ISFAHAN. By Caroline Singer and Cyrus Le Roy Baldridge. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 153 p. $5.00.

A book, handsomely printed and beautifully illustrated with drawings, about a motor journey by two Americans through much of Iran. Their volume will remain a record of that country as it was just on the threshold of westernization.

Africa

LA FRANCIA NORD-AFRICANA. By Giuseppe de'Luigi. Padua: C.E.D.A.M., 1936, 258 p. L. 25.

A summary of the political and economic development of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, by a recognized Italian authority on the Mediterranean.

FUAD, KING OF EGYPT. By Sirdar Ali Shah Ikbal. Toronto: McClelland, 1936, 317 p. $4.50.

A biography of the late king which emphasizes his rôle as a reformer.

THE CAPE-TO-CAIRO DREAM. By Lois A. C. Raphael. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936, 514 p. $4.50.

The diplomatic history of the railway that Rhodes tried to build.

CAESAR IN ABYSSINIA. By G. L. Steer. Boston: Little, Brown, 1936, 405 p. $3.00.

One of the most revealing accounts of the Ethiopian War that we are likely to have. The author, London *Times* correspondent with the Ethiopians, explains very clearly the causes for Haile Selassie's defeat, of which the most important were the embargo on arms and the Ethiopian tradition of fighting in masses. Italian planes and poision gas also played decisive rôles.

LA PREPARAZIONE E LE PRIME OPERAZIONI. By Emilio de Bono. Rome: Istituto Nazionale Fascista di Cultura, 1937, 215 p. L. 20.

An important and in some respects amazing book. The first commander-in-chief of the Italian armies in the recent war against Ethiopia makes numerous interesting revelations and publishes several highly illuminating documents concerning the origins and the early conduct of the operations. We learn, for instance, that as early as 1933 Mussolini had decided to solve the Ethiopian question not later than 1936. Marshal De Bono's book is one of the most candid that have come out of Italy since the Fascist Revolution. It opens with an introduction by Il Duce and contains many illustrations.

LA GUERRA D'ETIOPIA. By Pietro Badoglio. Milan: Mondadori, 1936, 249 p. L. 30.

This work by the commander who led the victorious Italians to Addis Ababa has a different tone. Badoglio is much more discreet, both about his relations with Il Duce, who was always telegraphing orders to speed up the campaign, and about such unpleasant things as the use of gas by the Italians. Even so, his book affords ample testimony to the effects of Italian *Schrechlichkeit* on the Negus' armies. Besides an introduc-

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tion by Mussolini, there are numerous documents, photographs, and a carton of nine colored topographic maps illustrating the major engagements.

LA GUERRA EQUATORIALE CON L'ARMATA DEL MARESCIALLO GRAZIANI. By Achille Benedetti. Milan: Zucchi, 1936, 323 p. L. 12.

This account of the operations of the army which moved north from Somalia is by the correspondent of the *Corriere della Sera* who was with Graziani throughout the campaign. Profusely illustrated.

THE WAR IN ABYSSINIA. By Edward Hamilton. London: Unicorn Press, 1936, 162 p. 5/.

A superficial account that omits mention of such unpleasant things as gas.

ETIOPIA ECONOMICA. By Carlo Manetti. Florence: Bemporad, 1936, 194 p. L. 15.

The physiography, climate, peoples, cultures, institutions and agricultural resources of Italian East Africa. Maps and photographs.

LA MISSIONE DELL'ITALIA IN AFRICA. By Alessandro Lessona. Rome: Istituto Nazionale Fascista di Cultura, 1936, 88 p. L. 5.

A statement by the Italian Minister of Colonies, with appendices.

THE EARTH GODDESS. By G. Howard Jones. New York: Longmans, 1936, 205 p. $5.00.

A survey of agriculture on the west coast of Africa where simple peasant farming is giving way to profit-farming.

JOURNEY WITHOUT MAPS. By Graham Greene. Garden City: Doubleday, 1936, 310 p. $2.75.

A travel book that tells us much about the seldom-explored back country of the Negro republic of Liberia.

Far East

HISTORY OF THE FAR EAST IN MODERN TIMES. By Harold M. Vinacke. New York: Crofts, 1936, 556 p. $5.00.

A revised edition of a standard treatise.

FAR EAST IN FERMENT. By Gunther Stein. London: Methuen, 1936, 244 p. 10/6.

A well-balanced and up-to-date survey of the problems posed by the expansion of Japan, by one who knows the country well. This excellent analysis can be recommended as a very good background against which to project current events in Japan.

THE PACIFIC AREA AND ITS PROBLEMS. Edited by Donald R. Nugent and Reginald Bell. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936, 234 p. $1.35.

Materials for the study of current Pacific problems.

MIGRANT ASIA. By Radhakamal Mukerjee. Rome: Comitato Italiano per lo Studio dei Problemi della Popolazione, 1936, 310 p. L. 30.

A careful examination of the major aspects of Asia's population and migration problem, by a professor at the University of Lucknow.

EAST AND WEST. By Basil Mathews. New York: Association Press, 1936, 206 p. $1.75.

Several religious leaders discuss the relations between Orient and Occident.

THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND GERMANY SINCE 1898. By Feng Djen Djang. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936, 281 p.

This work, based on the published documents, attempts to show how Germany's economic position in China greatly improved when she gave up her prewar privileges and became a non-extraterritorial power.

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THE NEW MONETARY SYSTEM OF CHINA. By W. Y. Lin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936, 175 p. $2.00.

An explanation of the breakdown of China's silver standard and an evaluation of the monetary policy adopted in November 1935.

THE POLITICAL DOCTRINES OF SUN YAT-SEN. By Paul Myron Anthony Linebarger. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1937, 278 p. $2.75.

This study, by an American who was once Legal Adviser to Sun Yat-Sen, will be useful to all occidentals who wish to understand the ideological foundations of the Chinese Nationalist movement.

LANDLORD AND PEASANT IN CHINA. By Chen Han-seng. New York: International Publishers, 1936, 144 p. $2.00.

The facts about the agrarian crisis in southern China and a Leftist interpretation of what they mean for that country's future.

THE FLIGHT OF "BIG HORSE." By Sven Hedin. New York: Dutton, 1936, 246 p. $3.75.

Dr. Hedin was sent by the Chinese Government to survey two motor roads to Sinkiang. When he arrived there in 1934 he found that remote region in the throes of a civil war, on which this exciting book sheds much light. Many illustrations.

MILITARISM AND FOREIGN POLICY IN JAPAN. By E. E. N. Causton. London: Allen and Unwin, 1936, 207 p. 7/6.

A particularly timely book in that it gives a dispassionate and balanced evaluation of the rôle played in Japanese foreign policy by the Army and Navy.

Latin America

MEXICO TODAY. By Colonel Irving Speed Wallace. Boston: Meador, 1936, 364 p. $2.00.

A sympathetic description of the country, its people and its institutions.

JAMAICA, THE BLESSED ISLE. By Lord Olivier. London: Faber, 1936, 484 p. 21/.

The author has been connected with Jamaica since 1882 and was governor of the island from 1907 to 1913. His chief interest is the well-being of the Negroes, which he believes can best be attained by encouraging them to become peasants rather than wage-slaves.

THE GÓMEZ RÉGIME IN VENEZUELA AND ITS BACKGROUND. By Pedro Manuel Arcaya. Washington: The Author, 1936, 238 p.

A not altogether convincing attempt to rescue the late Venezuelan dictator from his present ill-repute.

A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF BRITISH GUIANA. By Sir Cecil Clementi. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 546 p. $7.25.

British Guiana had a very peculiar constitutional development, the story of which is here painstakingly chronicled. Those interested in the practice of representative government as applied to colonial areas will learn much from it.

WESTWARD FROM RIO. By Heath Bowman and Sterling Dickinson. Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1936, 351 p. $3.00.

A travel book with many intimate views into the social and political conditions of Brazil, Bolivia and Peru.

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By Denys P. Myers

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OFFICIALLY PRINTED

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Library of Information, 270 Madison Ave., New York. *France:* Gerda M. Anderson, 12 Ave. Ernest Reyer, Paris XIV^e^. *League of Nations, Perm. Court of Int. Justice, Int. Institute of Intellectual Cooperation:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York. *Int. Labor Office:* 734 Jackson Pl., Washington, D. C. *Int. Institute of Agriculture:* World Peace Foundation, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted. Since 1928 a list of Government documents has been printed in the *Monthly List of Books Catalogued in the Library of the League of Nations.*

AIR NAVIGATION, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION

PROTOCOLS regarding the Amendment of the Convention relating to the Regulation of Air Navigation of October 13, 1919, Brussels, June 1, 1935. London, 1936. 27 p. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 7 (1936), Cmd. 5332.) 6d.

ALEXANDRETTA

QUESTIONS of Alexandretta and Antioch. Letter from the Permanent Delegation of Turkey Accredited to the League of Nations, with Six Annexes. Geneva, 1936. 19 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.538.M.348.1936.Gen.8.)

ARMAMENT

RECORDS of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Series D. Volume 3. Minutes of the AIR Commission, February 27–June 24, 1932. Geneva, 1936. xi, 316 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, 1936.IX.7.)

——— Volume 5. Minutes of the POLITICAL Commission, February 27, 1932–March 10, 1933. Geneva, 1936. iv, 62 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, 1936.IX.8.)

STATISTICAL Year-Book of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition. Geneva, 1936. 338 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.263.M.156.1936.IX.6.)

ROYAL COMMISSION on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms (1935–36). Report. London, 1936. 101 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 5292.) 1s. 6d.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

BALANCES of Payments 1935. Geneva, 1936. 176 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, 1936.II.A.18.)

INTERNATIONAL Trade Statistics 1935. Geneva, 1936. 370 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, 1936.II.A.19.)

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

PROTOCOL regarding the Immunities of the Bank for International Settlements, Brussels, July 30, 1936. London, 1937. 8 p. 24½ cm. (Miscellaneous No. 1 (1937), Cmd. 5344.) 2d.

BRITISH EMPIRE

GEOGRAPHICAL Distribution of British Empire Shipping 1936. London, 1936. $1.50. Chart and tabular statement of the sources and routes of supply of the British Empire.

CAPITAL MOVEMENTS

STATISTICS of capital movements between United States and foreign countries and of purchases and sales of foreign exchange in United States, as reported weekly by banks, bankers, brokers, and dealers in United States to federal reserve banks, under regulations issued by Treasury Department, Jan. 1935–Sept. 1936. Washington, 1936. 127 p. 25 cents.

CHILD WELFARE

CHILD WELFARE Committee. Child Welfare Councils (Denmark, Norway, Sweden). Geneva, 1937. 96 p. 24½ cm. (League of Nations, C.8.M.7.1937.IV.1.)

CHINA

ADMISSION of Chinese into the United States. Supplement B of the Consular Regulations Notes to Section 368. Effective October 1, 1936. Washington, 1936. iv, 49 p. 23 cm. (The Department of State, Immigration Series No. 3.) 10 cents.

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REPORT for the 23rd Fiscal Year July 1934 to June 1935. Ministry of Finance. Nanking 1936. 23 p. 25½ cm. (At head of title: National Government, Republic of China.)

COMMERCIAL TREATIES

AGREEMENT between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Argentine Government relating to Trade and Commerce (with protocol, protocol of signature and letters), London, December 1, 1936. London, 1936. 76 p. 24½ cm. (Argentina No. 1 (1936), Cmd. 5324.) 1s. 3d.

COMMERCIAL Agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Italian Government, Rome, November 6, 1936. London, 1937. 9 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 2 (1937), Cmd. 534.) 2d.

English text only issued as Italy No. 1 (1936), Cmd. 5306.

RECIPROCAL TRADE. Agreement between the United States of America and Finland. Signed at Washington, May 18, 1936. Washington, 1936. 22 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series, No. 97.) 5 cents.

RECIPROCAL TRADE. Agreement between the United States of America and Nicaragua. Signed at Managua, March 11, 1936. Washington, 1936. 24 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series, No. 95.) 5 cents.

COMMERCIAL Relations. Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics continuing in force until July 13, 1937, the agreement of July 13, 1935. Washington, 1936. 3 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series, No. 96.) 5 cents.

CANADIAN-AMERICAN Trade, Analysis of the First Half Year under the Reciprocal Agreement. Washington, 1936. 24 p. 23 cm. (The Department of State, Commercial Policy Series, No. 32.) 5 cents.

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT

The PAJZS, Csáky, Esterházy Case. Permanent Court of International Justice. Judgment of December 16, 1936. Leyden, 1936. 30–94, 30–94 p. 24½ cm. (Series A/B, Fascicule No. 68.)

The LOSINGER & Co. Case (discontinuance). Permanent Court of International Justice. Order of December 14, 1936. Leyden, 1936. 99–102, 99–102 p. 24½ cm. (Series A/B, Fascicule No. 69.)

CONDITIONS of Voting Requests for Advisory Opinions from the Permanent Court of International Justice. Observations received from governments and from the International Labor Office. Geneva, 1937. 17 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.543.M.351.1936.V.9.)

COVENANT OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The COVENANT of the League of Nations, including Amendments in force, November 1, 1936. London, 1936. 26 p. 24½ cm. 6d.

DOCUMENTS relating to the Question of the Application of the Principles of the Covenant. Geneva, 1936. 97 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 154.)

DISPUTE between Ethiopia and Italy. Co-ordination of Measures under Article 16 of the Covenant. Proposals and Resolutions of the Co-ordination Committee and the Committee of Eighteen and Official Correspondence and Communications relating thereto. Geneva, 1936. xxxii, 359 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 150.)

DOUBLE TAXATION

FISCAL Committee. Report to the Council on the Sixth Session of the Committee. Held at Geneva from October 15 to 21, 1936. Geneva, 1936. 7 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.450.M.266. 1936.II.A.21.)

AGREEMENT between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Greece for the Reciprocal Exemption from Income Tax on Certain Profits or Gains Arising from an Agency, Athens, September 17, 1936. London, 1936. 7 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 30 (1936), Cmd. 5318.) 2d.

ECUADOR-PERU

MINISTERIO de relaciones exteriores. Limites entre el Ecuador y el Peru. III. La real cedula de 1802, por Fabio Lozano Torrijos. Quito, Imprenta Nacional, 1936. 57 p.

——— Memorandum sobre limites entre el Ecuador y el Peru, presentado a pedido del Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, General Angel Isaac Chiriboga N. Quito, Imprenta Nacional, 1936. 48 p.

EGYPT

AGREEMENT between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government regarding Financial Questions affecting the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Cairo, November 5, 1936. London, 1936. 2 p. 24½ cm. (Egypt No. 3 (1936), Cmd. 5319.) 1d.

MAP to Illustrate the Treaty of Alliance with Egypt of August 26, 1936. London, 1936. fold. map. cover 24½ cm. (Egypt No. 2 (1936), Cmd. 5308.) 9d.

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EXTRADITION

EXTRADITION. Supplementary Convention between the United States of America and Denmark. Signed at Washington, May 6, 1936. Washington, 1936. 3 p. 23 cm. (Treaty Series, No. 911.) 5 cents.

TREATY between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and His Serene Highness the Regent of Hungary Supplementary to the Treaty of December 3, 1873, regarding Extradition, Budapest, September 18, 1936. London, 1936. 5 p. 24½ cm. (Hungary No. 1 (1936), Cmd. 5311.) 1d.

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

INDUSTRIAL Property Protection throughout the World; by James L. Brown. Washington, 1936. vi, 184 p. (Trade Promotion Series 165; Industrial Property Section, Commercial Laws Division.) 20 cents.

JAPAN — Foreign Relations

DAI NIPPON Gaiko Bunsho. Vol. I–. 1867–68. Compiled by the Foreign Department. Tokyo, 1936–. 1000 p. In Japanese.

This series is announced as a publication of the diplomatic correspondence of the Meiji reign, 1867–1912.

MANDATES

ANNUAL REPORT to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of the South Sea Islands under Japanese Mandate for the year 1935. [Hibiya, Tokyo, The Herald Press.] The Japanese Government. [1936]. v, 95, iv, 18 p., tables, maps. 26 cm.

RAPPORT ANNUEL adressé par le Gouvernement Français au Conseil de la Société des nations, conformément à l'article 22 du Pacte sur l'administration sous mandat du territoire du Togo pour l'année 1935. Paris, Imprimerie Générale Lahure, 1936. 211 p. incl. tables. 32 cm.

RAPPORT PRÉSENTÉ par le Gouvernement Belge au Conseil de la Société des nations au sujet de l'administration du Ruanda-Urundi pendant l'année 1935. Bruxelles, Établissements Généraux d'Imprimerie, 1936. 257 p., maps. 31 cm.

RAPPORT ANNUEL adressé par le Gouvernement Français au Conseil de la Société des nations, conformément à l'article 22 du Pacte sur l'administration sous mandat du territoire du Cameroun pour l'année 1935. Paris, Imprimerie Générale Lahure, 1936. 216 p. incl. tables, maps. 31½ cm.

PERMANENT MANDATES Commission. Minutes of the Thirtieth Session, Held at Geneva from October 27 to November 11, 1936, including the Report of the Commission to the Council. Geneva, 1936. 221 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.500.M.313.1936.VI.A.2.)

MARITIME LABOR

HOURS of Work on Board Ship and Manning (Supplementary Report). International Labour Conference, Twenty-First (Maritime) Session, Geneva, October 1936. Item (A and B) on the Agenda. Report I (A and B) (Supplement). Geneva, 1936. 14 p. 24 cm.

HOLIDAYS with Pay for Seamen (Supplementary Report). International Labour Conference, Twenty-First (Maritime) Session. Geneva, October 1936. Fifth Item on the Agenda. Report V (Supplement). Geneva, 1936. 8 p. 24 cm.

INTERNATIONAL Labor Conference. Draft Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the Conference at its Twentieth Session, 4 June–24 June, 1936. London, 1936. 30, 30 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 5305.) (In French and English.) 1s.

——— Draft Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the Conference at its Twenty-First Session, 6–24 October 1936. Geneva, 1936. 52 p. 32 cm.

——— Draft Convention adopted by the Conference at its Twenty-Second Session, 22–24 October 1936. Geneva, 1936. 8 p. 32 cm.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

DECLARATION by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Italian Government regarding the Mediterranean (with an exchange of notes regarding the status quo in the Western Mediterranean dated December 31, 1936), Rome, January 2, 1937. London, 1937. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Italy No. 1 (1937), Cmd. 5348.) 1d.

MEXICO

The PRESIDENT'S Message to Congress. Mexico City, Press of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, 1936. 69 p. 22½ cm. (The Mexican Government in the Presence of Social and Economic Problems, 5.)

PRESIDENTIAL Plan for Incorporation of Federal Territories. Ideology and Work of National Revolutionary Party. Mexico and Spain, and the League of Nations. The Agrarian Problem in the Laguna Region. Mexico City, Press of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, 1936. 28 p. 22½ cm. (The Mexican Government in the Presence of Social and Economic Problems.)

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MILITARY MISSION

MILITARY MISSION. Agreement between the United States of America and Brazil. Signed November 12, 1936. Washington, 1936. 13 p. 23 cm. (Executive Agreement Series, No. 98.) 5 cents.

NAVAL WARFARE

PROCÉS-VERBAL relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare set forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of April 22, 1930, London, November 6, 1936. London, 1936. 5 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 29 (1936), Cmd. 5302.) 1d.

REPORT of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence on the Vulnerability of Capital Ships to Air Attack. London, 1936. 18 p. 24½ cm. (Cmd. 5301.) 3d.

OPIUM TRAFFIC

CONVENTION for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, of July 13, 1931. Estimated World Requirements of Dangerous Drugs in 1936. Fifth Supplement to the Statement issued by the Supervisory Body under Article 5. Geneva, 1936. 13 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.429(e).M.220(e).1935.XI.1936.XI.22.)

GENEVA Opium Convention of February 19, 1925. Convention for limiting the Manufacture and regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs of July 13, 1931. Permanent Central Opium Board. Report to the Council. Statistics relating to the year 1935 furnished to the Permanent Central Opium Board under the terms of the 1925 and 1931 conventions (including the Statement called for in Article 14, Paragraph 3, of the 1931 Convention). Geneva, 1936. 179 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.449.M.265.1936.XI.21.)

TRAFFIC in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs for the Year Ended December 31, 1935. Report by the Government of the United States of America. Washington, 1936. vi, 96 p. incl. charts. 23 cm. (At head of title: U. S. Treasury Department, Bureau of Narcotics.) 15 cents.

PAN AMERICAN CONFERENCE

OPENING ADDRESS to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, by the Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, Argentina, December 5, 1936. 14 p. 22½ cm. (The Department of State, Conference Series, No. 25.) 5 cents.

RAW MATERIALS — TRADE

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AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

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THE RESULTS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BUENOS AIRES CONFERENCE

By Cordell Hull
Secretary of State of the United States

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SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT TO VOL. 15, No. 3

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THE RESULTS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BUENOS AIRES CONFERENCE

An address before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, February 25, 1937, Hon. Norman H. Davis, presiding.

By Cordell Hull
Secretary of State of the United States

IT IS with unusual satisfaction that I avail myself of this opportunity to review briefly the results and the significance of the Buenos Aires meeting. I welcome the opportunity especially, because to those who, like myself, were privileged to take an active part in the work of the Conference, the experience remains a vivid and inspiring memory.

The work of the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace touched the very heart of the tangled complex of problems which today plague the responsible statesmen of the world and upon the solution of which depends so greatly the future welfare of the nations. The twenty-one American Republics have forged among themselves new ties of friendship and peace. More than that, they have, in my opinion, made a genuine contribution not only to the safeguarding of peace, but to the strengthening of democracy and of international order as well. While dealing with regional problems, the Conference pointed straight at the frightful deterioration of many essential international relationships everywhere and vigorously proclaimed a basic program for their restoration.

I

The Buenos Aires meeting was one of a succession of inter-American Conferences which have been, for nearly fifty years, a factor of ever-growing importance in the international life of the Western Hemisphere. There were, however, two features of out-

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standing importance which distinguished it from its predecessors and invested it with the character of a really extraordinary occasion. The first of these was the subject-matter of the Conference itself, its all-embracing concentration upon the problem of safeguarding the maintenance of peace. The second was the dismal world setting in which the representatives of the American Republics assembled for their arduous and momentous labors.

The problem of peace was never absent from the thoughts of those statesmen who had in the past gathered together in major inter-American conferences. Step by step, foundations were laid for the organization of pacific relations.

A feeling of mutual trust, an attitude of the good neighbor, for some years has been steadily growing among the American Republics. I well recall how completely and how gratifyingly that accumulated feeling permeated the atmosphere of the Seventh International Conference of American States, held at Montevideo in 1933. More than any other factor, it was responsible for the constructive achievements which made that meeting a memorable occasion in the annals of American history.

But even there, opportunity was still lacking for a comprehensive effort to build a complete structure of enduring peace in the Western Hemisphere. It was primarily to launch this vast undertaking that the convocation of the Buenos Aires Conference was proposed by President Roosevelt in his letter, addressed on January 30, 1936, to the Chiefs of State of the other twenty American Republics.

President Roosevelt's proposal met with prompt, unanimous and enthusiastic response. The character of the response and the readiness and vigor with which the American Republics engaged in the preparation of the proposed conference made it abundantly clear that the time was ripe for the effort which was in contemplation.

All of us had watched with increasing apprehension the swelling of the angry stream of recent events in world affairs. The tendency almost everywhere was steadily in the direction of international anarchy. Religion and morals, constituting the entire foundation of normal and worthwhile international relations and of civilized intercourse itself, were breached, and often flouted, with impunity. International or domestic strife was in progress in some parts of the world and in undisguised preparation in others. The construction of armaments was proceeding on

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a scale unparalleled in history, and more and more nations were being drawn into the suicidal race—notwithstanding that the late World War and the recent world panic had not been liquidated.

The régime of international law was honored more in the breach than in the observance. Unilateral departure from treaties—or, to put it more bluntly, the policy of breaking a given word—endangered the whole structure of international agreements.

Combined with this, economic policies were being evolved by various governments, supposedly for their individual advantage, devised to restrict and confine trade and to burden commerce with almost mediæval restrictions and discriminations. The resulting destruction and artificial diversion of trade were creating, among nations, animosities and resentment and were provoking economic aggression and retaliation. They were causing, within nations, acute economic distress, with declining standards of living and deepening dissatisfaction.

All these conditions and tendencies were breeding widespread unrest, were undermining governmental structures and impairing political stability. They were disrupting democratic institutions and, by correspondingly encouraging and strengthening autocratic rule, were hopelessly handicapping the forces of peace and international order.

All of us knew only too well the destruction and misery which the onrushing stream of all these discordant elements was leaving in its wake. All of us realized only too acutely the even more fearsome consequences that would emerge if the stream were to overflow and widespread military conflict were to engulf our entire civilization.

It was with a clear visualization constantly before them of these unprecedented difficulties and critical conditions that the responsible statesmen of the American Republics went to the Buenos Aires Conference.

II

From the very first interchange of views among the delegates, it became manifest that all the American Republics are determined in their desire that peace prevail among them, as well as between each of them and the rest of the world. There was no mistaking the concerted will of the twenty-one nations for an effective renunciation of war as a means of policy and action and for the enthronement of peaceful means as the sole instrument for

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the adjustment of differences. As the work of the Conference progressed, this solidarity of purpose and unity of determination became more and more crystallized.

The whole Conference was not one in which rival governments sought exclusive or superior national advantages or purposes. Instead, throughout, a similarity of thinking and of outlook demonstrated itself and made our meetings a truly joint effort for a mutually desired purpose. The Conference drew from all present a willing contribution towards a general result which corresponded to the underlying purpose of all.

This was the real condition that made possible a successful conference. This was the fact which explains why the major agreements were brought before the Conference as drafts supported and presented unanimously by the twenty-one participating governments. What was sought and attained was not a diplomatic victory by any of the nations represented, but full understanding, friendly coöperation and long-time planning.

Three main premises were accepted by all. The first was that the American Hemisphere has a distinct and peculiar contribution to make, because no nation in it is driven by any compulsion or professes any right to threaten the peace of its neighbors. The second was that the only safety for all nations is loyal acceptance of a rule of law under which the integrity of every country, large or small, will be assured. The third was that renunciation of war and other similar declarations must be implemented by a method of action which can set into operation almost instantaneously the coöperative effort of the Hemisphere in the direction of pacific settlements.

With this in mind, various proposals for implementation were advanced. But they were swiftly merged into a single dominant idea: any threat to the maintenance of peace on this continent must lead to an immediate consultation between all of our governments with a view to seeking common policies and taking common measures which may end a conflict in progress, or prevent a conflict not yet begun.

It was out of these considerations that emerged the major treaties and agreements negotiated at the Conference. These instruments provide a complete consultative system. They are designed thus to bring into active coöperation all twenty-one governments whenever the peace of the Hemisphere is menaced either from within or without, or whenever a sufficiently grave

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situation arises elsewhere in the world which may create a threat to the peace of the western world.

III

Of the numerous accords reached at Buenos Aires, there were three which, if universally ratified, will constitute an effective organization for the maintenance of peaceful and cordial relationships between the American Republics. These were:

First. *The Convention to Coördinate, Extend and Assure the Fulfillment of the Existing Treaties Between the American States.* In this agreement, the American Governments reaffirm the obligations they had previously accepted in five international pacts and accords (among which are the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1933). These comprise the obligation of the nations to settle, by pacific means, controversies of international character that may arise between them.

The nations furthermore agree to consult and coöperate to make available effective means of pacific settlement. They further pledge themselves that, while such consultation is in progress, the parties in dispute for a period of at least six months will not have recourse to hostilities or any military action whatever. And those American nations which may be involved in a controversy likewise obligate themselves to report to the other American Governments the methods of pacific settlement which they select, as well as the progress made in the adjustment of their dispute.

Lastly, the agreement provides that in the event that, despite these pledges and arrangements, war should occur between any American Republics, the other American Republics will attempt through consultation to adopt, in their character as neutrals, a common and solidary attitude in order to discourage or prevent the spread or prolongation of hostilities.

Second. *The Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reëstablishment of Peace.* This agreement is based on the conviction expressed in its text, "that every war or threat of war affects directly or indirectly all civilized peoples and endangers the great principles of liberty and justice which constitute the American ideal and the standard of American international policy." In its five brief articles the various American Governments pledge themselves to consult with each other in three different types of circumstances which might threaten their peace. First, in the

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event that the peace of the American Republics is menaced; second, in the event of war between American States; and third, in the event of an international war outside America which might menace the peace of the American Republics.

I have faith in the usefulness of this prospective process of consultation. I believe that if and when crises of the kind envisaged should arise, the peoples of the American continent will demand of their governments that they find in consultation the means of avoiding or ending conflict.

In adhering to this agreement, the American Republics accept and demonstrate a joint concern for the "peace of the American Republics." This concern was also recognized and set forth in the Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation adopted at the Conference which declares "that every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one of them, and justifies the initiation of the procedure of consultation. . . ." In this promise of concerted obligation small as well as large States will find assurance. The Government of the United States welcomes this action as completely in line with the historic concern which it has always had for the independence and territorial integrity of this hemisphere.

Third. *The Additional Protocol Relative to Non-intervention.* This agreement reaffirms the convention signed at Montevideo in 1933 which embodies the fundamental principle that "no State has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of others." In the continued reaffirmation of this principle and continued pledge of its observance, the American Republics see a guarantee of full equality and complete freedom to manage their own affairs.

What a boon to humanity it would be if other groups of nations in other parts of the world were, at this crucial stage in world affairs, to give their plighted faith to a similar undertaking — if they were, in a spirit of peace, unity and moral consecration, to re-assert and revitalize the law of nations, of international morality and of treaty obligations, and to pledge solemn observance of the doctrine of the equality, the sovereignty, the territorial integrity and the liberty of all nations.

IV

In addition to the three accords just described, the Conference adopted a number of significant and far-reaching agreements and

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resolutions calculated to increase the flow of trade, to stimulate cultural interchange and to improve the methods of communication.

There was general and emphatic agreement that all countries must work toward a system of freer economic interchange, so that the standards of living in the various countries may be gradually raised and the commercial necessities of each country adequately recognized, and that thereby the economic compulsions towards war or military and domestic strife may be removed. There was equally emphatic agreement that rising economic prosperity, resulting from growing and mutually beneficial international trade, is an essential condition for freedom and for the preservation and strengthening of democratic institutions, and that such institutions constitute a most effective peace insurance.

The Conference unanimously affirmed the necessity and desirability of lessening the present excessive obstacles to international trade and of conducting trade relations on principles which assure equality of treatment. It asserted the necessity of shaping governmental policy to the end that trade will not be diverted into artificial channels created by narrow and forced political arrangement, but will flow more along lines of economic benefit. It recognized that trade should not be disrupted and handicapped by the discriminatory effects of various systems of control, clearing and compensation devices. The Conference recommended that these declarations of economic policy be followed by quick and vigorous action on the part of the American Republics. This liberal commercial policy should be the central point in the economic program of every important nation today.

By means of still other agreements and resolutions, the Conference perfected plans and arrangements for increasing the educational and cultural interchange between the American countries. These look towards a growing exchange of students and teachers between our various countries and a greater coöperation in scientific work. They aim to secure a steady, fuller and better-proportioned movement of current news in this Hemisphere and a proper utilization of the facilities of the radio to spread a continuous picture of life throughout the continent. They are designed to promote a deeper mutual understanding and to provide a broader basis for friendly relations founded upon

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a growing knowledge of, and respect for, each other's views and aspirations.

V

These were the immediate results of the Conference. They represent far more than a mere beginning. The agreements and arrangements negotiated at this Conference are interconnected segments of a structure of permanent peace in the process of creation.

In a world in which cynics scoff at all efforts to banish war, the twenty-one American Republics have resolutely declared their determination to keep alive the spirit of peace. They have affirmed their trust in each other and their faith in the sacredness of treaty obligations. At Buenos Aires there was no cynical dismissal of the idea that a nation's pledged word is a valid obligation. There was a determination among these nations that their relations with each other should be conducted on the basis of friendly coöperation, of law and justice, and not by the rule of force.

At Buenos Aires the American nations, speaking through their governments, demonstrated their conviction that the maintenance of peace requires the reëstablishment of profound respect for international law and a sincere concern for the higher principles of international relationship. It is my firm belief that the agreements, resolutions and recommendations formulated and adopted at this Conference represent an important step in the direction of the reëstablishment and revitalization of international law and international order.

This profession of faith in the desirability and possibility of a world organized for peace and advancing civilization, rather than for war and degrading savagery, is applicable not only to our Hemisphere but to all other parts of the world as well. In other regions external conditions may be different somewhat from those which prevail in the American continent. The agreements and arrangements adopted by the American Republics may not, in all their detail, meet the requirements of the other continents. But the principles underlying the instruments of peace forged at the Buenos Aires Conference are universal in their application. They, within themselves, constitute an appealing invitation to all nations in all parts of the world to accept them and to accept them without delay.

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The right of each country to manage its own affairs free from outside interference; the principle of sovereignty and of equality of states, irrespective of size and strength; sincere respect for law and the pledged word as the foundation of an international order; friendly and coöperative effort to promote enduring peace; mutually advantageous economic intercourse based upon the rule of equal treatment; and mutually broadening and uplifting cultural relationships — all these are indispensable if the governments of the world are to fulfill the sacred trust involved in the task of planning and providing for the safety and welfare of their respective peoples.

The future of our entire civilization is bound up with the acceptance by all governments of these fundamental tenets of constructive statesmanship. The longer important nations delay their adoption, the graver will be the jeopardy into which all worthwhile international relationships will be plunged, and with them the welfare, the happiness and the civilized existence of all nations. A government which substitutes for these principles policies based upon extremes of national pride, ambition, aggrandizement and ever-increasing armaments, renders the greatest possible disservice not only to the world at large, but to its own people as well.

VI

The issue which confronted the American Republics at the Conference, the issue which confronts every nation of the earth, is clear. In the portentous future which lies immediately ahead, will the nations move further in the direction of increasing distrust and suspicion, of destructive commercial policy, of growing economic antagonism, of unprecedented races in armaments, of the worst extremes of militarism — and thus inevitably plunge many parts of the world either into a military catastrophe or a crushing economic collapse? Or will the nations, as at Buenos Aires, embrace a program of understanding and trust, of friendly and peaceful relations, of fair-dealing and coöperative effort for the restoration of conditions of peace and economic well-being?

So far as the Western Hemisphere is concerned, the answer has thus been given. Our own country is prepared to do its full part to bring it about that, on the basis of the arrangements reached at Buenos Aires, the nations of this continent will order their lives upon a sane balance of national freedom and practical

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international coöperation. We are confident that our sister republics will act likewise.

If we succeed, this will remain a healthy and hopeful Hemisphere. And its twenty-one nations, with their quarter of a billion inhabitants, freed by their common action from the dread and scourge of war, should be able to encourage and, to the extent consistent with their traditional policies, coöperate with other nations to surmount their difficulties by similar methods.

There is every reason to believe that friends of peace, all over the world, hitherto laboring under serious discouragement, have taken increased hope from what was said and done at Buenos Aires. It is not too much, I hope, to say that the acts and utterances of the Conference are at once a challenge to the statesmanship of the world and a heartening symbol to the peoples of all nations.

I cannot believe that it is beyond the power of the statesmen of today to check and reverse the drift toward international anarchy, in the direction of which some parts of the world find themselves moving. The work of the recent Conference proves, in my judgment, that no part of the world needs to reconcile itself fatalistically to the inevitability of war. Upon the same basic principles that were implemented at Buenos Aires, the entire world can — and, I hope with all my heart, *will* — build a structure of enduring peace.

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